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SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis is a sustained meditation on the relationship between embodiment, memory 
and cultural creativity in the black diaspora. It seeks to generate a theoretical vocabulary 
outside the stale polarisation between essentialism and anti-essentialism. Using the 
phenomenology of lived experience, I contend that black diasporic memory and identity 
are actively constructed within each present. I argue that bodily expression is part of a 
broader set of cultural strategies of self-definition, self-maintenance and self- 
preservation. In the case of the black diaspora, the past is evoked, invoked and provoked 
into existence once again through each expression of embodiment. A key concern in the 
thesis is therefore to highlight the active capacity of the body to recreate its world and in 
the process empower, renew and re-orient itself in the face of adversity and oppression. 
Rather than succumb to an account of black diasporicity as either a history of pain or the 
background of cultural hybridity, I argue that the pleasures and pains of black 
diasporicity are different aspects of the same ongoing phenomenon. Through the 
example of Jamaican dancehall culture, I show how the adorned, transgressive dancing 
body of dancehall women creates a dynamic of eroticised autonomy in an otherwise 
hostile environment. In sum, my thesis provides an analysis of the dynamics of diasporic 
identity and the antiphonies of continuity and discontinuity. 
Introduction 
Introduction 
In his essay, 'Princes and Powers' (195 1) James Baldwin asks the following question: 'For 
what beyond the fact that all black men [and women] at one time or another left Africa or 
have remained there, what do they really have in common? ' His response: 
What they held in common was their precarious, their unutterably 
painful relation to the white world. What they held in common was 
the necessity to make the world in their own image, to impose this 
image on the world, and no longer be controlled by the vision of the 
world, and of themselves, held by other people. What, in sum, black 
[people] held in common was their ache to come into the world as 
men. And this ache united people who might otherwise have been 
divided as to what man should be. (1951: 49-50) 
The question Baldwin asks about the nature of black identity and existence, and to some 
extent the answer he provides, sets the framework for this thesis. His question, 'what do 
black people have in commonT is first of all answered in negative terms: black people 
share a common history of pain imposed by white supremacist domination. If this were 
all black people had in common, black identity would surely become a myth. It is a 
tautology to say that if shared pain is the only form of sharing, then there is no sharing 
beyond this. Any suggestion of an essence to being black, whether it is laid out in 
historical, biological, cultural or any other terms, would be deconstructed once the 
realisation was made that black identity was always only ever provisional. Black identity 
would therefore be like any other form of enforced grouping unnecessary outside of the 
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confines of oppression. In this case, it would only be the ongoing and ever mutating form 
of white supremacy that guarantees black identity. 
If we look at Baldwin's response closely, we will see that his response concerning black 
commonality and identity is however more nuanced than this. Baldwin emphatically 
links the framework of a history of oppression with the project for emancipation - 'What 
they held in common was the necessity to make the world in their own image, to impose 
this image on the world, and no longer be controlled by the vision of the world, and of 
themselves, held by other people'. It is this connection between oppression and the 
exigency to act, to refuse domination that is at the core of this thesis. Like Baldwin, I 
will seek to refuse the equating of a history of suffering with powerlessness, and the 
framework of white supremacy with the ascription of a lack of agency. In sum, I shall 
argue that despite the context of existential pain and suffering, black people continue to 
strive to 'make the world in their own image'. It is this striving, and the paradigms and 
practices of creative expression that develop in its wake, that finally unites black people 
across all their differences. In this sense, Baldwin's response to the question of black 
identity points towards some of the key arguments of this thesis: the relationship between 
black history and oppression, agency and creativity amidst the pains of difference. To 
progress further, it is necessary that first of all we begin to clarify how black identity has 
been configured in theory, and furthermore the relation between this theorisation and 
power. It is only then that the work of exploring black historical agency can begin to 
unfold. 
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Identity As Power 
Theories on the formation of black identity have generally been linked with domination, 
exclusion and repression. From the exclusion of black people from citizenship because 
they were constituted as commodities, being relegated to the status of sub-person (Mills 
1998), and being constituted as the repressed of Other of the European Man (Spillers 
1987) black existence has revolved around exploitation, social inequalities, disciplinary 
control, and violence. This is not to say that these theorists have not offered powerful 
accounts of black agency and resistance. It is more the case that accounts of agency and 
resistance takes exclusion and domination as a starting point. While I would clearly not 
want to deny the existence of structures of inequality that maligns black life, I am 
unhappy with an account of agency that makes domination and oppression determinative. 
This is because such a starting point frames in advance the way in which we talk about 
agency, resistance and our capacity to change our situation. Moreover, the danger of 
such a starting point creates a situation whereby the mere existence or everyday action of 
a subordinate group is automatically seen as subversive, in some way radical and 
inherently transformative of the status quo. This is precisely the claim made by Corrie 
Claiborne in her essay Leaving Abjection: Where "Black" Meets Theory'. Claiborne 
argues that by the virtue of being born black and female, African American women 'are 
always already unstable and disruptive to the dominant structure' (1996: 34). In my view, 
there is nothing inherent about being black and female that is disruptive to the dominant 
structure. As I shall argue throughout this thesis, disruption to and transformation of 
hegemonic power structures is not automatically given. I suggest that transformation of 
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the given is a metaphysical possibility in a virtual sense that is available to all cultures. 
However, in order to fulfil this metaphysical promise there needs to be a moment of 
action, or a practice or an event or a tradition. I am suggesting that as agents embedded 
within a field of power relations we acquire various capacities which predispose us to 
respond and act in a variety of ways to structures of power towards self-autonomy and 
collective solidarity. Subversion, thus, becomes possible when there is an active 
response to this metaphysical promise. 
This brings us back to Baldwin. Given the history of domination and the continued 
injustice in the contemporary, what would it mean to theorise the agency of black identity 
using a non-oppressive, non-oppositional and non-dominating framework as a starting 
point? In other words, is it possible to theorise the constitution of black identity as a form 
of creative and generative work? 
One way of approaching this task is in terms of the relation between oppression and 
power. A major aim throughout this thesis is to contest the assumption that the history of 
oppression equates directly with the history of powerlessness. Put the other way, I will 
challenge the idea that power is necessarily a negation or violation of the agent's 
capacities for creativity. Even in extreme situations, the history of the black diaspora has 
been one where agency, collective expression are immanent to structures of oppression. 
From this perspective, identity becomes a function of experience lived through creative 
embodied praxis. To understand this more clearly, it is necessary to clarify what is meant 
by power. 
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Synthesising the theories of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty to explore how built forms of architecture and urban design mediate social 
practices of power, Kim Dovey (1999) suggests that the term "power" is widely used and 
yet misused. To avoid any misunderstanding, Dovey distinguishes between two basic 
forms of power - power to and power over. For Dovey, power to is the more 
fundamental of the two. The word derives from the Latin potere - "to be able" (the link is 
more obvious in French - where "pouvoir" still means both "to be able" and "power"). 
Power to represents the capacity to act. In contemporary terms, power to is often 
expressed as 'empowerment'. However, Dovey contends that there is a tendency to 
privilege power over as the more fundamental form. Power over refers to the ability to 
use the capacities of others to enhance one's own empowerment, and to act upon others 
through political forces, social and cultural control of the body. Again, Dovey holds that 
because we think of power in this secondary, limitative sense as primary, we tend to think 
of power and freedom as opposed. On the contrary, for Dovey, 'Oppression and 
liberation are the two sides of the power coin' (1999: 9). Following Foucault, Dovey 
holds that subjectivity is constituted around the vectors of constraint and liberty. That is, 
the subject, Foucault argues 'is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more 
autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty' (1988: 50). Throughout this 
thesis, I shall argue that power is first of all positive in form and concerns power to. Of 
course, one person's active power is another person's power over; however, we shall not 
make the mistake of confusing the one with the other, but viewing them as intertwined. 
For Foucault, power is 'a set of actions upon other actions', in which the relationship 
between acting subjects are sustained through the recognition and maintenance of the 
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subject who acts (cited in Crossley 1996: 105). In this account of power, power as 
limitation, as an external imposition, assumes a subject with the potential to act. This 
means that agency becomes a prerequisite for power as domination. 
Through the distinction between power as capacity and action, and power as limitation 
and constraint, we are already beginning to show that black identity is constituted firstly 
as a form of empowerment. That is, power in a positive sense, involving agents with the 
capacity to act, takes primacy over its obverse: power as the imprint of institutional, 
historical and cultural forces. This means that a construction of black identity emerges 
not through the logic of domination but through capacities that enables agents to alter 
their existential context and create an alternative mode of being. Later on in the thesis, I 
shall show that this positive capacity is dialogic in form, incorporating what I will call 
antiphonal processes. Black diasporic identity and experience is therefore figured in this 
thesis not in terms of oppositionality but antiphony. In order to achieve this, I will have 
to adopt a philosophical method that is conducive to these purposes. 
Why Phenomenology? 
The privilege accorded to power as empowerment and agency in this thesis is framed 
methodologically and philosophically in terms of a phenomenological approach, as 
formulated by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology is an 
appropriate method for my purposes here because it does not assume a metaphysical 
framework within which all subsequent operations take place. That is, phenomenology 
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brackets the question of subject and object, in order to address the nature of the 
phenomenon. The phenomenon is simply 'that which appears' - something which 
happens and is yet to be explained. ' The phenomenon is therefore not merely a 
subjective entity - something which appears only to the subject. On the other hand, the 
phenomenon is not merely an object - something that stands absolutely outside the 
subject. What is crucial about phenomenology is that it is about the phenomenon that 
emerges; as a philosophical method, it does not make preliminary assumptions about the 
phenonenon. Instead, the phenomenon is that which has to be explained. Neither science 
nor poetry, universal or particular, the phenomenon is simply 'that which occurs' that 
requires explanation. As I shall argue, it is precisely because phenomenology, in the 
form which is useful for my purposes here, makes no initial claims on the part of either 
the subject or the object, that both are seen to be originally and essentially intertwined. 
The key element here, as we shall see, is that of embodiment; phenomenology can think 
outside of dualist schemas of thought because it is a philosophy of lived bodily action 
(Fraleigh 1987). 
One objection to this way of characterising phenomenology would be to say that 
phenomenology's starting point - the phenomenon - must in itself involve metaphysical 
assumptions. It is through answering this objection that the radical nature of a 
phenomenological methodology begins to emerge. The only major assumption 
phenomenology makes in order to begin is that it is always existential in its scope. That 
is, phenomenology, the study of the phenomenon, always begins with the facts of our 
1A detailed account about the nature of phenomenological method is offered in the preface to Merleau- 
Ponty 's book Phenomenology of Perception (1962). 
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existence. Now, the first form of our existence is lived experience. When I wake up in 
the morning, there is a background of recognition, certain forms of discourses, certain 
forms of latent histories, which confronts me and works through me. I do not relate to 
my being a diasporic subject as an object: a historical or sociological or cultural object, 
instead, it is through my lived experience in concrete situations that I apprehend the 
facticity of my diasporicity. Through phenomenology then, the metaphysical 
assumptions regarding the status of the subject or the object is bracketed out in favour of 
the phenomenon as it appears in the midst of my existence, as a form of lived experience 
or as Lewis Gordon calls it as a "situation" (1997: 3). In sum, prior to representation, 
prior to conscious articulation even, phenomenology's central aim is to mine the rich 
layers of lived experience - of how the world appears. 
As I have indicated already, it is clear that as soon as we begin upon this 
phenomenological path, the issue of embodiment crops up. The crucial thing to 
understand is that for a phenomenologist such as Merleau-Ponty, the body is not first of 
all and most fundamentally physical. As the distinction made by feminists between "the 
body" and "embodiment" demonstrates, in existential phenomenology, the physical body 
is preceded by an entity that is embedded within a life-world or existential context. 
Moreover, for Merleau-Ponty, as we, shall see in more detail in chapter one, the body in 
this existential sense is not merely the- passive receptacle of the forces of culture and 
history, time and place. Rather, there is a reciprocal co-determination between body and 
world. While I never experience my body as an object, it can be turned into an object 
through limitations imposed by external forces so that I become alienated from my body. 
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For Sondra Horton Fraleigh, Embodiment is thus the ground for all experienced values, 
for both intimacy and alienation, freedom and limitation' (1987: 17). Furthermore, she 
suggests that the lived body is not determined by limitations - my capacity to choose and 
act allows me to create myself and attempt to change my situation. 
The emphasis on embodiment in Merleau-Ponty's thought provokes comparison with the 
work of the Foucault who stresses the role of the body in philosophy. A cursory 
interpretation of Foucault's view on the corporeal is that the body is simply "imprinted" 
upon by history and political forces - in effect, a passive tabular rasa that is re-written 
anew within each historical discontinuity (Levin 1989). It is in fact the case that 
Foucault's account offers a more nuanced account of the body (Gedalof 1999, Crossley 
1996). Although, like Foucault, Merleau-Ponty offers an account of the body that is both 
active and acted upon, the difference between them is that they emphasize different 
aspects of embodiment. As Crossley writes, 'Merleau-Ponty tends to concentrate upon 
the active pole, while Foucault tends to stress the acted-upon pole' (1996: 106). As a 
result, both theorists have been charged with either paying too much emphasis on the 
imprint of power (Foucault) or insufficient attention to the effect of power relations on 
the body (Merleau-Ponty). While I think there is a degree of validity to both these 
claims, I want to show, at least through the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, that this is 
not entirely correct. I will do this by responding to two common claims made against his 
thought. 
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First of all, to his critics, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology appears naively incapable of 
accounting for the imposition of dominant forms of power over the subject and therefore, 
incapable of showing how power works through different modes of subjectivity (see 
Burkitt 1999, Young 1989, Butler 1989). 1 would argue on the contrary that in stressing 
the primacy of power as empowerment, Merleau-Ponty offers a sophisticated account of 
how we empower ourselves in terms of freedom and historical action. Now, when 
Merleau-Ponty is charged with the failure to offer an account of power relations, what 
this means, as we have seen above, is that he does not offer an account of power as 
limitation, power as domination, power as negation. While Merleau-Ponty is 
overwhelmingly optimistic about the ways in which power works through the subject, 
this is not to say that he completely ignores the ways in which power can frame 
schematic bodily freedoms. According to , Crossley, in both Phenomenology of 
Perception (1962), and Humanism and Terror (1969), Merleau-Ponty does 'include 
consideration of the political situation of agents in relations of oppression and control' 
(1996: 105). Merleau-Ponty posits that our capacities as embodied beings are always 
embedded within historical and social life-worlds that give us certain affordances, 
directives and limitations. We can see that the relationship between power to and power 
over is already assumed in Merleau-Ponty's thought. In any case, Merleau-Ponty's critics 
are right only in the sense that the relationship between dorminant modes of power and 
agency is not fully explored when compared to Foucault's work, especially in his later 
work. Nonetheless, as I shall show, the account of power as capacity offered by Merleau- 
Ponty is particularly useful for theorising how black diasporic identity has evolved, how 
it survives, recreates itself and is manifested in the public realm. Enriching Baldwin's 
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response to the question of black identity, it allows us to understand how in each case of 
historical, socio-cultural domination, agency and action are prerequisite. While I am 
aware that this position may incur the charge of romanticisation of the subject matter 
presented in this thesis, not to insert agency and action at the centre of structures of 
domination leads inevitably to the problematic conflation of the history of oppression 
with an history powerlessness mentioned already. Moreover, it creates a situation where 
certain action by a socially dominated group is automatically assigned a subversive 
status. 
Secondly, historically, phenomenology has held the view that consciousness is 
intentional. Consciousness as intentionality, allows the perceiving subject to organise 
activities and 'stimuli according to present purposeful perception - purposeful because it 
is directed toward, and involved in, its objects' (Fraleigh 1987: 15). Edmund Husserl, the 
so-called "father of phenomenology", stressed that intentionality as construed in 
phenomenology is not psychologistic but about a universal intentionality; what he calls a 
"theoretical consciousness". While Husserlian intentionality is not psychologistic 
because it is not about individual expressions of intention, but about a universal structure, 
this move nonetheless has left many critics of phenomenology with the lingering idea that 
phenomenology is still about the individual and their intentional consciousness. 
Because of its focus on the intentional consciousness phenomenology has therefore been 
charged for being too voluntaristic or subjectivistic. I would argue that because Merleau- 
Ponty's provides an account of the co-determination between actors and world, 
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intentional agency itself is ambiguous. This ambiguity occurs in a causal sense in that 
there is no linear causality, there is no original x- whether this is a world or a person that 
starts meaning of. Instead, Merleau-Ponty's account of agency can be thought of as 
involving a loom that weaves the world into meaning. In other words, there is no one 
origin or set of effects, there is just movement, co-dependence, co-horizon and co-evality 
of being and world. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty's account of embodied intentionality is 
not individualistic or voluntaritistic in any way. Rather, his brand of phenomenology 
shows how the body's intentionality needs a situation in which to act from. However, the 
specific expressions of intentional behaviour can be disrupted or affected by the world. 
Again, the reverse is true. The individual can and is able to imprint his/her own image 
onto the world. An individual's capacity to project her image onto the world is also 
possible precisely because the world is receptive to that projection at that particular 
moment. From this perspective, we are forced to rethink hegemonic power structures 
such as patriarchy and white supremacy as necessarily imprinting itself on a passive 
body. Rather than viewing these systems as revolving around a master plan or blue print 
that is imposed, it is more productive to look at how groups and agents generate certain 
autonomous patterns of being, producing sites of struggle, contestation and 
transformation. In other words, complicity and freedom of autonomy, freedom to act 
differently is always available within each existential context. 
12 
Introduction 
Telling Stories 
Having said all the above, it is however important not to underestimate the relationship 
between power and the history. As a general tendency, written history is a reconstruction 
and representation of the past filtered through the lens of the dominant group (Nora 1989) 
in an attempt to 'make the world in their own image'(Baldwin 1951: 49-50). According 
to Pierre Bourdieu, history is the effort by 'monopolistic power to impose [their] 
legitimate categories of perception and appreciation' (1993: 106) onto the world. 
Legitimacy is often derived primarily through the valorisation of textual or inscriptive 
modes as a reliable source for the transmission of the past and in its wake the 
preservation of hegemonic worldview. Such a way of construing the history of a people 
is however put into crisis by what Kirsten Hastrup terms "Other histories" (1992). 
Conventional history becomes the history of crisis - the crisis of violating experience and 
difference. It is therefore not a coincidence that part of feminists and black theorists' 
project has been to contest the selective telling and representation of stories about the 
past. In different ways, they have argued that orthodox historiographies have neglected 
the role played by women, black people and differently marginalised groups in the 
production, transmission and transformation of cultural traditions. For feminists, this 
action is undertaken not without recognising the diversities among women that 
necessitate attention to women's multiple and changing histories. 
One of the forms this undermining of the relationship between power and history has 
taking is through personal testimony. For example, the "slave narrative" contests a 
13 
Introduction 
universal meaning for slavery through the recording of the intricacies of an individual life 
and thus a reconfiguration of slavery (Morrison 1990). In her work on the Brazilian 
dance form Samba, Barbara Browning writes that beyond the inscriptive mode, the black 
diaspora has used dance as a 'form of cultural record keeping' (1995: xxiii). In the 
context where the telling of history is aligned with the power over another, it becomes 
imperative to tell invisible histories, subcultural activities and other forms that are not 
recognised as part of official history. In this thesis, through focusing on the agency of 
black subjectivity as expressed in such cultural form as Jamaican dancehall culture, I am 
attempting to challenge and change the way in which, through the filter of history, we 
discuss the agency of the oppressed. For example, if we take the experience of women in 
dancehall culture, and position them simply as the victim of patriarchal power because of 
the misogyny and homophobia of the predominately male DJs, then we reproduce that 
patriarchal power at the level of historical discourse itself. In so doing, what women do 
and how they respond to the culture is effectively silenced or encountered only through 
the stories of the male DJs. However, once we actually start to talk about what they did, 
the rituals they constructed, the patterns of movement they choreographed, the way they 
adorned themselves, through historical discourse, we start to actually challenge certain 
conceptions of agency itself. 
Through rethinking historical action, we begin to see how the way we tell a story about 
history often reflects the way we think about agency. One example that comes to mind is 
around the writing of black female sexuality in slavery. In her text Ain't IA Woman: 
Black Women and Feminism, bell hooks suggest that the sexual universe of the enslaved 
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female is one of sexual violence and domination. She argues that The female slave lived 
in constant awareness of her sexual vulnerability and in a perpetual fear that any male, 
white or black, might single her out to assault and victimize (1982: 24). This image of a 
victim of sexual oppression dominates writings on the black woman in slavery. While 
sexual domination was a significant part of the slave history, writers such as Nancie 
Caraway (1991) and Barbara Omolade (1983) suggest that this did not define entirely 
black female sexuality. Citing the work of Omolade, Caraway points to a more 
complicated sexual universe where the female slave was entangled within a 'web of 
cruelty and pleasure, love and hate' (1991: 84). She suggests that in any account of 
enslaved female sexuality we need to have two pictures in our imagination 
simultaneously. One of enslaved females as 'victims of systematic sexual violence, as no 
other American women have been'and the more uncomfortable perspective of a 'sexual 
agents [ ... ] who brought their erotic power to the beds of both white and Black lovers' 
(ibid: 84). In this way, black female sexual history is not wholly defined by oppression 
and the cruelty of slavery, but of a history reflecting 'the juncture where the public and 
private spheres, as well as personal and political oppression, meet' (Caraway 1991: 85). 
These two accounts then boil down to how a particular person or group acted and 
responded to events within their world historical culture and the way in which subsequent 
generation retell the story. Here then, history becomes less about public events and grand 
achievements and more about how they relate to private acts. 
Therefore, if I privilege the agency of the black diaspora to act differently or against the 
grain of normative imposition, it is because I want to redraw our starting point for 
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theorising agency. In this way, the starting point for agency does not rely upon an 
originary violation and domination, but on the agents capacities to act in a world that is 
both constituting and constitutive through antiphonal processes. 
Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter One, I develop a number of opening thoughts and themes that frame my 
general argument throughout this thesis. I begin by outlining the notion of diaspora as it 
currently circulates in contemporary critical theory. I then develop a critique of this by 
suggesting that it lacks an adequate account of embodiment as it relates to experience of 
dislocation. In so doing, I argue for the primacy of the body as an index of lived 
experience and its relation to issues of emotions. I develop this argument through a focus 
on the phenomonology of Merleau-Ponty, suggesting that his account of embodiment as 
the locus of being-in-the-world allows us to think about a diasporic identity that is 
grounded within the layers of tradition, and therefore enables us to see how dispossession 
impact upon the emotional horizon of dispossessed people. I will claim that in a sense, 
Merleau-Ponty's thought allows for a delimitation of corporeal freedom, which once 
violated by the historical event of transportation, enslavement and colonisation, has the 
effect of altering how we understand the black experience. The importance of Merleau- 
Ponty is finally challenged by the work of Frantz Fanon. I will show how Fanon 
introduces the idea of a historico-racial schema which undercuts the freedom of the 
corporeal schema assumed by Merleau-Ponty. Fanon argues that the freedom and 
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autonomous agency assumed in Merleau-Ponty's notion is undermined by the violence of 
race. 
Having set the stage of this study, chapter two concentrates on the origin and evolution of 
black diasporic identity. This question is taken up through the role ships and the Middle 
Passage has played in the formation of black diasporic identity as figured in the work of 
two key thinkers of the black diasporia: Hortense Spillers and Paul Gilroy. Spillers 
proposes a violent discontinuity between an African origin and a New World home that is 
severed by the ships in the Middle Passage. Discontinuity here operates as a violation 
upon what would have been a continued tradition with a fixed origin. I contest this view 
by suggesting that discontinuity is not absolute. Rather, the Middle Passage and the ship 
provide a different way of conceptualising origin and tradition. In order to further this 
criticism, I discussed the figuration of the ship as explored by Gilroy. Gilroy relates 
specific historical journeys and crossings in order to construct an account of the 
contemporary diasporic situation as a complex medium of exchange - the Black Atlantic. 
I take issue with this position by returning to Spillers' attention to historical specificity. I 
then begin to outline a third position between Spillers' absolute rupture constitutive of 
the Black Atlantic experience and Gilroy's painless relativism by introducing questions 
of memory and antiphony. 
Chapter three explores and substantiates the questions of memory raised in the second 
chapter. I argue that we can understand the performance of everyday 
life in black 
diasporic cultures only through attention to memoration and rememoration. 
Memory 
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here does not involve a privileged past nor is it a cognitive representation, rather it is an 
index of the conditions of the present being-in-the-world. Memory therefore operates 
through its capacity to articulate contemporary demands. In this thesis diasporic black 
memory is presented as a rhythmic-gestural pattering in order to explore how the black 
diaspora expresses and articulates its historical, cultural and social world. I do this by 
outlining aspects of African formal structures animating and inflecting black diasporic 
expressive cultures. Having explored how memories become embodied and are linked to 
the taking up of these African formal structures in the diaspora, towards the end, I start to 
suggest that these formal elements can only be meaningful when they are located within 
the existential context of each diasporic community. 
In the fourth chapter I expand this point by arguing that the reworking, transformation 
and rehearsing of complex socio-economic and cultural positioning in the black diaspora 
is expressed through the celebration and performance of the adorned dancing body. I do 
so by performing a reading of Jamaican Ragga Dancehall culture which reads it as an 
attempt by participants to re-write and re-claim their body as a site of erotic recognition 
and desire in an effort to reconstruct and remake their world in a world indifferent to their 
plight. I argue that the carnivalesque excess of the culture has to be understood as a 
response to the conditions of their experience. This response is predicated on the attempt 
to create alternative survival strategy. In this chapter the issue of the relationship 
between survival and the imagination is explored. I will argue that within this culture 
survival is not grounded in the satisfaction of physical needs (alone), rather, survival is 
about desire and the limits of the imagination. It is about desiring to desire; to be given 
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the freedom to desire. It is about becoming autonomous and becoming what one can 
become. Women in dancehall push beyond the limits of material survival towards an 
imaginative potential. It is at this point that the imagination leads to subversion, 
perversion, vulgarisation and an aestheticisation of the ugly. Such a reading will allow us 
to explain how adornment, fetishism, excess, exaggerated dance movements operate 
among those with so little. 
Questions of visibility and invisibility are important in any understanding of the diasporic 
situation of black people. Existing accounts of vision have been decidedly negative 
(often with good reason). In the final chapter, using dance as a paradigm for motility, I 
challenge the dualist ontology of the gaze in Fanon's text which assumes a negative 
relationship between subject and object. I suggest that the motile body in dance can 
disrupt the Fanonian racial gaze (thereby resisting the power and fixity that has been 
accorded the gaze). I show that Merleau-Ponty offers a more redemptive alternative to 
the paralysis of the gaze proposed by Fanon. Here, the gaze offers a potential for erotic 
communication and mutual recognition through shared signification. I offer a detailed 
phenomenological analysis of the film Dancehall Queen in light of this mutuality. 
I 
argue that the dancer in the film teases the gaze, her performance subverts the power 
relations of the gaze and transforms it into one of mutual interaction, in a way that 
blurs 
the distinction between the spectator and the actor. Through what I am calling the 
'female rebuff' the dancer communicates directly back to and with the audience. 
In this 
way, the power relations of 'the gaze' that are often assumed 
in contemporary film theory 
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are challenged, and a more ambiguous, antiphonal account of looking relations is inserted 
as its alternative. 
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Chapter 1: 'The World is Our Market, Heaven is Home': Embodiment 
and Diasporicity 
An imagined, all too real dialogue: 
"Where are you from? " 
"London" 
"No, but where are you really from? " 
"Stoke Newington II 
"Okay, your parents, where are they from? " 
"Same-place I am from" 
"What about your grandparents, where are they from? " - and it goes on, and on! 
Diaspora and embodiment: two terms that have separately gained currency in 
contemporary critical thought. However, the relations between them have yet to be 
explicitly explored. This is the task ahead. Diaspora describes the dispersion of a group 
from an "original" emplacement. What is key is that this movement away from and to a 
place can only be understood via a third mediating term: the body or embodiment. In my 
view we can no longer continue to theorise these terms in an adequate way without 
acknowledging their material and conceptual interrelatedness. Place and body support 
and belong to each other. As Edward Casey notes, 'there is no place without body - 
without the physical or psychical traces of body - so there is no body without place' 
(Casey 1993: 104 author's emphasis). Bodies shift in meaning as they shift in place; and 
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'are marked as different and often as negatively different to the dominant cultural system' 
in which they are located, 'producing a dissonance or gap between one's practices and 
affects' (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 704). Places construct the body and are constructed 
in turn by embodied lived experience. For example, the black female body signifies 
differently in London, Lagos, Cuba, or Jamaica. According to Radhika Mohanram, In 
each situation the signifier black'resonates with the history, culture and power dynamics 
that are particular to that place' (1999: 52). Although this is the case, one would never 
guess from perusing recent studies on diasporicity. Rather, one never fails to encounter 
the familiar litany of relational terms which refer to (without unpacking) body-place 
dynamics such as borders, deterritorialisation, displacement, hybridity, multi-locality and 
the politics of location, as though there is an anxiety about missing something out. Or, 
when the litany is not in view, there is an attempt to distinguish between theory, 
discourse and the historical experience of diaspora (Clifford 1994, Brah 1996). Such 
approaches will remain abstractions unless they are returned to the body that grounds 
them. 
As an example of such abstraction, in his essay Diaspora'. James Clifford observes that 
the rise of the concept of diaspora in critical theory requires a distinction to be made 
between "diaspora theories", "diasporic discourses" and "distinct historical experiences of 
diaspora" (1994: 244). He admits, however, that it is difficult to maintain them in any 
absolute terms because they slide into each other. He argues that this slippage concerns 
the different conceptual and physical maps and histories in which the terms are 
embedded. For instance, to theorise the Black 
diaspora is to begin to engage with the 
22 
Chapter 1: Embodiment and Diasporicity 
Middle Passage of slavery, racial capitalism, colonial pillaging, post-colonial conditions 
and contemporary European racism. This engagement also requires attention to be paid 
to the violent representational regimes that legitimatise such activities, as well as the 
spiritual and psychic effects on the experience of those under its ruse. For Avtar Brah 
(1996) however, it is precisely because of these slippages between the historical, the 
conceptual and the experiential, that it becomes necessary to map out the usefulness and 
the limits of the word. This, Brah argues, allow us to understand its theoretical purchase. 
While these distinctions are important for heuristic purposes, the reasons and motivations 
for the distinctions remain unclear. 
In this chapter, I will argue that the distinctions offered by Brah and Clifford inter alia 
can only be resolved by a return in theory to the body-place dynamics that ground 
experience. I want to suggest that the Black diaspora, or any other diaspora for that 
matter, must be understood first of all as felt, lived and experienced corporeally. That is, 
to theorise the evolution of the black diaspora in the Western Hemisphere involves 
examining how the sinister power of white supremacy has organised and modified the 
lived and living body of experience through a denial of black humanity (Gordon 1995). 
As we shall see, the African body is inserted into European discourse as a lack, a 
savage/exotic other, a sub-human economic and ideological category devoid of any 
history (Wolfe 1982, Fanon 1961, Mills 1998). These factors influence the construction 
of diasporic black identity. However, and in line with the argument throughout this thesis, 
the black body must not be seen solely as the passive victim of white supremacist power. 
Rather, by drawing upon resources from their African past, as wells as their encounters 
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with other cultures in the New World, diasporic Africans actively contest the inscription 
and forces of white supremacist power. Paget Henry has written that the European 
evasion of black humanity was met with a corresponding reassertion of black humanity. 
Europeans and Afro-Caribbeans'he argues 'were increasingly locked into a historically 
structured game of imperial and anti-imperial struggle' (1997a: 27). Moreover, as 
Alphonso Lingis has written, 'Bodies that are forcibly subjected produce power in their 
turn, devise their evasions, resistance, snares, ambushes, ruses and mockeries; they 
signal, feint, and delude'(1994: 54). From the revolutionary act of the Haitian Jacobins 
described by C. L. R James (1963) to slave poisoning (Bush 1990) and religious and 
expressive cultural forms (Robinson 1983), black diasporic agents continue to confin-n 
the ontological inseparability of freedom and constraint. The presence of and various 
projects by black diasporic agents to assert the agency of their humanity in the New 
World thus introduce fissure and contradiction into white enlightenment project (Walker 
1993, Gilroy 1993), thereby transforming it in radical ways through cultural syncretism 
(Mintz and Price 1976). In so doing, the course of (diasporic) historical action itself is 
altered. 
The black diaspora must therefore be seen as denoting a relational network of experiences 
that are sited in and through the body. Whether this experience is of colonial brutality or 
the resistance against that scene of 'pure physical experience of negation' (Scarry 1985: 
52), it is the body that experiences and rejects these forces. My core argument is that the 
lived, situated, powerful body is the activational site of black diasporic experience and all 
its constitutive elements: memory and tradition, repetition and difference, melancholy 
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and nostalgia, continuity and mutation, emplacement and displacement, pain and 
pleasure, space and spacing, roots and routes, time and timing. ' Throughout this chapter 
and the rest of the thesis, I emphasis that diaspora is not an abstract relation concerning 
the spacing of the subject across time; rather, diasporicity is registered in every gesture, 
movement and comportment of the diasporic body. Diasporicity engages actual motile 
bodies and bodily practices which have been (actually or by association) "rooted" in a 
place, and which by being uprooted and re-routed to another place produce a sort of dis- 
positioning and re-positioning. Embodied orientations are dis-oriented, and bodies of 
culture can no longer continue as they did. Or rather, they have to be reoriented and 
remobilised afresh in each new location. As I shall show, this imperative to rework a 
cultural patterning according to its new context always involves a relationship between 
the remembrance of traces of the "old" practices and the process of engagement, 
interaction with and (re)reading of the new situation. This ability to extend and transform 
itself, I will argue in the thesis, is part of the rich African cultural legacy that was 
transported, brewed and transformed in the diasporic situation (Simone 1989). The 
relationship between African trace structures and New World encounters is clearly 
illustrated in Stuart Hall's account of black Caribbean identities. Hall writes, 
we might think of black Caribbean identities as Tramed'by two axes or 
vectors, simultaneously operative: the vector of similarity and continuity; 
and the vector of difference and rupture. Caribbean identities always 
11 am thinking here about the non-linear and disjunctive temporality expressed in James Snead's notion of 
the "cut" in his discussion of the use of repetition in black cultures. The "cut" is a beat that continually cuts 
back to its begin but with a new take. 
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have to be thought of in terms of the dialogic relationship between these 
two axes. The one gives us some grounding in, some continuity with the 
past. The second reminds us that what we share is precisely the 
experience of a profound discontinuity: the peoples dragged into slavery, 
transportation, colonisation, migration, came predominately from Africa. 
(1990: 226-227) 
This chapter suggests that recent theoretical perspectives on black diasporic identity lack 
an account of embodiment and the way it grounds social practices, experiences, relations 
of power and habits of being. Theorising the diasporic experience, we are forced to 
engage with and acknowledge the living body of experience. Failure to do this, I suggest, 
results in a situation whereby the ontological imperatives for the physical and psychic 
effects of rootedness and routedness cannot in any meaningful way be adequately 
addressed. This is apparent in Brah's (1996) inability to substantiate the reasons and 
motives for the distinctions she makes between the conceptual, experiential and 
discursive aspects of diaspora. Of course, she begins to allude towards this when she 
calls for a multi-axial performative conception of power. However, her text remains 
overly abstract. Only by theorising the embodied diasporic agent can we be clear as to 
why such distinctions are made and why the experience of displacement can be 
experienced with such 'ambiguity and anguish' (Berman 1983: 15 my emphasis). 
Ontology, or at least a social ontology, the study of the "being" of diasporic agents, 
allows for a comprehension of its attendant emotions that is more than just psychologistic 
or individualistic. The emotions of diaspora are diagrams of the deep intertwining 
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between dis/placement and its effects on reflective and pre-reflective accounts of the self. 
That is, auto-constructions of the self or community of selves are affected by the 
emotions or moods produced through displacement. Emotion', according to M. L. Lyon 
and J. M. Barbalet 'is precisely the experience of embodied sociality' (1994: 48). On a 
philosophical level then, I argue for an ontological. structure to diaspora. This enables me 
to make a general claim about a construction of subjectivity and identity that is neither 
rooted in fixity nor dissipated as a form of deterritorialised nomadism. Moreover, when 
we begin to understand diasporicity as an ontological condition, the full force of the 
damaging consequences and violence of transportation, enslavement and indifference to 
black humanity comes into sharp relief. Again, I will reiterate that on an experiential 
level, this way of conceptualising identity works through the body. Discursively, bodies 
are encoded into a world and ways of being that organise it. For the diasporic black 
body, this organisation bears a distanced and deferred relation to a (real or an imaginary) 
home. I do so by offering a phenomenology of diaspora. By referring to 
"phenomenology" here, I hope to emphasise the phenomenon of embodied experience 
over and against its more abstract conceptualisations. Diasporic black identity is written 
on the surface of the body and it is read through it. Beyond this, I will in moments of this 
chapter be engaging directly with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his 
book 
Phenomenology of Perception (1962). 
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The Field of Diaspora 
Recent efforts to find new models for understanding changes in social, territorial and 
cultural reproduction of group identity (Appadurai 1996: 48) have resulted in the 
proliferation of movement metaphors: hybridity, border, transcultural, intermixture, 
politics of location and diaspora. In this section I focus on diaspora because in a sense it 
references all the above. Diaspora is an ancient term generally associated with the 
historic experience of the Jews after a forced expulsion from their "historic homeland" 2 
and their dispersion across many lands, wherein exile (Galut) had become a way of life 
and (death) itself (Kitaj 1989: 35, Blanchot 1969). But as Kitaj states 'Jews do not own 
Diaspora; they are not the only diasporists by a long shot' (1989: 21). Although its 
association with a Jewish historical complex remains, diaspora now articulates 'a 
discourse that is travelling or hybridising in new global conditions' (Clifford 1994: 249). 
Or as Khachig T616lian observes, the term now 'shares meanings with a larger semantic 
domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile 
community, overseas community, ethnic community' (1991: 4-5). For Clifford, this 
severing from its historical mooring can be attributed to changes brought about by 
decolonisation and technological innovations which 'encourage multilocal attachments, 
dwelling, and travelling within and across nations' (1994: 249). 
2Some writers have began to suggest that 'an alternative story of Israel, closer it would seem, to the 
readings of Judaism lived for two thousands years, begins with a people forever unconnected with a 
particular land, a people that calls into question the idea that a people must have a land in order to be a 
people' (Boyrains 1993: 718). This assertion is a challenge to the monolithic, destructive and violent 
territorialism of Zionists claim of an original homeland. Citing Davis, the Boyrains suggest that the state of 
Israel was created by Jews in exile. For the father of Jewry, 
Abraham was deterritorialized. 
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For many diaspora theorists, the voguish appeal of the term has to do with the fact that it 
offers a novel way of understanding new forms of sociality and experience that registers 
'a spatialised politics of identity grounded in a particular notion of space' (Keith and Pile 
1993: 20). In so doing, the concept of diaspora has the potential to challenge identities 
constructed around the nation-state, racial purity, patriarchal ideals and essentialising 
discourses of origin and home. For Gilroy, one of the values of the term is that it'breaks 
the dogmatic focus on discrete national dynamics which has characterised so much 
modem Euro-American cultural thought' (1993: 6). Several writers, however, have 
began to suggest that diaspora can and often does become the very site for the re- 
articulation and perpetuation of such discourses (Hall 1990, Grewal 1994, Clifford 1994, 
Dhaliwal 1994). These writers suggest that people often become more self-consciously 
nationalistic when they move away from their locus of origin than when they stay at 
home. This is especially the case when diasporicity is chauvinistically aligned to a notion 
of a lost origin or a trans-historical essential unity and therefore 'the need to recover a 
homeland or identity' (Wollen 1994: 189). In so doing, it can provide 'the fuel for new 
ethnic conflicts' (Appadurai 1996: 49). However, when not equated with a chauvinistic 
celebration or yearning for land, dispersion, according to Blanchot, 'also clears the way 
for a different exigency and finally forbids the temptation of Unity-Identity' (1969: 126). 
As such, it has the capacity to generate and explain new forms of sociality, which are 
connected to trans-national flows of people, information communication technologies, 
capital, goods and cultural forms. These forms are an outcome of the search for profit by 
trans-national corporations, who transform, often with negative effect, traditional ways of 
living. According to Robin Cohen, the emergence and impact of new technology on 
29 
Chapter 1: Embodiment and Diasporicity 
social and spatial relations means that Iransnational bonds no longer have to be cemented 
by migration or by exclusive territorial claims'(1996: 516). In this way, 'a diaspora can, 
to some degree, be held together or re-created through the mind, through artefacts and 
through shared imagination' (ibid: 516). 
Diasporas articulate the unfolding of multiple, difficult and sensuous narratives of speech 
and body, of identities, desires and communities on the make. They involve journeys 
people sustain by myths and stories of an original shared homeland and communal 
memory, without necessarily nurturing dreams of a physical return (although physical 
return is a central feature of diaspora). Clifford has suggested that while the evocation of 
an originary, pristine communal culture is often important to diasporic communities, 'a 
shared, ongoing history of displacement, suffering, adaptation, or resistance may be as 
important as the projection of a specific origin'(1994: 250). 
These narratives of ongoing oppression, personal ordeal, and communal solidarity in the 
creation and transformation of groups must be distinguished from the voguish elitism of 
the global currency of the postmodern, fragmented, ungendered nomadic subject (Wolff 
1993, hooks 1991). The diasporic subject should not be put in close company with the 
ideal of the jet-set, multi -pas sported (often white) western traveller (Gedalof 1996), for 
whom the experience of crossing borders is purely pleasurable, a genteel form of 'eating 
the other' (hooks 1992, Mohanram 1999). Diasporas are not the same as casual, self- 
exploratory forms of travel; they are journeys people are forced to make. They 'are 
essentially about settling down, about putting roots "elsewhere"' (Brah 1996: 182). The 
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crossing of borders for those bound to diaspora, is more likely to involve immigration 
anxieties - the refusal of visas, detention, waiting, rejection, expulsion - rather than the 
prospect of a pleasurable consumption of alterity. Inaugurated by forced migration, 
economic necessity and cultural imperialism, "travel", according to bell hooks, is not a 
word that can easily be evoked about the Black diaspora (1991). This is not to say that 
diasporic black agents have not engaged in travels that are associated with questions of 
self-expl oration into new territories (Gilroy 1993). Rather, a distinction needs to be made 
between forms of travel and the status of the travellers within the imagination of their 
host culture, as well as their social positioning in their country of origin. 
The black diaspora refers to the cultures, identities, spaces and memories that were 
created as a result of whole-scale commerce in African bodies and the flow of ideas and 
information across the Atlantic Ocean. Central to the notion are words like "origin", 
"departure", "voyage", "arrival", "residence", "search", "loss", "longing", "memory", 
"continuity and discontinuity". They are words that resonate in all experience of 
journeys, issues that any traveller must confront and contend with. They force us to ask 
questions about the motives, the purpose, and the conditions of the journey as well as the 
experiences of arrival and settlement (Selvon 1956). However, for communities forced 
onto the road or sea, such enquiry prompts a variety of questions. These questions are 
embedded in complex factors which involve histories and experience of racial violence, 
economic and cultural colonisation, global capital forces and multiple forms of migration. 
These experiences are embodied and embedded in racist discourses where race is 
inscribed on the skin. Increasingly, these questions are further complicated by the 
31 
Chapter 1: Embodiment and Diasporicity 
resurgence in the over-developed countries of selective policies that make a division 
between skilled and unskilled prospective immigrants. Encountering such questions 
requires us to attend to the following issues: of landing, of falling, of failing, of being 
"Othered", of displacement, of restlessness, of feeling un-settled and then perhaps 
reaching an "eventual" rest, and a new home. This has created a situation, even a feeling, 
where hope and hopelessness, fear and desire, security and insecurity, pain and pleasure, 
loss and longing, are both a menacing and pleasurable reality for the black diasporic 
subject. These emotions are responses every diasporic subject faces - consciously or 
unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly. 
It is therefore important to stress that diasporic journeys, if not the outcome of genocide, 
persecution, slavery, indentureship or ineffable terrors, are often at the least movements 
forced by the global flow of labour caused by the "debt boomerang" (George 1992). It is 
within the context of these painful trajectories that black diasporic communities are 
formed and multiple attachments and "lateral" connections are forged (Clifford 1994). 
These uprootings have meant that, out of necessity, they rework and transform their 
cultures and the "host" cultures (Sobel 1987), and bear witness to the unfolding of new, 
multiple and sensuous as well as dreadful cultural narratives. 
Of course it is necess ary to emphasise the specific trajectories that have helped to 
'similarise and differentiate between and across changing diasporic constellations' (Brah 
1996: 183), without which we are unable to specify the relations of power that have 
produced them. Brah has usefully reminded us that differences in socio-economic capital 
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and modes of arrival have different effects on how diasporic communities navigate and 
negotiate the host culture. For example, she highlights the need to make a distinction 
between South Asians from the sub-continent and East African Asians (who are products 
of a double diasporicity). Such distinctions allow us to understand the complex responses 
to the reality of poverty (or otherwise), the agony of uprootedness, isolation from other 
segments of their communities and the attendant exclusion and inclusion from the civic 
life of the host culture within different diasporic groups. 
Spatialising Diasporic Temporality 
If we accept then that diaspora and diasporic experiences involve the difference of 
geography (in the literal sense of writing the earth) and history and the experience of 
displacement, its binding reference cannot necessarily be equated with the "original" 
home. The original home itself is always displaced by time and the space of the present. 
Diasporic communities develop and diverge from the culture of origins as the original 
culture shifts and is preserved in archaic or transformed way in its diasporic sites (see 
Wamer-Lewis 1991 & 1996, Houk 1995). This calls for a different account of origin, of 
home, and all that is associated with it: cultural expressions, artefacts, gender norms and 
meanings. For example, among the Yorubas of Western Nigeria, in the edun drumming 
ensemble, the lead drum is known as Iya Ru (the mother drum) and it is the most 
important of the ensemble. All the drums in an ensemble are tied or set to a particular 
tone, and they act as accompaniment to the Iya flu which is untied. This allows the 
player to vary the tone and to instruct the other drummers and the dancers alike. 
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However, as this drumming technique travelled across the ocean, the mother drum is 
transmogrified by gender into the "master drum", reflecting the cultural values of its new 
location. Any account of origin then, must have at its core a differentiation that is 
perpetually unfolding across history and geography. Therefore, the motivation in the 
present to "repeat the same" of what is past or revisit the ancestral home becomes at the 
least problematical, if not impossible. The original home cannot be recreated as a perfect 
copy because it always exists at an insurmountable distance. As Stuart Hall writes, 'The 
original 'Africa' is no longer there. It too has been transformed. History is, in that sense, 
irreversible' (1990: 231). 
However, it is necessary to recognise that this claim about the impossibility of returning 
home is often resisted within diasporic groups by redemptive discourses of home as the 
promised land. In such cases, the imagined ancestral home is invested with mythic value. 
For example, G. C. Montilus (1993) recounted two contrasting Haitian stories that have 
persisted as enduring truths about Africa. When a man wishes to boast about his valour 
he would claim that he was neg Ginni (a black person from Guinea); and if this man 
wants to insult another, he would refer to him as a neg Congo (a black person from 
Congo). In this story, "Guinea" symbolises the mythical origin of valour and virtue 
whereas "Congo" personifies meekness and docility. Montilus notes that these 
contrasting myths each allude to 'a mythical place of origin that had became an ideal of 
resistance against slavery, its suffering, and its humiliation' (ibid). Guinea is seen as the 
site for an eventual return which will secure identity. It is often assumed that such a 
security will involve a journey back home 'even if it means pushing other people into the 
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sea' (Hall 1990: 235). For Hall, such a conceptualisation of a return is 'the old, the 
imperialising, the hegemonising, form of 'ethnicity'. We have seen the fate of the people 
of Palestine at the hands of this backward-looking conception of diaspora - and the 
complicity of the West with it' (ibid: 235). 
One of the values of current writing on diaspora lies in arguing against discourses that 
prescribe a return to the original home. In doing so, writers such as Brah, Hall and 
Clifford propose that such discourses cannot completely conceal the fact that the 
conditions of displacement - forced labour and migration, indentureship, racial 
capitalism, colonisation and imperialism - constitute a critical matrix in which diasporic 
cultures were produced (Kelley and Lemelle 1994: 9). Failure to recognise this 
constitutive matrix can often lead to those discourses having a distorted conception of 
history. Here, we have only to cite the example of a history passed through the 
redemptive filter of a certain form of afrocentric discourse in which an idyllic-Kemitic 
unchanging, timeless Africa is propagated. This notion of an unmediated primordial 
continuity between pre-European colonial Africa to the present in Afrocentric discourse 
is one of the key targets of Paul Gilroy's critique in his book The Black Atlantic: 
Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993). While Gilroy recognises the 'lingering 
power of specifically racialised forms of power and subordination' (Gilroy ibid: 32-49) 
motivating this desire for a return to an idyllic past, he nonetheless denounces 
Afrocentrism as a 'poor basis for the writing of cultural history and the calculation of 
political choices' (ibid: 188). 1 suggest, however, that recourse to essentialism and 
fantasies of a glorious past must not be read entirely negatively or dismissively - they are 
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symptoms and responses to a white racist hegemony which continues to be a menace to 
black humanity (Chrisman 1997, Lipsitz 1995). Following Jacqueline Rose's work in 
States of Fantasy (1996), Alasdair Pettinger suggests that the recent focus on the 
invention of traditions and imagined communities has created an environment where the 
psychic and unconscious forces that shape cultural constructions have not received the 
attention they deserve. He argues that the construction of elaborate fantasy in 
remembrance, 
is testimony to the effects of the trauma of dispossession. It gives rise to 
absolutist yearnings for justice that take (often violent) forms that we 
cannot easily control. The attempt to come to terms with the inheritance 
of "racial terror" in more reasonable, non-nationalistic ways, are harder 
than is commonly supposed. (1998: 145) 
What must be demonstrated is that diasporic cultures and identities are not produced or 
sustained by a direct and unchanging relation to a territory across time. However, the 
national culture of each diasporic African community cannot be ignored in favour of an 
abstract trans-nationalism as championed by Gilroy. Even when we travel beyond our 
national border or local context, we still carry the politics and the poetics of our local 
context into our various trans-national zones. According to Hortense Spillers our 
experience of the global is reflected and refracted through the national culture and the 
national moment (1998: 7). In fact, it is through attention to the national context and our 
embeddedness within it that we can begin to assert ourselves on the international stage 
and can initiate a dialogue beyond the frontiers of our own national context. Lipsitz 
makes the point succinctly: 
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Recourse to the strategic essentialism of black nationalism in the US has 
frequently enabled a people under siege to transform themselves from a 
despised cultural minority to part of a global majority, to render the terms 
and conditions of white supremacy in the US relative, provisional, and 
contingent rather than absolute. The generations of African Americans in 
slavery and in freedom who buried their dead facing Africa and who 
placed broken glass on their graves in the African manner reminded 
themselves of their history before captivity and slavery. They were not 
engaging in essentialism: on the contrary, their actions reminded them of 
the historical - and therefore changeable - nature of their bondage. (1995: 
197) 
In diasporic communities the building blocks of identity are always being renewed and 
recreated, according to the needs and demands of each new moment or cultural regimes 
and in the intersection between the national context and trans-national zones. The 
relationship to a territory is an index of the interplay between imagination and memory 
and the reconfiguration of practice as demanded by the situation. From here, diasporic 
cultures and identities acquire their meaning, and that meaning gets transformed and 
projected back into the world. For example, places - like Brick Lane in London or the 
Porte de Clignanourt in Paris - absolutely lose any unified meaning that might have been 
ascribed to them, through the infusion of migrant cultures. As the current site of the 
newly arrived Bangladeshi migrant community, Brick Lane continues its historical 
absorption or gathering of migrant communities: the site of an earlier settlement for 
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Huguenots and European Jews. Their cultural practices and traces of texture and aroma 
are woven into the fabric of contemporary Brick lane: Bagel shops, textiles, bric-a-brac, 
street signs now written in foreign script. Here we see the sensuous and material 
interaction between body and place. As Casey writes, lived bodies serve both to animate 
and to connect places' (1993: 73) with the cultural habits of earlier communities. 
Diasporic bodies thus scatter, gather and transform the meaning and texture of places as 
they scatter and gather themselves across the planet. It is this dynamic of creating 
cultures in diverse locations that enables diasporic communities to construct a bridge 
back to "home". In many cases there is an acknowledgement that this bridge involves a 
crossing, an interval of different existential conditions. For instance, the recent Yoruba 
and Akan pirate radio station Empire Radio' in London reports and relays stories of 
unfolding dramas in Nigeria and Ghana respectively. It also offers directives and 
resources about conditions in the new home and ways of "mastering" and negotiating it: 
such as language-training, supplementary schools, jobs and training, business 
opportunities and moral guidance. Implicit within Empire Radio's output is a crossing or 
interval between conditions back home and conditions of diaspora. One presenter 
advises his listeners: We are a long way from home. Husband, support your wife with 
childcare. Wife, support your husband with putting bread on the table so that your stay 
here will be of harmony. We are a long way from home. We don't know the date of our 
return! ' This was immediately followed by the Nigerian Juju musician Chief Ebenzer 
Obey singing: "Adversity makes man travel far away from home". Obey sums up how 
many members of the Yoruba and Akan diaspora understand their situation. 
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Diaspora always evokes questions about the practices of remembrance, separation, 
anxiety, loss, freedom and new habits of being. A theological dimension (again grounded 
in the connection between diaspora and stories of the Pentateuch) is ever-present: that of 
eschatology and soteriological return. "Babylon" and the Promised Land are the repeated 
tropes of black diasporic discourse especially amongst Rastafarians (Smith et. al 1960, 
Chevannes 1994). Diasporas are also the sites for the unleashing of imaginative futural 
possibilities that are perhaps otherwise unimaginable in the ancestral home. The 
diasporic context can thus become the site for the re-articulation and reworking of the 
past and the possibilities for their transformation through the affirmation of a sensuous 
future lived in the present. 
Diaspora therefore refers to the articulation of what both Clifford and Gilroy punningly 
calls "roots" and "routes". As such, in many instances the diasporic subject's relationship 
to her roots or origin is less about the primacy of dwelling (in the past or in a place), and 
more about distance, separation and the geography of the present (Blanchot 1969). For 
Blanchot the "truth" of diaspora, or what he terms the "exilic condition", is the 
affirmation of a 'residence that does not bind us to a place or to settling close to a relation 
forever and already founded' (ibid: 127). Diasporicity here then becomes akin to an 
ethics of existence, one that affirms the Yoruba adage that 'the world is our market, 
heaven is home. In this maxim, home is a metaphysical issue. It is not of this world. 
Home, I was told by my "grand" aunt, is not where you are from, or where you are, but 
where you are going. It is an ethics of existence that accepts our inherent homelessness; 
the futility of searching for a "ground" to support identity on earth. Home is a dream 
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deferred and encountered only in a dance towards the ancestors. While a metaphysical 
idea of home and our inherent homeless is useful for breaking down the distinction 
between the "native" and the "foreigner", it becomes problematic if this metaphysical 
assumption is not returned to the existential context which differentiates between forms 
of being at home and being homeless. 
Here we have it, diaspora is first of all about space, spacing, and distance, rather than 
time. In fact the primacy of temporality and history, with their assumptions of fixity, 
residence and dwelling, are dis-placed (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993). When we think the 
diasporic experience first of all spatially, we are moved to consider the place and 
conditions of the present, the existential here and now present; the ways in which 
'processes of inclusion and exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under a 
given circumstance' (Brah 1996: 192). Moreover, how these circumstances, embedded as 
they are in power relations, modify and modulate the diasporic experience. It is only then 
that we can begin to account for diasporic temporality and the fantasies, stories, and 
myths constructed in the new place. But, by this time, the possibility of continuing a 
linear trajectory is ruptured. Instead, the present opens up different avenues, different 
paths, different possibilities from which we navigate and assume an embodied presence: 
a 'garden of forking paths'(Borges 1964). The present thus becomes a complex open site 
of potential transformation or even an open wound that refuses to heal, because the space 
of the present continues to militate against calling a place home even when we are more 
at home in that place. As I noted above, Brah suggests that differential positioning within 
the spatio-existential field of the diaspora engenders different experiences of home. I 
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may feel at home in my diasporic location (London), but for various reasons, a residue of 
non-belonging remains. Something is always telling me, that I don't belong here and I 
will never belong. The extent to which I feel comfortable among white people is the 
extent to which I feel comfortable among black English people. Therefore, I find myself 
calling to Lagos as "home". Once in Lagos, the feeling of home dissipates as soon as the 
family meetings are over: I never lose sight of its strangeness. As always, this yo-yo-ing 
between feeling at home and calling a place a home is tied in with current circumstances 
and habits of being - the spaces of the present. Of course, the dialectics of belonging and 
non-belonging have always to be determined and achieved with each unfolding context. 
Such a context could be related to the degree in which one can access different forms of 
capital or privilege as it is the case among different Asian groups in Britain mentioned 
above. These differences often determine the extent to which the diasporic subject will 
experience alienation, sense of freedom, entrapment, the pain of loss and displacement, 
and the nostalgic longing for an "elsewhere" (Clifford 1994). 
Privileging the space and place of diaspora does not therefore imply a wholesale 
rejection of time and history and the difference of generations. Such an implication 
would be absurd. To focus on spatiality absolutely would entail merely another 
reiteration of post-modernist "nomadism", where all time (history, memory and 
difference) is reduced to space. As such, traces of the past would become neutral and we 
would become unable to account for the different historical, political, economic and 
symbolic situations out of which diasporas are formed and in which they are embedded. 
On the contrary traces of the past cannot be neutral because they constitute 
identity in 
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part. These traces are the "ground" in which identities derive their meaning and are 
performed and transformed. Identity is the transformation of traces in the present. To 
put it another way, identity is the interplay between subjective experience and its 
embeddedness within changing cultural, economic and historical constellations. As 
Stuart Hall writes of diasporic black cultural identity, 
Far from being grounded in a mere 'recovery' of the past, which is 
waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of 
ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different 
ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives 
of the past. (1990: 225) 
Black identities then become, to use Leroy Jones's phrase, a "changing same". It 
involves being (the positing of the traces) and becoming (their transformation). From the 
point of view of diasporic experience, identity thought of as a changing same can lead to 
feelings of connection or relatedness to a collective past or community. On the other 
hand, this identity taken in terms of a changing same can lead to feelings of profound 
difference and distance from it. In this instance, cultural forms, collective identities and 
experiences are perpetually open to reinterpretation, renewal, re-memory, and re- 
invention. Such a perspective is able to accommodate other identities in its fold without 
berating or denying the different histories that have produced them. 
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I will later in this thesis be arguing that the capacity of New World Africans to embrace 
the foreign and the strange has to do with African aesthetic and ethical sensibility with its 
emphasis on polymetric in music and polytheism in religion. In his important book 
African Rhythm and African Sensibility: Aesthetics and Social Action in African Musical 
Idions, John Nfiller Chernoff writes, 'African affinity for polymetric musical forms 
indicates that, in the most fundamental sense, the African sensibility is profoundly 
pluralistic' (1979: 158). He goes further to say that Africans make music 'out of the 
fragmentation and discontinuity of events, [and] respect pluralism as a source of vitality, 
and to bring to any situation the social presence and poise which is the counterpart of the 
African religious faith'(ibid: 158). But I am moving too far ahead! 
To make the project or processes of identity an open and inclusive one it is necessary to 
take into account generational differences. For example, children of first generation 
migrants might acknowledge a connection with parental identities while simultaneously 
embracing other identities that are forged in the encounters with others. In other words, 
there are important generational differences at work in the experience of diasporicity. 
The notion of "generation" can then, begin to be heard in its verbal sense: as the renewed 
constitution of relations between origins and the present. Identities are not voluntaristic, 
they are embedded in relations of power and domination that mark them as different, as 
not belonging. In contrast, if diaspora is privileged in terms of time and history, the 
question: "Am Ia diasporic subject? " has a fixed implication. Diasporic subjectivity 
becomes connected to a history in such a manner that the space and the different 
experience of the present are undermined by time. But when diasporic experience is 
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, approached first of all from the perspective of place and generation, any notion of a direct 
connection to a past is already fractured, deferred or broken by the demands of the 
present. Thus, diaspora, is always an interplay between geography and history and the 
difference of generations. The unfolding of diasporicity is always articulated within a 
spatio-temporal matrix that is less about a shared originary territory and more about the 
practice of embodied re-memoration and its transfiguration in the present. 
The space and place of the present mediates experience and the kinds of stories or 
histories we are able to construct. That is, the context of the present shapes the kind of 
question we can ask about the past. This context necessarily requires embodiment. 
Embodiment is the ground of lived experience. Put another way, embodiment refers to 
the way we "inhabit" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 139) our body through the performance of 
specific bodily acts in a given location and in time. As Dalibor Vesley writes 'inhabiting 
is a situational condition involving memories, dreams and imaginations' (1988: 61). For 
Gail Weiss, 'embodiment suggests an experience that is constantly in the making, that is 
continually being constituted and reconstituted from one moment to the next' (1999: 43). 
Embodied existence therefore affects, alters and limits the kind of experience we can 
have and the kind of origin story we tell the world and ourselves. To insert the notion of 
incarnated subjectivity into diaspora studies and therefore attain a more concrete level of 
analysis, I will now provide a basic account of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's early 
philosophy of the body. In order to do so, I will have to leave aside many important 
aspects of his phenomenology. Nevertheless, in providing a bare-bones 
phenomenological account of embodiment, I will have developed the resources to think 
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the relation between the body, space and time. Therefore, I will be able to show how 
phenomenology allows us to begin to think diasporicity as an embodied situation. 
The Body in Merleau-Ponty 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is in part an attempt to counter the philosophical 
tradition that privileges the role of the disembodied mind or consciousness in human 
existence and the production of meaning. The strategy he employs is to stress the active 
embodied relations between human consciousness, thought, knowledge and the world, 
thereby refuting the Cartesian thinking subject. 'Consciousness', Merleau-Ponty writes, is 
not only embodied, it 'is in the first place not a matter of I think that" but of I can"' 
(1962: 137). This incarnated intentionality refers to the body's capacities to act in the 
world at a stage prior to conscious or reflective thinking. Self-knowledge and perception 
are derived first of all from an awareness of bodily capacities according to the demands 
of a situation. For example, through practising the headstand asana (position) in yoga, I 
know my own strength, power and discover weaknesses and limitations in parts of my 
body. I know this because my body is my most intimate possession and that with which I 
am most familiar (1962: 107). This awareness of my bodily capacities, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, is acquired through habits formed in practice. These capacities are, of 
course, limited by physiological constraints, previous attitudes and movements and my 
world-historical and cultural positioning. All these factors together with my 
communications with others condition the way I comport myself and inhabit the world 
around me. 
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The intentional 1-can" means that in my relation to the world my body has acquired 
(through leaming, mimesis and transformative repetition) certain patterns of 
comportment and engaging with the world. This intentionality takes place on the basis of 
what Merleau-Ponty calls the 'corporeal schema' (1962: 142). The corporeal schema 
refers to the set of functions the body has acquired in order to perform actions in the 
world. The schema involves a relationship between the self and the world; it is the 
necessary condition for the body's situatedness and grounding within a world. In a sense, 
the motivated, schernatising body is what brings the world into existence and is the 
prelude to action. On the other hand, the world gives the body a sense of its horizon, its 
spatial positioning, and corporeal possibilities. According to Kirsten Hastrup 'The person 
as bodily presence is the locus - and the pre-text - of action' (1995: 89). My acting in the 
world then is always directed and situational, the potentiality for a world. As Merleau- 
Ponty writes in a paper entitled "An Unpublished Text", 
A "corporeal or postural schema" gives us at every moment a global, 
practical, and implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, 
of our hold on them. A system of possible movements, or "motor 
projects, " radiates from us to our environment. Our body is not in space 
like things; it inhabits or haunts space. (1964: 5) 
So, for Merleau-Ponty intentionality is irreducibly embodied, and each specific 
intentional act is bound up with a set of pre-dispositions which make up an intentional 
character. That is, as embodied subjects our actions are constituted, 
limited and 
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empowered by an interaction between our habitat, history and other cultural and 
biological inheritances. It is within this "already constituted" space, to use Merleau- 
Ponty's term, that we take up our place in the world, interact with others and make 
ourselves feel at home or made not to feel at home. The intentional body is therefore 
always constituted spatially (a link between a here and a yonder') and temporally ('a now 
and a future') (1962: 140). This is what it means to inhabit the body. In another lexicon, 
the body acquires habit through a vital relation to the habitus that gives it pointers and 
suggestions in a world-place that precedes the agent. The capacity to act in the world 3 
involves perception and "motility". Action and experience in the world are grounded in 
forms of habit that are repeated and re-established with each bodily involvement. Habits 
are therefore, 'not long established custom' (ibid: 146). This acting and repetition of 
habit, the essence of motility, is always grounded within the corporeal practices of a 
culture. Later on in this thesis, I refer to this form of bodily grounding as "rhythmic 
gestural patterning". Motility refers to the body's capacity to move confidently in a 
certain way across time and in space. 
At this point, two objections may be raised regarding Merleau-Ponty's intentional 
motility. First, Merleau-Ponty's worldly incarnation might be accused of excluding the 
experience of those who are inactive or immobile. His response would be that insofar as 
such agents are involved in situations with others and exist in a familiar place, they are 
capable of intentions and actions (1962: 165). 'Movement', Merleau-Ponty reminds us, 
3 The world for Merleau-Ponty refers to an horizon which can never be completely articulated or achieved, 
just as a 'real' horizon can never be reached. As an open system, the world is perptually unfolding into 
new possibilities. It is in this sense infinite. The relation between the body/place, habitus is horizonal. 
They unfold each other, into each other. 
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should not be understood simply as 'object movement and transference in space, but as a 
project towards movement or "potential movement" [ ... ]a form of conduct (ibid: 234). 
Thus, the condition for worldly existence resides in the potentiality of movement as 
action, as a necessary ecstatic intentionality which might help bring about change within 
our social life-world. The second objection which has more force, suggests that in 
providing an account of a common embodied experience, Merleau-Ponty can be accused 
of neglecting the ways in which bodies exist in relationships to power. Or, as Viven 
Sobchack notes in her book The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film 
Experience, Merleau-Ponty neglects to consider 'bodily existence as it is culturally and 
historically lived in certain forms of critical differentiation and discrimination (1992: 
148). His account of the body is therefore applicable to "everybody" and "anybody". In 
the essay 'Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, 
Motility, and Spatiality', Iris Marion Young (1989) argued that the body's movement is 
always circumscribed and given significance within the field of power in which it is 
moving, a point which is at best under-emphasised in Merleau-Ponty's work. This 
context means that the (white) female subject can experience her body in contradictory 
ways or as an "inhibited intentionality". In a world where sexual difference and indeed 
racial, class, age and ability are interwoven, the Merleau-Pontyian confident 'I can', can 
,, 4 become translated into a restrictive, unconfident "I cannot 
We are already gesturing towards an embodied conception of the body's relation to 
movement, diaspora and its world. Embodied agents are grounded in their lived 
4 In another important essay in the book Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist 
Philosophy 
and Social Theory (1990a) Young also argues that 
Merleau-Ponty cannot deal with the female/mother 
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experience precisely because they "inhabit" their body and are forced to inhabit their 
body in a manner that is inscribed and circumscribed, social and self generated. The 
body referred to here is not the body seen as an "object", it is 'not a collection of adjacent 
organs', nor is it a thing that exists in the here and now in a discrete spatio-temporal slot. 
Rather, the phenomenological body is 'the congealed face of existence' (Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 234), that 'gives significance [ ... ] to cultural objects like words' (ibid: 235), 'the 
potentiality of a certain world' (ibid: 106), 'the systems of anonymous "functions" which 
draw every particular focus into a general project' (ibid: 354). Like diasporicity, the 
body, is an expressive movement from this space to another space, from this time to 
another time. As Merleau-Ponty writes: 
[ ... ] the body is essentially an expressive space [ ... ]. But our body is not 
merely one expressive space among the rest, for that is simply the 
constituted body. It is the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, 
that which causes them to begin to exist as things, under our hands and 
eyes The body is our general medium for having a world. (1962: 
146) 
As the ground of experience, the body is accorded a primordial ontological status in 
Merleau-Ponty. It is neither the subject nor object of experience. It is prior to both. It is 
what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the "third term" or "third space" or the "third genus of 
being" (Seel962: 104,244,248,254,350). The body lies between and yet prior to the 
experience of pregnancy. See Geil Weiss (1999) for a critique of Young's position. 
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two dichotomous poles. 'I apprehend my body as subject-object' (ibid: 95). Under 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology, subject and object fold into each other 
through lived experience. The body therefore acts as the ground of being a subject and 
being positioned as an object, of my having relations with others and as that which brings 
existence into being. Unlike Descartes' cogito, for Merleau-Ponty we are not primarily 
rational subjects who ground ourselves in a transparent act of consciousness. Conversely, 
we are not purely physical beings. Rather, our subjectivity, as beings capable of mental 
acts and dispositions towards the world, and our objectivity as physical entities, is only 
understandable on account of our embodiment. 
This phenomenology of the body has significant epistemological implications. Since 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment is grounded in ontology, it precedes any 
epistemic claims of the subject or the object. The body, in this ontologically primordial 
sense is not that which can be known (say in the discourses of biology), or that which 
knows, rather it is that which allows us to know. As the sociologist Ian Burkitt writes, 
'All knowledge is embodied and situated, created within that fundamental unity between 
subjects and objects which is the product of having an active body' (1999: 74). Merleau- 
Ponty's body refuses to be placed within an epistemology that can never overcome the 
dualism it must presuppose in order to install itself. This dualism continues up until the 
work of post- structurali st feminists such as Judith Butler. Her failure 
lies in refusing to 
rework ontology, therefore reducing all forms of embodied experience 
into forms of 
discourse and the effect of power. The body in Merleau-Ponty's sense must always 
exceed this reduction. As he writes, 
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In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and 
time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a 
limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into 
which it draws my body. I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive 
space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and 
includes them. (1962: 140) 
The expressive, situated body, like the world, is a process that continuously unfolds and 
reveals itself anew in relation to other bodies, new situations, new roles. This means that 
the body in motion and the knowledge it bears is always shifting and indeterminate. As 
indeterminate corporeal beings, we grasp situational shifts and are affected by them as we 
interact with our social life-worlds. Movements in the world affect our state of being and 
the way we commune with the world. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment 
can therefore be seen as the overture to a situated theory of emotions. In this sense it is 
possible to say that all motion is at the same time e-motion; positions and dis-positions 
have affective force. Indeed, this is precisely the claim posited by Sue Cataldi in her 
excellent book Emotion, Depth and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space (1993). She writes 
that 'Emotional experiences involve perceptions of meaningful change "in" a situation 
and "in" ourselves in relation to that situation' (ibid: 91). Motility always involves 
emotional shifts and the generation of 'another emotional stance "position"' (ibid: 91). 
This 'is intrinsically dynamic [and] apprehended kinaesthetic ally though [the] living 
body' (ibid: 117). Conversely, emotional experience always needs motility, or a 
background of some prior sense of orientation or dis-orientation. For example, people 
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moving their arms whilst talking on the telephone, going to a 3-D cinema where people 
hold out their arms in response to what they are watching, or, in general terms, the use of 
spatial vocabulary in the expression of emotions. Another example of spatial 
emotionality is captured in the phase I need to get away from x'as both a physical and 
emotional description. Thus, any form of displacement from the locus of significance 
can lead to a shift in mood. Following Merleau-Ponty, we can say that emotion is 
another name for being-in-the-world and 'being-to-the-world'(Merleau-Ponty 1962: viii). 
Cataldi's account refuses to reduce emotionality to a psychologistic frame; the emotions 
reveal the dynamic of relations between self/other and world rather than being merely 
aspects of the individual psyche. Far from being merely episodic events at work within 
an unchanging psychological structure, different emotional responses express changing 
relations to a changed world. Rather than emotions being "objects" of our experience, 
they are the forms of our experience and the fundamental way in which we orient 
ourselves within it. Cataldi's development of Merleau-Ponty's thought demonstrates that 
the (e)motional body in its socio-cultural instantiation and interrelationality is that which 
grounds experience and ethics. 
What I am suggesting here is that - ontologically and phenomenologically - 
diasporicity 
is not only an experience of movement, but often induces profound emotional responses: 
danger and fear, loss and grief, joy and pain. Again, the emotional responses at work 
within the experience of diasporicity are not merely 'a cognitive 
interpretation of the 
situation, nor of some inner physiological stirrings, rather it is a 
bodily expression within 
a situation that gives us joy [or pain]' (Ian Burkitt 
1999: 117 authors emphasis). In other 
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words, emotional responses demonstrate the deep-level effects that shifts in place or 
interactions with others have upon our being-in-the-world. In this sense, the embodied 
emotions of diasporicity should be taken more seriously than they have been. Certainly 
they should be taken at least as seriously as theoretical or discursive treatments of 
diaspora. 
The primacy of embodiment which draws into focus 'a deeper awareness of the sociality 
of being and emotion'(Lyon and Barbalet 1994: 62) within the black diaspora, will be an 
ongoing part of this work. A focus in this direction brings with it an explanatory power 
that has been missing from the work on the black diaspora that has appeared recently. 
For example, the tensions between the so-called essentialist accounts of the black 
diaspora, and the anti -es senti ali sts and anti- anti -e ssentiali sts, can be resolved by a return 
to an embodied account of the emotions. This return helps to position these different 
theorisations of diasporicity in terms of divergent affectively-produced responses to being 
dislocated from a familiar setting and conditions of oppression. Theory itself, while not 
being wholly produced by the emotions, is not entirely divorced from them: our thinking 
is itself part of an affective drive. 
It is with this background of the expressive, emotional body that we can begin to 
understand the relation between conditions of embodiment andfreedom. The body in 
Merleau-Ponty's sense is, as we have seen, not the actual physical or biologic all y-fixed 
body. Rather, embodiment refers to the fundamental synthesising agency that brings the 
world into existence. The body becomes a gathering of the past in the present that 
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enables the emergence of different possibilities, to create new beginnings and new 
futures. But this is only the active side of a two-sided story. The body's capacity to 
bring the world into being is based on its passive relation to a pre-existing world. This 
might at first sound paradoxical. - It appears that the body is both the origin and not the 
origin of the world's existence. The world at one and the same time appears to originate 
with and yet precede embodiment. However, the contradiction disappears when the 
relation between my body and the world is seen to be one of mutual interdependency that 
is non-oppositional. Embodiment allows a world that is always already pre-existent to 
come into being. The body therefore renews the world through a sort of "eternal return". 
The body takes up the possibilities offered by the world and repeats and transforms them. 
Merleau-Ponty writes, 'The synthesis of both time and space is a task that always has to 
be performed afresh' (1962: 140). The body-world relation then is one of incorporation, 
improvisation and innovation. In short, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology reveals the 
moment of freedom to be thoroughly corporeal. 
This co-conditionality of the body and world is an important insight in Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy that has far reaching implications for thinking origin, displacement and 
subjectivity. For Merleau-Ponty, whenever the body takes up the world it necessarily 
transforms it. To begin, the body's emplacement in a world means that the world exists 
as 'always "already constituted", and we shall never come to understand 
it by 
withdrawing into a worldless perception' (1962: 252). That is, the world we are 
located 
in has already been marked out by others; it is already imbued with values, traces and 
significance that precede our occupation. To illustrate this point 
Merleau-Ponty made 
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use of tropes of birth and death. Subjectively speaking, I cannot say that I experience the 
occasion of my birth because it is a pre-personal event that made my existence possible. 
Nor can I be present at the event of my death, for it is after the fact of my existence: 
I can, [ ... ] apprehend myself only as "already born" and "still alive" -I 
can apprehend my birth and death only as prepersonal horizons: I know 
that people are born and die, but I cannot know my own birth and death'. 
(ibid: 216) 
The world therefore has a sort of intentionality that is prior to our own subjective 
intentions or free will. And yet, the world only has significance when its sedimented 
values are taken up afresh in practice by each embodied community or subject: 'We have 
the experience of an I not in the sense of an absolute subjectivity, but indivisibly 
demolished and remade by the course of time' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 219). For instance, 
although the judicial power of white supremacy has been abolished, many white people 
still benefit and unwittingly perpetuate it. According to Charles W. MIN, the founding 
narratives of white supremacy are still 'maintained through inherited patterns of 
discrimination, exclusionary racial bonding, cultural stereotyping, and differential white 
power deriving from consolidated economic privilege' (1998: 102). In this instance, if 
freedom is the capacity to act and realise my intentionality, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, 1, 
as an individual, have the choice and power to either persist with an oppressive practice 
or help to change that practice. Freedom to reject oppressive practices as well as 
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contribute to its perpetuation is, however, grounded in socio-historical process which acts 
as the bases for the formulation of our choices. Merleau-Ponty writes, 
The fact remains that I am free, not in spite of, or on the hither side of, 
those motivations, but by means of them. For this significant life, this 
certain significance of nature and history which I am, does not limit my 
access to the world, but on the contrary is my means of entering into 
communication with it. (1962: 455) 
Anti-racist struggles, affirmative action policies and alternative cultural practices are 
attempts to question and demolish hegemonic power structures (Alcoff 1999). The living 
body is the site for this demolition and reassertion of a world or structural power that is 
always experienced anew across and within different groups. These "prepersonal 
horizons" are what constitute tradition, values and mythos. They are the opening, or an 
invitation to work within existing frame as the frame is carried along (consciously and 
unconsciously) and transformed. Thus, Merleau-Ponty describes the capacity of the body 
and world to assimilate and (sometimes) transform each other as a 'communication with 
the world more ancient than thought' (1962: 254). It is worth citing the passage, to which 
this phrase belongs in full, 
My personal existence must be the resumption of a prepersonal tradition. 
There is, therefore, another subject beneath me, for whom a world exists 
before I am here, and who marks out my place in it. This captive or 
natural spirit is my body, not that momentary body which is the 
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instrument of my personal choices and which fastens upon this or that 
world, but the system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every 
particular focus into a general project. Nor does this blind adherence to 
the world, this prejudice in favour of being, occur only at the beginning 
of my life. It endows every subsequent perception of space with its 
meaning, and it is resumed at every instant. Space and perception 
generally represent, at the core of the subject, the fact of his birth, the 
perpetual contribution of his bodily being, a communication with the 
world more ancient than thought. (ibid: 254) 
Although it may sound odd and initially contrary to common sense, Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology shows that the world's origin is constituted and re-constituted through 
each event of embodied agency. In effect, the world is always gathered through a 
dynamic of differential repetition. The notion of "origin" is therefore relativised - we 
have no absolute origin or "home". The movement that is injected into the world through 
each somatic dance is therefore the source of a fundamental "homelessness" at work. In 
the Yoruba proverb mentioned above 'the world is a market, heaven is home', we see this 
sentiment expressed in pithy form. 
Merleau-Ponty's account shows that consciousness, emotion, representation, knowledge, 
and thought in general are secondary to an embodied communication with the world. It is 
as intentional, situated, and inter-corporeal beings that we have a world and arefree to 
act. And it is through this "worlding" of our embodied communication that we take up 
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sets of stylistic gestures, features and habits that are specific to our cultural, geographical, 
economical and historical situation. Moreover, this communication does not happen once 
and for all. Although it is the origin of bodily being and the world, the communication is 
always renewed upon each encounter. Here then, Merleau-Ponty offers a radically 
different way of thinking both origin and freedom. Paradoxically, origin is always 
repeating itself, through difference. That is, "origin" itself is already always constituted 
by difference. The origin is fated, perpetually to become a stranger to itself. 
Freedom, for Merleau-Ponty is not a return to an I, rather, freedom, is the lived body's 
ability to structure its world and to realise the potentialities informed by its social history' 
(Diprose 1994: 107). Freedom and origin are thus given in the active interaction between 
embodied subjects, their situatedness and interactions with others. The origin is 
incessantly forgotten through the active work of its creation. The force of Merleau- 
Ponty's account works precisely because he demonstrates that ontology is constituted by 
difference; and by implication social identities. It is from the primordiality accorded to 
difference that as embodied subjects we give birth to the world and new possibilities are 
opened up. What is most significant in this thought is the way in which it opens up a way 
of thinking free actions in bodily and intersubjective terms. For Merleau-Ponty, freedom 
is generated using tropes of the fiminin - that of pregnancy and nativity. The birth of the 
body-world relation does not happen merely once in time, rather it is continually 
renewing itself. The body and the world are therefore co-originary, in the sense that the 
former repeats the values and directives of the latter through a transformative reiteration. 
The birth of the subject in a space-time frame then, is always already a re-birth. 
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Incarnated Diaspora 
Although Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has many implications for an embodied 
reflection upon the diasporic experience, here I want to focus on two. First, it can be 
used to show that the experience of diaspora is grounded in embodiment. Because for 
Merleau-Ponty, the body and the world are closely interwoven and because the body acts 
as origin to a world that already precedes it, the body therefore is always already situated 
in place. At the end of his career, in his posthumously published work, The Visible and 
the Invisible (1968) this insight is taken to its logical conclusion. He argues in effect that 
there is no absolute distinction between the two. The body is a place, a repository for a 
certain view of the world, for ways of moving, for ways of recognising and interacting 
with others, and so on. In its turn, a place is a form of the body: a unifying site of 
historical and cultural forces. We can never say that a body is not a place or a place is 
not a body. Merleau. -Ponty calls this intertwining relation the "flesh of the world". 
5 
We can now see how diaspora emerge within a phenomenological perspective. If 
possessing a body entails being possessed by a world or being-in-place, being displaced 
or being out-of-place has serious experiential consequences for diasporic subjects. 
Because one is no longer in a geographical setting that is familiar, one can no longer have 
the deep habitual connection to the world. Severed from her cultural horizon and "motive 
will" (Spillers 1987), the diasporic black subject can therefore experience the pain of 
5 The French feminist philosopher, Luce Irigaray (1984) also makes similar point in her essay Place 
Interval'. She extends the place-body relation to women's double emplacement. For Irigaray, women 
do 
not only exist in a place, but are also a place -a container. Although twice emplaced, 
in social and political 
discourses women are deprived of a proper place. 
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displacement acutely. This pain, according to Casey, goes beyond an emotional 
response; it is physical because one no longer has a certain habitual connections to the 
world even when emplaced. Casey writes, 'Entire cultures can become profoundly 
averse to the places they inhabit, feeling atopic and displaced within their own 
emplacement' (1993: 34). Referring to the plight of the Dineh Indians in northeastern 
Arizona, forced to relocate to a reservation camp, Casey argues that there has been an 
increased incidence of suicide, alcoholism, depression and disorientation (ibid: 35). This 
is because for the Dinehs (or Navajo) their land supports and gives coherence and 
continuity to identity. I am therefore suggesting that, to the extent that we move 
geographically, from our locus of origin is the extent to which we are all diasporic. The 
issue in theorising diaspora in this way will involve how the distinction between a 
metaphysical form of diasporicity and the collective historical mode of diasporicity is 
resolved. 
Painful or pleasurable, if the grounding of diasporic experience in the emotionally 
situated body remains unthought, a dangerous alignment presents itself where the 
historically constituted diasporic subject is compared to the world traveller mentioned 
above. In this situation, the diasporic subject is associated with the elite of nation states: 
entrepreneurial, intellectual jet setters who are able to celebrate the commodity fetishism 
of their global access and privilege. Such consummate consumers express a violent and 
vulgar display of their ability to cross borders with ease and consume difference without 
regard for those they encounter and without significant emotional impact on their 
lives, 
let alone emotional destabilisation. Because of these cultural and border crossings 
by the 
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metropolitan elite, historically constituted diasporic communities may uncritically cling 
ever more to the allure of cultural and racial purity. As bell hooks writes, 
The unwillingness to critique essentialism on the part of many African- 
Americans is rooted in the fear that it will cause folks to lose sight of the 
specific history and experience of African-Americans and the unique 
sensibilities and culture that arise from that experience. (1991: 29) 
As such, a diasporic idyll is constructed which celebrates the trans-national and hybrid. 
Once this discursive framework is intemalised by those who have been genuinely 
displaced, their own diasporicity is rendered unproblematic. There is seen to be a joy and 
intrigue of diasporicity that is available for appropriation. The subject is neither 
absolutely without home, deterritorialised, nor boxed into a certain form of identity, and a 
form of freedom is apparently established. 
Again, it is necessary to stress the significance of emotion upon the experience of 
diasporicity. What such an alignment fails to show is that for those whose entry into the 
New World has been one of violent negation of the freedom of the corporeal schema, 
hybrid, mongrel, and all those wonderful international beige figurations are in fact rife 
with conflict and unspeakable agony. These conflicts involve positionings, crises of 
identity, alienation, of being always out of time, off key. All these crises are crises of 
embodiment; crises of being a bodily being in the world where one set of codes or 
corporeal schemata lies in direct conflict to others; of being in two places at once or, 
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better, of hopping between various languages and not finding solace in any. In this 
manner, diasporic subjects come to realise that their place in the world is a house of 
difference rather than the security of any particular difference' (Audre Lorde 1982: 226). 
The "house of difference" equates with the Duboisian "double consciousness", where one 
is, in Gilroy's words 'striving to be both European and black' (1993: 1). Despite the 
recognition that the self is a "house of difference", many of us still yearn for a stable, 
coherent ground to support the self. In its absence, there is created the dilemma of being 
continually jostled by feelings of alienation from the body - being estranged by race, 
gender, generation, language and geography. A crisis whereby suicide, self-harm is a 
willing friend of the mind. This conflict can be so devastating that it renders itself 
incapable of expression and the body is enlisted for expression. In this case, diasporic 
agents can remain forever lost in translation, cut adrift in the interstitial, prey to the 
negative theology of the gods of the gaps. I am suggesting that the dis-placed diasporic 
body can be, and is often, a site of conflict and despair and not this wonderful 
consumerised, global mish-mash of difference and transgressive hybridity that is so 
celebrated in contemporary theory. 
Diasporicity, as Hall defines it, is 'not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a 
necessary heterogeneity and diversity' (1990: 235). Disporacity is finally, according to 
Hall, a positionality. Hall is indeed right to say this. But what he fails to say is that it is a 
positionality that is always plagued by crisis, anxiety, restlessness, fear, and despair. 
This, statement, however, will be one-sided if we fail to acknowledge that in every 
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condition of displacement, replacement is always at hand. The dynamics between 
displacement and replacement can and often do generate a positive, redemptive 
transformative self-representation where diasporic agents resist cultural and psychic 
annihilation by turning to positive elements within their own culture. This I will be 
discussing in chapters three and four. 
The second implication of Merleau-Ponty's account is that through thinking the deep 
significance of the body-place relation, he offers a radical way of thinking about origin. 
His model of origin refutes a naive "efficient" causality of embodied habitus (a tacit 
sedimentation of cultural practices and dispositions) as that which happens once and only 
once. In the naYve model, the embodied subject would be seen to acquire competence 
from a repetition of bodily acts grounded in an invariant culture. Within this model, any 
account of cultural change would involve what we might call purely external factors, the 
tradition of tradition. In contrast, the origin for Merleau-Ponty is a momentary event that 
is always renewed and reconstituted in the embodied moment of the present. As was 
shown above, although the world is always already constituted, it has no value or 
significance of itself until it is incorporated into the body of the present. It is at this point 
that the "subject" of tradition may become "agent" of change, both personally and in 
terms of the tradition itself. We can see that this process of incorporation always 
involves transformation, reworking, and mutation. Placement, displacement and 
replacement are always implicated in the transformation of origin. In other words, 
movement away from an original locus means that the origin itself is always being 
reconstituted according to its new context. In terms of thinking diasponcity, Merleau- 
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Ponty's insight is that rather than seeing diasporicity as a result merely of changes in 
location and culture, it is instead the outcome of transformatory dialogues between the 
embodied subject, time and displacement. Thus, Merleau-Ponty allows us to think 
diasporicity as always already ontological and therefore a general condition of bodily 
being, rather than being simply an empirical -historical fact. Ontologising diaspora 
implicates difference within embodiment. Just as we tell changing stories of our 
childhood as we age, the agent's relation to home and origin is always one fractured and 
structured by a diasporicity of sorts. Home opens itself up to be reworked in the present. 
Through this disruption of linearity, home and subjectivity get imbued with new traces. 
The embodied situation, thought from the space of the present suggests a new way of 
thinking origin: an origin that oscillates between being-at-home and being-not- at-home, 
and a non-linear temporal form to being-in-the world. 
As such, Merleau-Ponty's thought offers something like an ethics of diasporicity. Instead 
of the diasporic situation being understood as static and unresolved, his thought enables 
an account of an active agency that takes up the pre-constituted diasporic complex 
through the work of the present. The diasporic situation is therefore, through Merleau- 
Ponty's phenomenological lens, no longer fixed or unchangeable; subjection turns into 
agency. Separate from the issue of being overlooked and unrecognised in theory, we can 
see that paradigms of pain are not a necessary condition of diasporicity. That is, because 
origin itself is a differential repetition, it means that the negative emotionality associated 
with displacement is open to the play of differences. It is in such an instance that we can 
begin to talk about the humour, the creativity and the joy of diasporicity. As Blanchot 
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has noted of the Jewish diaspora, while it is important to emphasise the exilic conditions 
of the Jews, it is also necessary to highlight the positive and productive history of these 
diasporic communities. 
One such form of situatedness that can be activated lies in the body's relation to a 
particular tradition. For example a black British female dancing body has a complex 
relationship to a given tradition of dance. Rather than merely taking up that form of 
dancing and repeating it, it is possible to see that the dance itself is already complexly 
imbued with traces of other times and other places, 'more ancient than thought'. 
Merleau-Ponty's thought therefore injects transformativity into the given as I have 
argued. Each new time of dancing involves a communication with the history or tradition 
of that dance and at the same time gives rise to the potential in that act to reconstitute and 
re-energise that tradition. The tradition itself encourages absorption from other sources 
for its continuity. However, at this point in the text I would like to a note a difference 
that has opened up between Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'a communication more ancient 
than thought' and my own model of embodied diasporic agency. If we took what 
Merleau-Ponty writes uncritically, it would seem that each time any black female dancer 
dances, then the tradition in which she places herself is necessarily transformed. From 
my point of view, this model is too strong. I suggest that each act of dancing in the 
present has only the potential to transform the tradition. Ritual is required, a framework 
or practice to stop embodied agency's transformation being only accidental. The origin 
of any particular dance form is never an origin in the sense of something that just began 
at a certain time and maybe repeated in future. This is because the dance's origin is itself 
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always being transformed through its performance. As Ralph Ellison suggests, a jazz 
musician achieves creativity and innovation by being thoroughly immersed and versed in 
the musical tradition of jazz. Within the frame of the tradition, the artist is able to assert 
and insert his or her own vision. In this way the tradition is continually energised and 
transformed: 
I had learned too that the end of all this discipline and technical mastery 
was the desire to express an affirmative way of life through its musical 
tradition and that this tradition insisted that each artist achieve his 
creativity within his frame. He must learn the best of the past, and add to 
it his personal vision. Life could be harsh, loud and wrong if it wished, 
but they lived it fully, and when they expressed their attitude toward the 
world it was with a fluid style that reduced the chaos of living to form. 
(1955: 189) 
To talk about tradition or origin does not therefore mark a return to a static or an 
unchanging time in the past. Tradition need not be traditional. Rather, origin and 
tradition become the motile source that is always taken up within each performative 
moment of the body's condensation or secretion of the past and present in the 
refashioning of the future. As Merleau-Ponty aptly writes: 
In every focusing movement my body unites present, past and future, it 
secretes time, or rather it becomes that location in nature where, for the 
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first time, events instead of pushing each other into the realm of being, 
project round the present a double horizon of past and future and acquire 
a historical orientation. My body takes possession of time; it brings into 
existence a past and a future for a present; it is not a thing, but creates 
time instead of submitting to it. But every act of focusing must be 
renewed, otherwise it falls into consciousness. (1962: 240) 
Merleau-Ponty therefore enables us to think about an embodied diaspora that is at the 
very heart of what it is to be human. There is however a serious problem with this 
position. We can only accept whole-heartedly a generalised and metaphysically 
positioned diaspora if we disregard the question of how we are positioned by, and take a 
position in relation to others (Diprose 1994: 18). Being positioned and taking up position 
means that we have to enquire about the status of different forms of embodiment; about 
diasporas of ontological space-time differentiation versus historically constituted 
diasporas. Although Merleau-Ponty's theory provides an account of the important role 
others play in the constitution and reconstitution of the development of the corporeal 
schema, he does not provide an analysis of variations within the social field. And it is 
thus that factors of gender, race, class, generation, location and language insert 
themselves within the warp and woof of diasporicity. 
Merleau-Ponty's ethics of active transformation of cultural-historical origins comes up 
against its limits most succinctly when we ask the question: 'Can you be a diasporic 
subject and not know iff The French philosopher would have to answer in the 
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affirmative. Within his model it is possible to be unmindful of one's diasporicity due to 
the absence of conscious dialogue about how one's origins are being reworked through 
embodiment. That is, retention does not necessarily reveal itself as such, even as it 
operates within every gesture, speech pattern or movement. The force of Merleau- 
Ponty's work is its opening up of the pre-thetic dynamics of embedded and embodied 
agency, and tacit knowledge not the divergences orchestrated upon the subject's 
consciousness by the world. For example, if one is brought up in a world that has certain 
sets of vocabularies, norms, discourses, one does not necessarily have a critical 
relationship to the surrounding discourses. For instance, at least until recently, the 
heterosexual, white, male living in cultures which take whiteness and maleness as 
normalcy, rarely questions his manner of being-in-the-world and is continuously 
legitimatised by the socio-economic order. Consciousness of his mode of being-in-the- 
world only comes when it is challenged in intersubjective relationships (such as when he 
moves into another social culture where whiteness is not normative) and even then it is 
doubtful that the challenge will cause any profound emotional upheaval of the type so 
characteristic of the diasporic subject. 
The very question that Merleau-Ponty suggests we answer with an affirmative "Yes" 
proves more complicated when 'we recognise the continuing and continuous operation of 
"fixing" performed by the categories of race and ethnicity, as well as class, gender, 
geography and so on in the formation of identity' (Ang 1994). The power of being 
positioned permits us to understand that the construction of subjectivity is not solely the 
work of the embodied subject itself. Although the body is both "subject" and "object" for 
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Merleau-Ponty, he does not explicitly acknowledge the other's work of objectification in 
social relations. Again, Merleau-Ponty avoids an account of objectification Imposed 
from the outside by stressing the bodily capacities of agents as a powerful medium. 
However, what is required to complete such an account is the recognition that as a 
positioned subject, there is always a moment when the self is constructed through the 
externalising power of the other and that ontology is first of all social. In such a moment 
one can only experience the self through the gaze of the other; the body is no longer both 
subject and object in Merleau-Ponty's sense. Rather, the body tends, through visual and 
perceptual sphere, to become objectified or named. The body as subject no longer exists 
for itself, but does so as object to others. Here, we are reminded of the unbridgeable 
difference between the for-itself and the in-itself in the existential philosophy of the other 
French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. For Sartre, the gaze of the other attempts to fix the 
subject in its being, as if the subject were an object. That is, it is only when I take 
account of how I appear to others that I experience my body as other to me. Fraleigh, 
suggests that 'Alienation, the sense of separation from others, seems located precisely in 
this experience' (1987: 17). In this model, the subject can either accede to the 
objectifying gaze of the other or attempt to refuse it or not even notice its presence. Is it 
possible to reject the Sartrean bifurcating move of seeing subjectivity and positioning as 
opposed, such that one is either a subject or objectified? 
I suggest that in any full account of subjectivity, the dialectics between auto- 
constructions of subjectivity and those imposed from outside would have to be 
negotiated, rather than set up as opposed. While how I appear to others might be limiting 
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and conditions my habits of being in the world, my whole corporeal trajectory need not 
be determined by these external limitations or the limitations wrought by my body. 
Through my power of choice and action I can create myself. As Thomas Slaughter 
reminds us in his discussion of black agency: 
Certainly racism wounds - it can often mutilate individual self-respect, 
but this is not the same thing as saying that it conditions an entire 
community's perception of itself. Moreover, what is left out of this 
image is the group's actual history. This history is not one in which 
passivity was the name of the game. (1983: 106) 
To adapt a phrase from Shakespeare, some are born with diasporicity, some achieve 
diasporicity, and some have diasporicity thrust upon them. For all Merleau-Ponty's uses 
in providing something like an ethics of diasporic redemptive transformative agency, the 
limits of his work as it stands are that it can only account for the first of these three 
possibilities. By refusing to analyse the differences at work in the social field, Merleau- 
Ponty's thought risks concealing the power relations that constitute it, setting his work 
adrift as an abstract ontology rather than a concrete engagement. In terms of applying his 
thought to the theorisation of diasporic experience, the "dangerous alignment" mentioned 
above looms large, as a generalised existential diasporicity threatens to swamp empirical- 
historical forces of fixity. 
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Historicising the Corporeal Schema 
In this light, it is pertinent to look at the work of Frantz Fanon in order to show how the 
other two possibilities - diasporicity as an achievement and as an imposition - can be 
embraced within a phenomenological framework. In the chapter, 'The Lived Experience 
of the Black 6 in his book Black Skin, White Mask (1967), Fanon confronts Merleau- 
Ponty in terms of the criticism developed above concerning the absence of positioning 
and inattention to other-directed limitations upon experience in his phenomenology of 
embodiment. Fanon begins this chapter by agreeing with Merleau-Ponty that there is a 
fundamental ambiguity in how the subject is constructed. Like Merleau-Ponty, the 
corporeal schema is described by Fanon as 'a definitive structuring of self and the world 
[ ... ] because it creates a real 
dialectic between my body and the world' (1967: 111). 
However, for Fanon, this pre-discursive play between agent and horizon is threatened or 
mediated by a third term - white racial norms and their discursive representational 
regimes. In the racialised encounter, the agency of the African body is challenged, 
negated and reduced to a phobogenetic object, whose selfhood is represented through 
what the colour black signifies. In this representation, the African agent is stripped of all 
social and cultural practices, and he 7 comes to embody the white "myth of the negro", a 
myth that reduces black people to "savages, brutes, illiterates" (ibid: 117). Despite 
Fanon's effort to assert black humanity, this myth continues to determine and structure 
black and white relations. The black subject comes to experience his body in solely 
6 Although my discussion of this chapter in Fanon's book make use of Charles Lam Markmann 
(1986) 
translation, I have not followed his English translation of the title The Fact of Blackness' Charles 
7 In Fanon, the black diasporic experience is constituted around of the experience of the black male. Fanon 
sees the association of blackness with corporeality as signified 
in the figure of the monstrous black penis. 
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negative terms and the freedom of agency presumed in Merleau-Ponty's corporeal 
schema becomes a luxury afforded only to imperial white males. In this way, Fanon 
sketched out what he terms h istorico- racial schema. This schema, he argues, precedes 
the corporeal schema and its elements are not provided for him by "'residual sensations 
and perceptions primarily of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic and visual character", but by 
the other, the white man, who had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories' 
(Fanon 1967: 111)). The emphasis on the epidermal by the European white other, Fanon 
argues, provides the "racial parameters" for black people's action and engagement with 
the world. 
In opposition to this denial of his corporeal schema, Fanon attempts to assert black 
humanity by showing that the black male also has limbs just like other human beings. 
This attempt too, was rejected and reduced to a frozen caricature. Such an 
objectification, Fanon tells us, 'fixed [him] there, in the sense in which a chemical 
solution is fixed by a dye' (ibid: 109). At this point, the corporeal schema dissolves and 
is superseded by the racial epidermal schema. This refers to the inscription of race on 
the skin wherein the black skin is a signifier of cultural difference. The power and 
violence of "epidermalization" functions as an implicit refusal of the potentiality of the 
embodied subject to transform her historically given world. The white other fixes the 
black subject as having a specific origin which he or she must relate or return. An origin 
that has been constructed by the white other as 'tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual 
deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships' (ibid: 112). Such representation denies 
the freedom of the black subject. The subject is alienated from the possibility of 
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participating within historicity - the process of historical change - and therefore of being 
able to transform the present. The black subject can no longer re-create her origins by 
forgetting them; because the stories and details have the weight of white institutional 
powers and its representational machinery. For these reasons Fanon argues that the 
historico-racial schema precedes both the epidermal and corporeal schema. 
Early on in the text Fanon describes his own experience of being looked at by a white 
child with his mother on a train, an experience that objectifies and forces an awareness of 
his skin, diasporicity and finally origin: ... Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened! "' A 
child's utterance reduced him to the total sum of his skin. Here then, the visible become 
central to the constitution of racialised identity and the experience of race. The realm of 
the visual is invested with values, which produces and fixes the black body as different in 
the naturalisation of racist ideologies. As Fanon writes, he is responsible not only for his 
body, but, for his race and ancestors: 
It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was 
becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if 
the physician made a mistake it would be the end of him and of all those 
who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a Negro? As 
long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no 
nonsense, under any condition! The black physician can never be sure 
how close he is to disgrace. I tell you, I was walled in: No exception was 
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made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or my 
understanding of the quantum theory. (Fanon 1967: 117) 
The next stage of the destablisation of the corporeal schema, of the freedom of 
embodiment, lies in the black subject internalising this objectification - an internalisation 
that affects the construction of selfhood and autonomy. Just as in Foucault's (1977) 
account of the Panopticon where the prisoner internalises the warden's gaze, so too, the 
black subject internalises the epidermal racial schema. A sense of inferiority derived 
from the skin no longer requires the gaze of the other in order to be felt; the freedom and 
agency of the corporeal schema is shattered and the black individual find herself 
'grasping for selfhood somewhere between nothingness and infinity (Henry 1997: 30). 
However, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, Fanon's employment of Sartre's 
negative ontology in this text doesn't allow for the disruption of white discursive and 
representational regimes. I shall propose that the movement of the dancing body in its 
spatio-temporal situatedness challenges the immutability of white racial norms. Fanon's 
problem is that he just can't dance! Or at least he doesn't dance enough. 
1U_ 
For my purposes here however, Fanon enables the diasporic African to answer the 
question 'can you be a diasporic subject and not know iff with an emphatic 'No'. 
Through the intervention of the epidermal schema, the diasporic African is forced into an 
awareness of diasporicity. This awareness results from the challenge of the imposition of 
a return to an "origin" that is inscribed and signified in and through the skin. As Fanon 
writes, 'I am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of 
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the "idea" that others have of me but of my own appearance' (1967: 116 my emphasis). 
The challenge to black humanity, proscribes both the possibility of historical agency and 
invalidates the structure of that history itself. Fanon's child on the train negates the 
condition of the here-now present of the diaspora. Thus, each time the question 'where 
are you really fromT is posed, questions of the relationship between origin and 
embodiment are brought to the fore. In so doing, the assumptions behind the question 
lead to a refusal to engage with the embodied situation of the present, of the 'where 
you're at'. The racialised diasporic subject becomes fixed by the continuous play of the 
fixing regimes of race and ethnicity. And for as long as negation and denial continue to 
be the order of the day, diasporic subjects are forced into the 'cultivation of a lost "where 
you're from"' (Ang 1994). 
The significance of showing how the epidermal schema undermines and undercuts the 
freedom inherent in Merleau-Ponty's corporeal schema is only undertaken by Fanon in 
order to find ways of surmounting it. His fundamental political ideal is one of a universal 
humanity. The power of his fusing of phenomenological and psychoanalytic themes lies 
in showing how difficult this transcendence of objectification must be. He writes: "But I 
did not want this revision, this thernatization. All I wanted was to be a man among other 
men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to build it 
together" (Fanon 1967: 112-3). 
In sum, Merleau-Ponty's notion of embodiment allows us to distinguish two forms of 
historicity. On the one hand, there is a conservative version, whereby the historical is 
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that which is merely past and cannot be changed. In this instance 'origin' refers to a 
once-only inaugural moment. On the other hand, a transformative historicity is 
uncovered whereby the embodied subject transforms what is given through acts of 
motility. Merleau-Ponty assumes that the latter notion of transformation is pre- 
discursive. With Fanon however we see that what is needed in addition is a discursive 
and reflective form of historical transformativity. His account also shows that the pre- 
discursive form is only comprehensible within the sphere of its inter-relation ship with the 
discursive field. Fanon shows then that transformativity cannot just be pre-discursive. 
Freedom and "dis-alienation" from the prison of appearance involves a reflective account 
of how the other positions the diasporic subject and attempts to naturalise this positioning 
through an over-investment in the visual register. And importantly, how diasporic black 
people negotiate this positioning in search of freedom and different mode of being 
beyond white supremacist logic. 
With both Merleau-Ponty and Fanon in mind we can see how it is possible to bridge the 
gap between the experience of different moods of diasporicity. The war between these 
aspects of diasporic experience has been fought on two theoretical fronts: the 'where 
you're from', which is generally associated with essentialism, and the 'where you're at' 
aligned with anti-essentialist and anti -anti -es senti ali st discourse. I want to conclude this 
chapter by suggesting that a cleavage between these two moments is unnecessary and 
wholly untenable if we acknowledge that through embodiment, the black diaspora has 
been 'constituted in the experience of exile and struggle' (hooks 1991: 29). 1 suggest that 
the two moments are mutually implicated and are necessary for comprehending why 
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diasporicity can be a source of both affirmative celebration and of melancholia and 
nostalgia. 
Melancholia and nostalgia have their clearest articulation in various forms of afrocentric 
discourses and some strands of black popular music with their interest in a static and pure 
origin, the 'where you're from'. This position relates to the experience of diasporicity 
from a purely temporal and embodied connection to a bygone, unmediated past. This 
embodied relation to time fails to attend to the difference spaces and places of the present 
make for the diasporic subject. The other celebratory mood entails an affirmative 
relationship to diasporicity. This position celebrates the possibilities and the hybrid 
character of the diasporic embodied presence. This presence implies the body's 
implantation in a given place and the way this place structures modes of being and seeing 
in the world. This is epitomised in Gilroy's evocation of the rap song 'It ain't where 
you're from, it is where you're at'. It is only by confronting the conflict of diasporicity 
openly that we can begin to understand how the two moments in diasporic discourses are 
in fact intertwined 
Thinking diaspora beyond the oppositional logic of either nostalgia of lost origins or the 
celebration of multi-originality is to become aware that these are two moments within the 
diasporic situation, of the here and now present facing its history. Whatever our own 
emotional stance, diaspora is as much about loss and nostalgia as it is about 
transformation and change. We need therefore to attune ourselves to the fact that just as 
one person can experience all these moments simultaneously, so too can a group 
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defined apparently according to one mood or perspective can actually collectively 
experience the other. The constant inquiry into 'where you are from', or the demand to 
be just 'where you're at', militates against any easy celebration or any simple pain of 
diasporicity. It is in this way that we can understand why certain strands of afrocentric 
discourse prove to be so alluring to many diasporic black people. We must therefore 
understand that such discourse is grounded in e-motionality - the anxious emotional logic 
of a community that finds it difficult to accept a metaphysical homelessness in light of a 
history of dispossession. The sense of diaspora I will explore throughout this thesis, 
however, concerns a joy that knows its pain, unlike the affirmation of a painless joy that 
is celebrated in current writing and theory of diaspora. 
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Chapter 2: "My race began as the Sea began"': The Aquatics of 
Diaspora 
As I argued in the previous chapter, diasporic experience is both situated and embodied. I 
suggested that each expression of identity is interwoven within the style or patterning of 
the body's historical and cultural situatedness. With the black diaspora, this patterning 
exists within a socio-historical context of transportation, slavery, multiple migrations and 
the continued lived experience of disadvantage within the white supremacist capitalist 
system. In this chapter, I shall explore attempts to think in more detail about the origin 
and the evolution of the black diaspora through the work of two important black diasporic 
thinkers: Hortense Spillers and Paul Gilroy. In both works, diasporic identity is construed 
in terms of what can be called an aquatic tension, concretised through the figure of the 
ship. Both metaphor and literal vessel of diasporic dislocation and relocation, ships are 
presented as critical in the evolution of the black Atlantic, lying outside of a secure 
economy of territory or a spatially fixed dwelling. In this way, trope and history 
intertwine in the form of the Middle Passage and the slave ship at sea. 
I begin with a reading of Spillers' essay 'Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American 
Grammar Book'(1987). In this text, Spillers argues that the slave ship constitutes the Ur- 
moment of black diasporic identity. The Middle Passage is presented as a site of 
1 Taken from Derek Walcott's poem'Names'(1962) 
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irrecoverable loss that disrupted African kinship structures. For Spillers, this experience 
has shaped African-American gender relations in the present. I will argue that while 
Spillers provides an important analysis of the positioning of enslaved Africans and 
slavery's relationship to the contemporary positioning of black women, the problem is 
that in assuming an absolute hiatus in the Middle Passage, she does not allow for 
constructive agency aboard the ship. 
I then argue that, in contrast, the role of the ship in Gilroy's text, The Black Atlantic: 
Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993) provides an analysis of the production of a 
recuperable affirmative black identity. For Gilroy, the ship represents the (reffashioning 
and reworking of histories and traditions. I will contend that Gilroy's account is an 
improvement on Spillers' precisely because of this positive imaginative potential of the 
ship. However, I shall then argue that Gilroy is able to recuperate the ship as a positive 
element only in terms of decontextualisation from the politic al-economic situation that 
surrounded it at each instance. It is at this point that we will return to Spillers for 
precisely the kind of contextualisation that is missing in Gilroy's account. 
By using Gilroy to highlight faults in Spillers' account and Spillers to do the same in 
reverse, I will, in finishing, begin to establish a position which combines what is 
significant and insightful in both. That is, I shall argue firstly that the figure of the ship 
can serve as the locus for a redemptive and wholly positive imaginative flotation of 
identity. Secondly, I will suggest that this imaginative figuration of the ship at sea can 
function redemptively only through being situated within the political -economic context 
80 
Chapter 2: The Aquatics of Diaspora 
of an ongoing history of pain and oppression. In this way, the real and inexpressible pain 
of journeys once made will be put in relation to the possibility of transforming their 
presence as traces within diasporic agency. 
Spillers' Aquatic Grammar 
Spillers'Mama's Baby'(1987) offers an important, if ambiguous and convoluted, account 
of the positioning of enslaved Africans in relation to the contemporary positioning of 
African-American women. According to Elizabeth Abel, Spillers draws on 'a Lacanian 
discourse politicized through the African-American context'(1990: 187). Spillers begins 
by posing a challenge to the white Western essentialisation of gender as a universal 
biological category that is transferable across cultures and history. At the same time, she 
critiques Anglo-American feminism (in particular object-relations theory) for proposing 
that gender constitution and transmission takes place through "the reproduction of 
mothering" (Chodorow 1978). For Spillers, such claims fail to register 1he structures of 
values, the spectacle of symbols'(1985: 78) which ensured that black and white women's 
points of entry onto the world historical stage are different. For instance, she argues that 
in a context in which enslaved women were constituted as property, reproduction is not a 
reproduction of mothering but of property. In this historical moment, the female captive 
transmits her unfreedorn to her offspring (Bakare-Yusuf 1997). From this critique, 
Spillers begins her argument about the relationship between the denial of gendered 
identity and racial violence by making a distinction between flesh and the body. In an 
earlier essay Interstices: A Small Drama of Words' Spillers argues that because of the 
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history of slavery, diasporic Africans cannot participate in the same way as white women 
in feminist discourses on sexuality. The economic reduction, whereby African women 
were exchanged in the 'market place of the flesh' (1985: 76), violently disrupted and 
denied African naming patterns and kinship structures. 
The distinction Spillers makes between the flesh and the body is important in 
understanding the denial of gender difference among people in captivity and the 
twentieth-century plight of African-American women. The flesh in Spillers' text refers to 
the Lacanian imaginary order figured as autonomous African cultural practices prior to 
European appropriation, and the imposition of an other language and grammar. The flesh 
is the indeterminate, raw material of social constitution. However, with captivity, 
Africans were robbed of this capacity to reproduce and assert their own symbolic order. 
For Spillers, both historically and in the contemporary scene of ongoing violation against 
African-Americans, the flesh functions as the redemptive figure of a world prior to the 
violations of slavery. The flesh is therefore an attempt to capture the sense of community 
and self-definition before life in the New World - in visceral terms. In the language of 
the last chapter, the flesh is an emotion of diasporicity -a discursive attempt to come to 
ten-ns with dispossession and the loss of cultural horizon. The flesh is therefore an 
emotional response to a perceived lack - in autonomous gender construction - rather than 
the name given to a specific historical moment or particular culture. A community of the 
flesh here and now does not and cannot take place - given the history of slavery and its 
effects on the present. In my view, it is precisely because of the difference of the 
diasporic present that the flesh as an originary actuality is not possible since it is itself an 
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imagined origin. The flesh, Spillers tells us, is in fact totally concealed - revealing the 
extent of the ongoing dispossession for diasporic Africans. Part of Spillers' claim then is 
that the European appropriative symbolic has yet to lift away from diasporic African 
cultures. The flesh stands as a figure of resistance against this enframing - an ideal of the 
corporeal that collects community and justice in its wake. The absolute non-existence of 
the flesh within the European symbolic therefore represents the denial of autonomy in the 
time of a white hetero-patriarchal hegemony. The flesh therefore concerns survival in the 
midst of an ongoing history of hardship, violence and lack of gender distinction. As 
Spillers writes, the diasporic body, figured as flesh, is what 'carries the female and the 
male to the frontiers of survival' (1987: 67). 
In order to get more of a grasp of this notion of the flesh, it is worthwhile comparing it to 
the account of the flesh given by Merleau-Ponty. For Merleau-Ponty, the 'flesh' 
represents 'being, not as plenitude, self-identity, or substance but as divergence or non- 
coincidence - being's most elemental level' (Grosz 1994: 100). The flesh refers to the 
reciprocal intertwining of beings in the world. This intertwining does not meld into 
union; rather, reciprocal co-being is maintained through difference and separation. The 
flesh gestures towards an embodiment of community that can only be given as different, 
as that which presents itself as a trace or as a subversive potentiality. The flesh does not 
and cannot coincide or converge upon the present; it cannot be a simple given; it is 
'being's dual orientation inward and outward, being's openness, its reflexivity' (ibid: 100). 
For both Merleau-Ponty and Spillers, the flesh then stands for something like the paradox 
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of a corporeal ideal -a yet-to-be-realised possibility for the body -a redemption from a 
disenchanted history and a dispossessed present (for the former, the legacy of dualist 
thought, for the latter, the legacy of slavery). The difference between the two accounts 
has to do with time. The flesh is not static for Merleau-Ponty; it refers to the world's 
temporal procession as it folds upon itself through relays of expression and response. The 
flesh therefore presents itself as a gathering that is forever displaced into the yet-to-come 
-a communication or transfer between all beings that perpetually re-opens the world to 
change beyond itself once again. In contrast, Spillers' flesh assumes a pristine, 
homogenised economy that is untouched by internal disruption and untroubled by social 
drama. In her account, the Atlantic Slave systems disturbed this structure, interrupting 
'hundreds of years of African culture' (1987: 68). The flesh is thus denied the active 
engagement between embodied agents and historically changing and mutating social 
habitus in the manner of Merleau-Ponty's account. Again, it is perhaps the effects of the 
emotionality at work in Spillers' text, as a work of loss and mourning, that leads to the 
flesh being frozen into a figure of nostalgic yearning. 
While Merleau-Ponty's account of the flesh compares with Spillers, his 
phenomenological approach ultimately does not provide an account of the power 
dynamics inflecting inter-subjective relations. In contrast, through the distinction she 
makes between body andflesh, Spillers provides a powerful account of the effacement 
and disruption of the communal ideal of the flesh. Enslavement invaded the potentiality 
of the flesh, transforming it into the inscribed surface that 
Spillers designates as the body. 
Spillers' "body" compares with Foucault's inscribed, disciplined and surveyed 
body. The 
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captive African "body" is controlled by the demands of the master and economic 
imperatives. As in Foucault's account, the body in Spillers is imprinted by history, coded 
as a sign for enslavement and objectification, where raw violence, economic forces and 
ideological investment coalesce. 2 For Spillers, the captive body became the surface for 
horrific acts of torture, involving the laceration of the skin, giving way to 'woundings, 
fissures, tears, scars, openings, ruptures, lesions, rendings, punctures of the flesh' (1987: 
67). The body is that which is objectified, given a price, put to work and forced into the 
production and reproduction of plantation economy. Spillers argues that the 
objectification and commodification of the African body opened 'up the entire western 
hemisphere for the specific purpose of enslavement and colonization' (ibid: 71). In the 
process, the slavers were able to construct and consolidate their own identity as the 
captive communities were relegated to the position of non-being; the marketplace of 
flesh. 
Sander Gilman makes a similar point in his essay 'Black Bodies, White Bodies'(1980). 
For Gilman, black female presence in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe enabled 
white people to assert their inherent difference from black people, and simultaneously 
sexualised the white world. The physical characteristics of the black female - her skin 
colour, her nose, her genitalia - especially, the so-called female Hottentot Venus, served 
as the representational and perceptual category for nineteenth century medical discourse 
2 The implication of a disciplinary order at work on the captive African body nonetheless remains a 
blindspot of Foucault's work - strange for a thinker so engrossed in providing genealogies of modernity. 
Foucault's work on seventeenth and eighteenth century public spectacles of torture and nineteenth century 
strategies of surveillance in the production of the subject has been used to theorise the spectacle 
surrounding lynching (see Robyn Wiegman 1995) 
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and aesthetic representation. Gilman notes that attention was focused on the enlarged 
buttocks of the Hottentot, which came to represent excessive, incommensurable sexuality 
and the source of corruption and disease. For Spillers, this investment into pathological 
corporeality and hyperbolic sexuality 'did not transform the black female into an 
embodiment of camality'(1985: 76). Instead, black women represent the beached whales 
of the sexual universe, unvoiced, misseen, not doing, waiting their verb. Their sexual 
experiences are depicted, but not often by them' (ibid: 74). The captive body, Spillers 
writes, 
becomes the source of an irresistible, destructive sensuality; [ ... ] at the 
same time - in stunning contradiction the captive body reduces to a 
thing, becoming being for the captor; [ in this absencefrom a subject 
position, the captured sexualities provide a physical and biological 
expression of "otherness"; [ ... ] as a category of physical powerlessness 
that slides into a more general "powerlessness", resonating through various 
centres of human and social meaning. (1987: 67) 
This generalised powerlessness and woundedness coincided with dehumanising naming 
practices. In the context of enslavement and colonisation, naming is aligned with power 
and ownership. The inscription on the flesh through laceration is perpetuated and 
rendered meaningful through its substitution in language. Within the new symbolic, 
ascension into language authorised the power to name, to establish and impose Law onto 
the world, but only for the enslaver(s). Located within a new symbolic as a dehumanised 
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commodity, the power to name and 'make the world in their own image, to impose this 
image on the world' (Baldwin 1951: 49 -50) was denied to the captives. Spillers sees the 
significance of the power to name as imperative to survival. She writes, 'Sticks and 
bricks might break our bones, but words will most certainly kill us' (1987: 68). The 
different names African-American women have been known by within the dominant 
symbolic order - "Peaches" and "Brown Sugar", "Sapphire" and "Earth Mother", "Aunty", 
II Granny", God's "Holy Fool", a "Miss Ebony", or "Black Woman at the Podium" (Spillers 
1987: 65) - 'demonstrate the powers of distortion that the dominant community seizes as 
its unlawful prerogative' (ibid: 69). 
In his book, The Wounded Body: Remembering the Markings of Flesh (2000), Dennis 
Patrick Slattery, links acts of wounding to practices of naming. 'Our wounds', he writes, 
'name us and give the trajectory of our destiny. They identify and mark us. Our name, 
along with our wound, records us in the world' (2000: 15). Finally, he asks: 'do our 
names in some way wound us as well? '(ibid: 15). Spillers' reply would be an emphatic 
'yes', for as she writes, 'naming [is] one of the key sources of bitter Americanizing for 
African persons' (1987: 73). As noted in the last chapter, this is the moment when the 
corporeal schema of the flesh is challenged by the violence and the force of technologies 
of vision Fanon characterises as the 'historico-racial schema'. Spillers argues that being 
named and marked as property is the key element in understanding the contemporary 
negative positioning of black diasporic subjects. Henceforth, the quest for contemporary 
renaming is a matter of survival. Spillers therefore presents the displaced, specularised 
body, especially the female diasporic African body, as the objectified, violated and 
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mechanised captive state of a repressed flesh. 
For Spillers, being dislocated, misnamed and reduced to a commodified property, 
constituted 'a high crime against the flesh' (1987: 67). This crime is even more 
pronounced when set against the background of a prior corporeal harmony: If we think of 
the "flesh" as a primary narrative, then we mean its seared, divided, ripped-apartness, 
riveted to the ship's hole, fallen, or "escaped" overboard' (ibid: 67). In this account 
(common to both Spillers and Fanon), the relationship between "captives" seems to 
correspond with flesh (corporeal schema) and the "liberated" with body (historico-racial 
schema). 
The distinction outlined here between flesh and body frames Spillers' idea of the 
fundamental relation between gender constitution and place. As Elizabeth Abel (1990) 
observes in her reading of Mama's Baby', Spillers follows orthodox Lacanian thought by 
linking gender constitution with the domestic. More specifically, the domestic is 
highlighted in Spillers' text as a fundamental site of significance. Implicit in her 
argument is the merging of flesh onto the production of gender within the home. The 
domestic is both the primary site of gender constitution and offers the most stable site for 
refiguring a dispossessed black (male and female) gendered body. For Spillers, 
fit gendering" takes place within the confines of the domestic' (1987: 72). It is here that 
proper names, inheritance, identity and socio-cultural norinativity are established and 
reproduced. The domestic is 'an essential metaphor that then spreads its tentacles for the 
male and female subject over a wider ground of human and social purposes' (ibid: 72). 
88 
Chapter 2: The Aquatics of Diaspora 
As such, the slavers' hold, with its human cargo, cannot be seen as an element of the 
domestic (Spillers 1987: 72). For captive communities, situated outside the domestic and 
within the frame of the body not flesh, gender identity is effaced. The domestic sphere is 
posited as the only discursive context for gender constitution. To speak of the 'domestic' 
therefore is to mark the site of a return home, to a secure economy, to the familiar - in this 
case, to the flesh of an African foundational homeland. And outside of the context of an 
original home, kinship and gender structures are skewed or perverted: 'The human cargo 
of a slave vessel - in the fundamental effacement and remission of African family and 
proper names - offers a counter-narrative to notions of the domestic' (ibid: 72). The 
slave-hold is the other side of the domestic, its grotesque parody. In this reversal of 
sociality, Abel writes that 'not only is gender severed from biology but also that "biology" 
shifts [ ... ] from the arena of sexual 
difference' (1990: 188). 
For Spillers, the slave ship constitutes the founding moment of flesh turning to body and 
the effacement of African kinship structure. In her text, the slave ship or Middle Passage 
cannot in any way be redeemed as a positive, hybrid space of black diasporicity. 
Dramatically, Spillers reads the suspension at sea in the paradoxical terms of an absolute 
violation of hitherto inviolable frameworks - specifically gender structure and its 
connection to the home-place-domestic unit. Spillers writes, 
First off all, their New-World, diasporic plight marked a theft of the body - 
a willful and violent [ ... ] severing of the captive 
body from As motive 
will, its active. Under these conditions, we lose at 
least gender difference 
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in the outcome, and the female body and the male body become a territory 
of cultural and political manoeuvre, not at all gender related, gender- 
specific. (Spillers 1987: 67) 
The sublime inexpressibility of the Middle Passage and slavery is the effect of this 
inviolable violation. As the conduit for the transfer of African bodies, the slave ship is 
thus posited as a vessel of effacement, brutalisation and a commodification that at the 
same time robbed Africans of their gender identity. 
It is worthwhile at this early stage to note how this figuration of the place of the ship and 
the Middle Passage compares with other theorisations in which the Middle Passage 
constitutes an imaginative resource for a transformative diasporic sensibility. For 
example, as I will show in a moment, for Gilroy the ship is characterised as a positive, 
hybrid black imaginative vessel. Again, Wilson Harris reconceptualises the slave ship as 
a place that engendered a new cultural practice, concretised in the form of a dance - 
limbo. The limbo dance is an important element of Caribbean cultural life; it involves the 
gradual lowering of the body in order to pass through to the other side of the pole with the 
knees first. For Harris, the limbo dance emerged out of the constricted space and the 
distorted spider-like poses Africans were forced into aboard the slave ship. This dance 
created a bridge, or, as Harris puts it, a 'gateway which dislocates (and therefore begins to 
free itself from) a uniform chain of miles across the Atlantic' (1970: 159). In this 
reformulation, the ship emerged as 'the renascence of a new corpus of sensibility that 
could translate and accommodate African and other legacies within a new architecture of 
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cultures'(ibid: 158). 
Under Spillers' scrutiny, however, there can be no redemptive conceptualisation of the 
ship as the rebirth of 'a new corpus of sensibility'. The slavers' ship and the patterns of 
relations generated can only be theorised as a profound site of historical terror and trauma 
that continues to assert its force in the contemporary. As Spillers writes, 
Even though the captive fleshibody has been "liberated", and no one need 
pretend that even the quota tion marks do not matter, dominant symbolic 
activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and 
valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and 
mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and 
its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is "murdered" over and 
over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, 
showing itself in endless disguise. (1987: 68) 
Using the Freudian term "oceanic" 'as an analogy for undifferentiated identity' (1987: 72), 
Spillers contends that insofar as the captives were 'literally suspended in the "oceanic", 
they could not assume a gendered position. It should be clear that Spillers is aware of the 
I application of gender rule' in the spatial organisation of the slavers' 
hold and the routine 
sexual violation of slave women. However, the kind of theoretical register she pursues 
takes the symbolic and juridical disregard for the gender of the captive as the 
final 
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indication of the captives' status. Moreover, she is insistent that within the legal and 
discursive context that positioned the captive communities as sub-human, economic 
reproducing machines, gender identity is effaced. 
By being literally suspended in the 'oceanic', Africans 'were also nowhere at all'. Spillers 
writes, 'we could say that they were the culturally "unmade", thrown in the midst of a 
figurative darkness that "exposed" their destinies to an unknown course'(ibid: 72). This 
oceanic suspension is 'a metaphor of the slave's perpetually suspended social definition' 
(Abel 1990: 188). It also inaugurated the conditions of insecurity and anxiety that are still 
today a feature of diasporic male and female experience. 
But, in keeping with Gilroy and Harris, we could argue that in this situation, the slaves 
could have asked, as the African-American rap group Public Enemy would later ask, 
'What's the timeT And the response, 'It's Nation time', could have marked the prelude to 
transformation, to rebellion, to the forging of connection across difference, to 
transcending historical time by 'asserting the irreducible priority of the present' (Gilroy 
1993: 202). What Spillers passes over is the possibility that even in extreme situations 
the opportunities for resistance exist in the shadow of external imprint of power. Against 
this, Spillers wants to show that gendered practices existed within a symbolic and legal 
order that denied 'every feature of social and human differentiation regarding the 
African-American person'(1987: 78). 
In sum, for Spillers, the ship is particularised 
historically as the site of an absolute 
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disruption of the ideal fleshed existence. It therefore cannot be recuperated as a positive 
space, nor is it ever a cause for celebration. In this argument, the Atlantic becomes a site 
of a painful black diasporic hiatus. From Spillers' account it would appear that the 
"catastrophic rupture" of the Middle Passage forces a repositioning of origin, specifically 
an origin based on the aqueous. Spillers is drawing on the image of the ocean in relation 
to the metaphor of "the oceanic state" - for example, the foetus floating inside the 
mother's amniotic fluid. The rupture of the Middle Passage is therefore figured as a 
violent and metaphorical return to the womb, in order to suffer rebirth in the inscribed, 
historical slave body. It is this figuration which allows her to insist that the "aquatic" and 
violated flesh is without gender. Through challenging the fundamentality or'grammar'of 
gender, assumed in Anglo-American feminism, Spillers outlines an identity without 
'ground', an aquatic suspended identity. However, Spillers presents this origin as a 
profound disruption of the connection between identity and territory, and correlatively the 
self-donating power of naming. A loss of territory is for her ultimately a loss of selfhood. 
The Middle Passage is therefore a site of cultural chaos, separation and irreparable loss 
and longing. In this text, Spillers makes no separation between the 'experience of 
separation which is painful, difficult, and psychically violent, and the violence of 
domination which is a very different thing' (Weir 1996: 150). 
Gilroy's Black Atlantic 
In contrast with Spillers' negative oceanic trajectory is Paul Gilroy's book The Black 
Atlantic (1993). Gilroy proposes another method of conceptualising the history of the 
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black diaspora that moves away from specific periodisations - of a backward looking pre- 
colonial Africa and a forward looking North America. Instead, he proposes that we 
embrace the ways in which roots are figured and reconfigured in the black Atlantic 
imaginary in the multiple routes diasporic Africans have taken in the continuous process 
of routing and re-rooting. This allows him to 'reexamine the problems of nationality, 
location, identity and historical memory' (Gilroy 1993: 16) that are central to African- 
American intellectuals' quest for freedom and justice during and after slavery. Like 
Spillers, Gilroy also opens up this enterprise by troping the marine and the naval. Ships 
and the fluid excessivity of the water offer Gilroy a "chronotype" for thinking about an 
identity that is not anchored to one national territory but rather favours the global and 
transatlantic 'circulation of ideas and activities' (ibid: 4). As with Spillers, for Gilroy 
ships have a central place in the black diasporic imagination. They evoke the 
transatlantic commerce in African bodies that is central to understanding the experience 
of diasporic black people and their positioning vis-a-vis European modemity: 
I have settled on the image of ships in motion across the spaces between 
Europe, America, Africa and the Caribbean as a central organising symbol 
for this enterprise and as my starting point. The image of the ship -a 
living, micro-political system in motion - is especially important for 
historical and theoretical reasons Ships immediately focus attention 
on the Middle Passage. (ibid: 4) 
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The horror of the Middle Passage and the condition of unfreedom are, in Spillers'words, 
the 'ethical and sentimental features that tied [black people together] across the landscape 
to others [ ... ] in a common fabric of memory and inspiration' (1987: 75). According to 
Gilroy however, such a historical experience generated its antithesis, articulated in the 
'various struggles towards emancipation, autonomy, and citizenship' (Gilroy 1993: 16). 
Ships and the Middle Passage constitute an important symbol of the 'various projects for 
redemptive return to an African homeland' (ibid: 4), as well as the cross border dialogue 
with the modem West, acting as the catalyst for revolts, resistance struggle and distinct 
political, philosophical and expressive cultures. According to Joan Dayan, for Gilroy, 
ships become an important 'vessel of transit and means to knowledge' (1996: 7). 
The ship is therefore offered as a chronotype for a metaphysics of history not grounded in 
an original home or a land-based topography but through complex hybrid trans-national 
interactions. This perspective acknowledges the interplay of history. That is, the ship in 
the ocean is recognised as a movement between histories and across cultures and 
geographical spaces. Historical and cultural fixity of ownership is denied through a fluid 
tropism. For Gilroy, the various voyages across the Atlantic produce a processuality that 
is not restricted to the New World or the Old World, nor do they represent the loss of 
cultural horizon, rather they produce the opening up of new histories and the imaginative 
transformation of cultural meanings. The Atlantic becomes the site of memory and loss. 
In his book, Song of the Earth, Michel Haar writes that the sea is 'the place of 
forgetfulness but where forgetfulness turns into memory, an impoverished place, a place 
of solitude and extreme errancy ("without paths"), but where all richness commences' 
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(1993: 144). Suspended between existences at sea, the African is therefore not the person 
she was at the beginning of the voyage, but she is not yet what she will become. She has 
no history, or the history she has becomes just one history among many. With such a 
mode of subjectivity, history and memory are integrated within an aquatic suspension of 
rich possibilities. The elemental suspension at sea therefore open up new forms of 
histories, subjectivities and cultures that are in the process of being articulated and re- 
articulated. 
Gilroy's emphasis on the suspension of the elemental does not suggest a loss of 
subjectivity or history, but rather a construction of identity that is divorced from the fixity 
of land and national borders 3. In other words, the sea does not mimic or trope the 
groundlessness of a deconstruction that empties the subject of all content and all means of 
expression. According to Gilroy, black identity can be 'understood neither as a fixed 
essence nor as a vague and utterly contingent construction to be reinvented by the will 
and whim of aesthetes, symbolists, and language gamers'(1993: 102). Rather, the images 
of the naval and the marine allow Gilroy to rework the subject's relation to its outside, to 
its environment and what might be considered as 'its own'. This incorporation of alterity 
with the subject destabilises any notion of a singular and national origin. Here Gilroy 
references African-American thinkers and artists as diverse as Edward Wilmot Blyden, 
W. E. B Dubois, Richard Wright and Toni Morrison, whose influences extend beyond their 
national border. I suggest that this grounding of identity in the suspension of the ship 
3 But as Madan Sarup rightly insists, identities are situated and limited by borders and boundaries' (1994: 
94). Indeed, Gilroy's critique of black cultural nationalists and Afro-centric thinkers reveal that his own 
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prevents the stamp of ownership on the fluid, excessivity of the sea. For Haar, the sea is 
'an unpossessed, unpossessable place where every mark of ownership, where every limit, 
is effaced, an elemental place' (1993: 149). An aquatic identity thus opens up new 
cultural horizon to be explored, reworked and assimilated into the collective cultural 
repertoire. 
Anchoring the black diaspora within the infinite fluidity of the sea, Gilroy aims to 
destabilise what he calls 'cultural nationalism', 'ethnic absolutism' or 'racial essentialism'. 
He rightly rebukes black nationalists such as Molefi Kete Asante (1988) who fail to 
accept the hybrid and creole origins of black identity and cultural production (Gilroy 
1993: 73). According to Gilroy, hybridity is rejected in this discourse because slavery is 
seen as a 'site of victimage and thus tradition's intended erasure' (ibid: 189). Gilroy also 
argues against theories that seek to disentangle enlightem-nent modernity from the 
brutality of racial slavery by suggesting that 'racial terror is not merely compatible with 
occidental rationality but cheerfully complicit with it' (Gilroy 1993: 56). However, while 
it is true that Gilroy mounts a powerful challenge against some of the excesses of black 
nationalism, it is also true that he often oversteps the mark. For instance, George Lipsitz 
asserts that Gilroy 'defines as "essentialist" just about any strategy that relies on ethnic 
solidarity' (1995: 197). 
Nonetheless, Gilroy's locating of black diasporic identity within the 'aqueous tension' of 
the Middle Passage and the memory of slavery entails that the notion that purity, 
diasporic identity remain limited national boundary. 
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ownership and nationality as the 'ground' of culture is contested. The insistent relation 
between identity and territory on earth is denied by de-centering any emphasis that would 
otherwise be placed on the latter. In Gilroy's Black Atlantic, black identity, tradition, 
cultural production and origin are therefore reconfigured as a multiple originary 
suspension, a bracketing of the historical, a rupture that will open up a hybrid history and 
plural cultural forms to come. Gilroy's project is therefore akin to the archaeology of 
history described by Wilson Harris in his important essay 'History, Fable and Myth in the 
Caribbean and Guianas' (1970). Here, Harris calls for a re-writing of Caribbean history 
that acknowledges the 'gateways between civilisations, between technological and 
spiritual apprehensions, between racial possessions and dispossession' (1970: 166). 
Gilroy thus wants us to read his text and the black diaspora as a celebration of 'mongrel 
cultural forms [ ... ] cultural mutation and restless (dis)continuity that exceed racial 
discourse and avoid capture by its agents' (Gilroy 1993: 2-3). 
One of the sources for Gilroy's alternative historicity and challenge to a territorial 
conception of identity is the philosophy of Nietzshe. It is worthwhile reciting one of the 
quotes that preface the book, taken from Friedrich Nietzsche's The Gay Science, headed 
'In the horizon of the infinite': 
We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned the bridges 
behind us - indeed we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. 
Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not 
always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries 
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of graciousness. But hours will come when you realize that it is infinite 
and there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that 
felt free now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick 
for the land as if it had offered more freedom-and there is no longer any 
"land". (Nietzsche 1974: 180 my emphasis added) 
That this is one of the quotes prefacing The Black Atlantic is a powerful reminder of 
Gilroy's quest to disentangle racial identity from territorialism. Gilroy, however, leaves 
this dense passage unexplored, as if its work is the thematic overture to the explicit 
thematisations of his text. This is a pity, because there is much in the text that needs to be 
made explicit. In Nietzsche's text, there is a positive affirmation of movements; away 
from land, from fixity, from dwelling, from what Luce Irigaray has called the 'mechanics 
of the solid' towards 'the "mechanics" of the fluid' (1985 106 - 107). This also entails 
destroying all that is associated with the land: mastery, property, 'national self- 
determination' (Boyarin and Boyarin 1993: 711). The passage embraces journeys into 
the unknown, into the unbounded ocean and into a place beyond dwelling, beyond the 
horizon. It is a celebration of potentialities, of contradictions, of limitlessness, of infinity 
and flows. An opening into new dreams and dreaming - gracious reveries. An invitation 
to forsake attachment to residency while taking refuge in the continuous flow of the 
unbounded ocean where ships criss-cross each other, creating wakes as they go. 
But Nietzsche's text is not only a celebration of the journey away from land; there is also 
a moment of fear, when the vastness of the elemental threatens to submerge the subject 
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through the aphasia of the sublime: when hours are spent mesmerised by the 
awesomeness of the infinite. At this moment, a desire for a return to the land itself is 
rendered impossible. The last statement 'Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if 
it had offered morefreedom - and there is no longer any "land... can be read as a caution 
against any notion of an unproblematical non-transformative return. The futility of 
nostalgia is revealed. As I argued in the previous chapter, once the seaward journey is 
embarked upon, there can never be a return to the land. At least, the land can never be 
the same; it cannot endure as the receptacle for the same flesh. For dispossessed 
communities, the land can no longer be a territory or a possession on which we can 
unproblematic ally stamp our identity on, even as it becomes the site of yearning and 
nostalgic investment. Embarkation means that the land has been transformed because we 
have been transformed - by the journey, and by the suspension of history that is the 
encounter with the elemental. In this way the passage can be read as homage to 
forgetting: forgetting not as tabula rasa, but as I shall argue in a moment, as that which 
motivates action in the present. In other words, here, forgetting is active, an activity, 
involving memory as hiatus, and the site of renascence - the birth of a new culture and 
means of expression. 
For Gilroy then, the encounter with the elemental provides a counter-narrative to the 
desire for purity and cultural proprietary. On board the ships, slaves and freed were 
between histories and cultural imprints. The Atlantic becomes the shared history of 
Europe and the Africans they enslaved. As Derek Walcott writes, 'The sea is history'; the 
fluid tension that constitutes and animate the black diaspora: 
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My race began as the sea began, 
with no nouns, and with no horizon, 
with pebbles under my tongue 
with a different fix on the stars. (Walcott 1976: 305) 
This elemental non-foundational metaphysics is what Gilroy offers as the birth of a new 
mode of conceptualising the Black Atlantic. His troping of the elemental is a way of 
mapping a reconfigured origin - in the plural - for the African diaspora. Rather than the 
site of absolute loss and memory, as in Spillers' account, the ship is celebrated as the 
engine of new forms of cultural expression. Diasporic cultural production such as music 
is offered as the clearest articulation of these new plural origins. 
Gilroy's passion for the interstitial imaginative productivity of the ship through the history 
of modernity parallels Foucault's notion of heterotopia as discussed in his essay 'Of Other 
Spaces'. For Foucault, a heterotopia is a space that is in process with itself, a temporal 
object open to difference and alterity. Foucault writes, 
Brothels and colonies are two extreme types of heterotopia, and if we 
think, after all, that the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a 
place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is 
given over to the infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, from tack to 
tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of 
treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat 
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has not only been for our civilisation, from the sixteenth century until the 
present, the great instrument of economic development ... I but has been 
simultaneously the greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the 
heterotopia per excellence. (1986: 27) 
This passage is the closest Foucault gets to discussing slavery and colonialism, which, it 
has to be said, is not very close! The subject in his imagery is the male sailor, who is not 
a slave, and who is bound to visit successive brothels as his ship moves from point to 
point in its colonial quest. The heterotopia is a paradigmatic contested space whose name 
is challenged across time. For Foucault, like Gilroy, the ship is the heterotopia par 
excellence. As a complex temporal object, the ship connects civilisations and reveals the 
'treasures they conceal in their gardens' (Foucault 1986: 27). Although they are aware of 
the ship as a 'great instrument of economic development' (ibid: 27), both theorists 
however place greater emphasis on its imaginative potential. 
The Political Economic Decontextualisation of the Ship 
At this juncture, after uncovering the redemptive recuperation of the ship in Gilroy's 
project, I am led to what I find problematic in his celebration of the naval hybrid. Gilroy 
is able to construct a wholly positive aquatic experience of black diasporic identity only 
on the basis of a fundamental lack of context. In a sense, this decontextualisation is a 
deliberate ploy, because the ship is being used as a metaphor or trope. However, using 
the ship as a metaphor is itself a form of reduction. The figure of the ship as figure serves 
to bracket out different situations and contexts within which other times and other 
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journeys are inscribed. As 'a complex temporal object' differentiating itself across time. 
the journey of the ship and slavery cannot be divorced from the specific contexts of their 
production and the economics of the sailing. What is missing in Gilroy's aqueous 
discourse is a balance between metaphor, imagination and the concrete historical 
situations of global capitalism and how they combine to shape black Atlantic cultures. 
Spillers' text provides a complementary remedy to this by highlighting the economic 
relations and exploitation lurking in the image of the ship. 
Aside from his comment that slavery is 'capitalism with its clothes off, Gilroy does not 
specify in any satisfactory way how networks of power, economic flows and gendered 
identity contribute to the development of racial consciousness and the capitalist world 
system. By over-dramatising the link between slavery and European Enlightenment 
modernity, Gilroy cannot make the point that the paradox of development and 
underdevelopment in Africa, the Caribbean and North America (so well explored by 
Walter Rodney (1972), Eric Williams (1964), Manning Marable (1983) and others) 
continues to push Africans and diasporic Africans away from their cultural habitus as 
they search for material betterment. In so doing, Gilroy renders 
"belated, " [ ... ] the vast and collective 
historical experiences - of indenture, 
wage labor, forced migrationg colonization, etc - that subtended and 
existed alongside slavery and that are as inextricably constitutive of the 
modem world as slavery is. (Neil Lazarus 1995: 334) 
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Thus, in presenting slavery as a dominating form of discontinuity within modernity, 'What 
might have been gained by the application of the concept of the capitalist world system is 
lost in the application of the concept of the black Atlantic' (Lazarus 1995: 334). 1 suggest 
that a singular focus on the ship as figure and metaphor is overly reductive. Whilst 
slavery was certainly a significant rupture in modernity, it was by no means the grounding 
and root cause of all its discontinuities. It is much more plausible to suggest a complex 
array of factors that affected each other to produce a shifting series of discontinuities of 
which trans-Atlantic slavery is a significant aspect. 
Focusing attention on the economics of the slave ship, Spillers reveals not only the terror 
and the agony anterior to the joys and all Ihe playful diasporic intimacy that has been a 
marked feature of transnational black Atlantic creativity' (Gilroy 1993: 16), but also its 
economics. In Gilroy's account, the differences at work in the production of diasporic 
experience tend to be reduced in the direction of a unified imaginative potential and a de- 
econornised 'purely cultural' exchange. The redemption through the image of the ship 
therefore enacts a reduction upon how we consider the experience at work within these 
different contexts. A positive recuperation of the Middle Passage, by weaving it with the 
broader stitching of Black Atlantic cultural production, threatens to disentangle it from 
economic relations and the way in which this relation continues to impact on black 
cultural production. 
Nowhere in Gilroy's account is there room for the difference between the forced or 
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economically motivated journeys towards the unknown (towards the Americas or to 
Britain or wherever the auction block may be) and the voluntary self-exploratoryjoumeys 
on ships of Wright, the Fisk singers and so on. The joy and rapture accorded to the Fisk 
Jubilee singers, who sang "No More Auction Block for Me" to the gleeful pleasure of the 
Prince of Wales in the early 1870s cannot be compared with that of the captive bodies in 
chains who were directed from the ships towards the auction block. Whilst Gilroy would 
probably not want to make such a comparison, he nevertheless collapses the two, in such 
a way that his metaphorical ship does not allow itself to encounter the difference between 
ships bound by pain and ships bound for pleasure, self-exploration and quest for freedom 
and citizenship. 
Although Spillers' argument also privileges slavery, she is nonetheless careful to argue 
for a specificity to the historical structure of the Middle Passage. For Spillers, the slave 
ship has its own real economy -a scale of economically rational measures. As was 
mentioned above, this is illustrated in the 'application of gender rule' in the spatial 
organisation of the slavers' ship. Citing Elizabeth Donnan's work on slavery, Spillers 
notes that men were allowed six feet by one foot and girls four feet six by one. These 
f scaled inequalities' meant, however, that women were 'nevertheless, quantifiable by the 
same rules of accounting as her male counterpart' (1987: 72). In this instance we lose 
gender differentiations: 
one is neither female, nor male, as both subjects are taken into 64account" 
as quantities. The female in "Middle Passage", as the apparently smaller 
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physical mass, occupies "less room" in a directly translateable money 
economy. But she is, nevertheless, quantifiable by the same rules of 
accounting as her male counterpart. (ibid: 72) 
Here, Spillers provides an economic contextualisation that contrasts with Gilroy's utopic 
conceptualisation of the ship and the elemental. Far from being a positive space, the ship 
inaugurated what Spillers calls the 'profitable "atomizing" of the captive body' (1987: 68). 
For Spillers, the captives'bodies were not only marked as reproductive commodities; they 
also became the conduits for medical research. 
Among the myriad uses to which the enslaved community was put, 
Goodell identifies its value for medical research: "Assortments of 
diseased, damaged, and disabled Negroes, deemed incurable and otherwise 
worthless are bought up, it seems ... by medical 
institutions, to be 
experimented and operated upon, for purposes of 'medical education' and 
the interest of medical science. (Goodell cited in Spillers 1987: 68) 
In refusing to map the 'myriad uses' to which knowledge was put and the 
commodification of bodies, Gilroy unwittingly reduces all ships and slavery to the kind of 
relativism that he is overtly keen to distance himself from. He is unable to think the ship 
beyond its transformative bridging metaphorics. Although "contamination", "hybridity", 
II complicity", "racial terror" are constant refrains in his text, the Middle Passage and 
slavery are ultimately an opportunity to declare a mature transnational. 
black Atlantic 
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network of exchange at home with difference and conversant in Western European 
political and philosophical discourses. For Gilroy, these transnational intellectuals 
pleasurably celebrate impurities as they push beyond the boundary of national 
perspectives (1993: 87). Despite Gilroy's transnational outlook, we do not reach an 
understanding of how black identity and expressive forms are interwoven within global 
capital production. Of course, it would be absurd to reduce these issues to economics 
alone. However, we cannot simply overlook how networks of power, interests and 
economic relations affect and mediate identity and cultural production. After all, Gilroy's 
most venerated cultural form- music - is itself the black cultural form that is open to the 
greatest mass commodification. 
What Spillers' historico-economic contextualisation of the ship suggests is that, 
important as the ship and the elemental suspension is to rethinking history, identity and 
the metaphorico-lingustic problematics of the "ground", it is imperative that we make a 
distinction between forms of suspension. There is a different form of suspension at work 
for objectified captives 'thrown in the midst of a figurative darkness' (Spillers 1987: 72), 
waiting in terror, from that experienced by Du Bois, Wright, or Soul H Soul, or to that 
produced by globe-trotting, waiting in harbours, in airports or in dj boxes. How can we 
understand in terms of cultural exchange the experience of the unfreed gathering the 
strength of waiting - singing unheeded songs as they keep vigil and await the daystar in 
the hold of the slave ship? We cannot. In contrast, the slave narrative of Olaudah 
Equiano illustrates difference in forms of suspension at sea: 
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[The sea, the slave ship] filled me with astonishment, which was soon 
converted into terror, when I was carried on board the ship. I was 
immediately handled, and tossed up to see if I were sound, by some of the 
crew; and I was now persuaded that I had gotten into a world of bad 
spirits, and that they were going to kill me. (cited in Spillers 1987: 69) 
Although obvious, it is worth reiterating in the face of Gilroy's text that the Equianos of 
the Middle Passage were not free subjects entering a self-chosen space; rather, their 
enforcement into the ship was ruled by the violence of economy and the economy of 
violence which sought to transform them into productive and reproductive machines. 
Of course, specific situations within the period reveal specific differences - none of which 
Gilroy's generalised and quasi -metaphorical account can articulate. Whilst some slaves 
travelled as captives, in other situations a more complex scenario was at work. As Joan 
Dayan argues, by collapsing different forms of suspension into one framework, Gilroy 
cannot account for 'the conversion of emancipated blacks into movable property, 
periodically sent out of the United States to Haiti from 1824 to 1864' (Dayan 1996: 10). 
Indeed, according to Dayan, Gilroy 'fails to account for the kind of self-invention 
necessitated by a racist Union' (1996: 11) which sent Fredrick Douglass to lead a black 
nation such as Haiti. Gilroy's carefully chosen trans-Atlantic figures are like the figure of 
the exile described by Haar in the text referred to above. Drawing on figures from the 
poetry of Saint-John Perse, notably that of The Stranger, The Wanderer and Nomad, The 
Pilgrim, Haar notes how the exhilic condition in Perse is devoid of a political frame, 
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It is an exile within being that excludes every political or even 
psychological connotation[ ... ] these insistent figures of the exile in the 
poetry of Perse are not men driven out, persecuted like the contemporary 
refugee, dissident, expatriate; they do not suffer mortally like those 
banished or ostracised from ancient cities. Joy and rapture accompany 
them on their journey. Where are they going? Toward an abode both 
more humble and richer, nearer and more remote. (1993: 148) 
These exiles do not suffer the anxiety of waiting in terror associated with an unknown 
destination. One might respond here by saying that there is a political context to Gilroy's 
travellers. I would respond in turn that the fact that Gilroy collapses such different 
scenarios within one poetical framework is itself a work of profound theoretical 
decontextualisation of the political. Aboard the ships, these interstitial figures travel with 
relative ease, even if freedom has been and continues to be fought for. In contrast, for the 
captives, 'packed like so many live sardines among the immovable objects' (Spillers 
1987: 70), the space of the ship, 'a place without a place' (Foucault 1986: 27), was the 
site of trauma - far from being the pleasurable hybridity Gilroy is keen to celebrate. 
While I agree with Gilroy's attempt to redeem the Middle Passage in the context of an 
ongoing history of journeys of cultural exchange, I cannot agree with the way in which he 
does it. The pain of journeys by ship has to be grounded in historically specific 
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experience. In Gilroy's account, the figuration of the ship denies the complex structures 
at work in the making of the black diaspora. As I have suggested, Spillers corrects this 
denial in her expression of the hiatus of experience and discontinuity across the Nhddle 
Passage by drawing attention to the economy of the ship and the discursive effacement of 
gender among the enslaved. The same specificity must be applied to naval journeys of 
joy and exploration of all the Grand Tours of the modem African-American intellectuals 
and cultural producers. Only after this historical, economic and phenomenological 
context has been worked through can we attempt to produce a redemptive synthesis 
concretised in the historico-imaginative construct of the ship. Only then can the ship 
become antiphonal. 
Neutralising Gender Difference 
Gilroy's failure to map the different historical and economic circumstances of ships 
crossing the Atlantic is plagued by yet another parallel deficit: the failure to engage in any 
sustained manner with the specificities of experience on his ship. This oversight prevents 
him from exploring how gender, class, nationality, economic status and education affect 
transatlantic migratory experience from slavery till the present. According to Stafan 
Helmreich, the transatlantic j ourneys and experiences described by Gilroy were 'available 
only to those politically and economically positioned in a male-dominated public sphere' 
(1992: 245). Although Gilroy wishes to argue against this reading by suggesting that 
European travels by New World Africans were not the exclusive preserve of men, in 
reality the Atlantic experiences he privileges were usually more accessible, and at an 
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earlier time, to men rather than to women. For example as noted by Spillers, African men 
constituted a large part of the human cargo that made the initial transatlantic journey. 
Following Herbert Klein's work on African internal slavery, Spillers argues that this has 
to do with the instructions given to Europeans merchants to buy more men than women, 
and also because women were central to the internal African slave market. Against this, 
Spillers argues that 'this observation does not change the reality of African women's 
captivity and servitude in New World communities' (1987: 72). Spillers invites us to 
reflect on the 'fate of the pregnant female captive and the unborn' (ibid: 73); and in so 
doing, she introduces the irreducibly embodied aspects of life on board the ship. At this 
stage, we can begin to imagine the difference in experience for men and women in the 
Middle Passage. While both men and women experienced the brutal effect of the Middle 
Passage, women were particularly vulnerable to sexual victimisation and the pains of 
childbirth. Describing the horrors of the slave ship, bell hooks points out that little 
attention was paid to the welfare of pregnant women as they were forced to occupy 
compartments of 16 by 18 feet (1982: 18): 
The women who survived the initial stages of pregnancy gave birth aboard 
ship with their bodies exposed to either the scorching sun or the freezing 
cold. The numbers of black women who died during childbirth or the 
number of stillborn children will never be known. (ibid: 18-19) 
Spillers regards the inattention to the fate of the expectant mother in the Nbddle Passage 
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as a denial of motherhood; which within the dominant society, 'is the only female gender 
there is' (1987: 73). Both hooks' and Spillers' accounts thus reveal the hidden drama of 
specifically female aspects of experience in the Middle Passage that cannot be simply 
theorised away in an effort to assert the process of black Atlantic male subject 
constitution. 
It is essentially men who steer Gilroy's ship towards the quest for freedom, citizenship, 
autonomy, resistance and hybrid cultural production. In terms of his choice of examples, 
such as Frederick Douglass in flight with Covey, or Richard Wright and W. E. B. Dubois 
off to France and Germany and later Africa, or rappers and djs struggling to refuse 
coercion within national borders - all demonstrate explicit, transparent acts of male 
resistance. His project is geared towards a celebration of African-American male 
activities and yet again linking men with the heroism of subjective and creative 
transcendence (Boyce-Davies 1994, Davis 1998). At this point, we may question the 
choice of Gilroy's examples as privileging a certain outlook that are again de-economised 
and masculinist. 
This is not to deny that Gilroy's male optics bears insights, in that it offers an important 
articulation of African-American male experience and identities in the New World. 
However, his refusal to map the ways in which these experiences are inextricably tied to, 
or differ from, the experience of women is a major flaw in his project. Only Toni 
Morrison's fictional account - Beloved (1987) - is allowed a place at this Captain's table. 
However, insofar as he does not engage with female experience or in any explicit terms 
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the relationship between travel and gendered identity, Gilroy's transatlantic does not 
depart from the general equation of voyage with the activities of men. James Clifford has 
argued that 'when diasporic experience is viewed in terms of displacement rather than 
placement, travelling rather than dwelling, and disarticulation rather than rearticulation, 
then the experiences of men will tend to dominate' (1994 258-9). While I agree with 
Clifford's position, there is however a problem with associating women with "dwelling" 
and men with "travelling". For as Carol Boyce-Davis argues, 'women do travel, and the 
issue is to find ways of understanding these negotiations of the road, since we do not all 
have "the same access to the road"' (1994: 132). In privileging the experience of black 
men on ship Gilroy blocks the experience of women as travellers, in particular black 
women whose migratory histories have been linked to men and the relations of capital. 
Diasporic discourses, as Brah argues, are always entangled within the complex web of 
travel and dwelling (1996). 
In contrast, for Spillers, thrown together as human cargo, denied the benefits of a 
patriarchalized female gender', dislocated from their African homeland, the slave ship 
constitutes a site of total eradication through denial of African kinship structure and 
gender identity. She makes this claim on the basis of a primordial relation between place, 
specifically the domestic and identity; and she thus argues that the ship's hold is 'not an 
element of the domestic' (1987: 72). While Spillers' account offers an important 
corrective to the androcentricism of Gilroy's ship, the basis for her account of gender 
disruption is, however, problematic. I now want to argue against Spillers' ungendenng 
thesis by suggesting that in grounding gender identity in the domestic she overlooks two 
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important issues. First, she ignores the different articulation of gender differences that the 
captives brought with them or were in the process of reworking. Second, she de- 
emphasises the relationship between space and embodiment and how they combine to 
construct and transform identities, experience, knowledge and social relations. 
Gender and Place 
As already argued, insofar as we are embodied subjects occupying a space, we always 
exist in relation to a place. The lived body cannot exist outside of place. For Casey, 
existence itself is intimately bound up with place. 'Place' he writes, 'is not just an 
invocation of a locatory or situational space, it belongs to the very concept of existence' 
(1993: 15). Bodies are shaped, disciplined, revered, and transformed by the place in 
which they are located. Similarly, bodies transform place, give it meaning. With this in 
mind, we can say that the situated body occupies the status of a fundamental ontology: the 
body is a primary element of being. This has been implicitly recognised in much recent 
theory. For example, a spatially grounded account of the body occupies an important 
place in contemporary feminist attempt to theorise difference among women. Adrienne 
Rich's (1986) notion of the "politics of location" and Donna Haraway's (1991) concept of 
11 situated knowledge" draw this into focus when they argue that women's occupation and 
orientation in space and time is invested with social, symbolic and historical meanings 
which shapes their experience and the production of knowledge. Developing the idea that 
every speaking subject is a situated subject, feminists like Rich and Haraway hope to 
avoid the globalising and exclusionary tendencies that has plagued much of white 
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Western feminist theory. Rich argues that our positioning in different locations are also 
historically situated and they form and inform the ways in which we live out our 
identities. Situating female embodiment therefore is an opening towards acknowledging 
such differences. 
From this perspective, we can posit that even the ship, as a transitory space in which the 
slaves were located, can be seen as a particular place; a place storing human as well as 
non-human cargo. As Susanne Langer affirms, whilst a ship constantly changes its 
location, it is nonetheless a self-contained place (cited in Relph 1976: 29). Once 
occupied by embodied sexuated beings, the indeterminate space of the ship becomes a 
sexually specific space that gives pattern to experience. Of course, I am not saying that 
the slavers'hold as a place is functioning in the same way as the domestic sphere. With 
Casey and Rich in mind, it is more fitting to describe the slavers' hold as a site of 
displacement. The slavers' hold is a 'place' outside or distinguished from the original 
home - place. It engenders certain histories, experiences and values, which bound and 
united those who experienced the Middle Passage towards a common destiny, and linked 
them to later generations who shared a common history of the Middle Passage. This is 
not to say that different kinds of identities (sexual, cultural, religious and so on) ceased or 
were not in the process of being produced. 
In their work on the evolution of African-American cultures, anthropologists Sidney W 
Mintz and Richard Price (1976) addressed the importance of the bond forged among 
"shipmates" to the social organisation and ongoing social relations in the diasporic 
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context. It was often said that 'so strong were the bonds between shipmates that sexual 
intercourse between them [ ... ], was considered incestuous' (J. Kelly, cited in Mintz and 
Price 1976: 43). They argue that even in such a depersonalised space as the slavers' hold, 
identity did not cease, rather, this experience set the term for New World social relations. 
Mintz and Price believe that 'the development of these social bonds, even before Africans 
had set foot in the New World, already announced the birth of new societies based on 
new kinds of principle' (ibid: 44). 
If Mintz and Price are right, the ship as a place 'serves to implace [us], to anchor and 
orient [us] finally becoming an integral part of [our] identity' (Casey 1993: 23). Against 
Spillers' account, the ship as a site of displacement is at the same time a site for the re- 
establishment of kinship structures and social bonds that traverse the event of the Middle 
Passage. In 'Place Intervals' Irigaray (1984) posits that, as long as a place is occupied by 
being, it is from the beginning always sexually differentiated. According to Moira 
Gatens, the situated subject is therefore 'always a sexed subject' (Gatens 1996: 9). From 
Spillers' account, it would appear that the captors were aware of sexual difference and 
used it to mark and separate the sexes from each other. However, as we have seen, 
Spillers argues that this 'application of gender rule' in the spatial organisation of the 
slavers'hold is premised on the commodification of the captives. According to Spillers, 
this economic imperative does not constitute a site of domesticity and therefore gendering 
cannot take place. 
Articulating Gender Difference 
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What are the assumptions that underpin Spillers' ungendering proposal in the diaspora? 
There appears to be confusion. On the one hand she wants to contest the position she 
ascribes to Anglo-American feminism for conflating gender identity with biology. 
Spillers argues here that African-American gender identity cannot be thought in terins of 
shared biology. On the other hand, Spillers also wants to argue that gender identity is 
constituted in the domestic, in the symbolic realm of juridical discourse. This second 
claim constructs the domestic in a 'purely' cultural manner, outside of the experience of 
being a body. However, this decoupling of the body from its discursive and juridical 
coding is curious given that Spillers makes such a powerful case elsewhere for the ways 
in which the captives flesh was maimed, put to work, re-named and transformed into a 
laboratory prose'. In other words, Spillers at one point (namely, when she argues against 
object relations feminism) wants to deny the significance of the sexed body, only to 
require it absolutely elsewhere (when she tries to account for the violence that turned 
flesh into body and the gendering of the slavers'hold). 
Even if we agree with cross-cultural accounts that self-identity is not necessarily 
conceived through physical embodiment, but established through social relations, (Moore 
1994, Oyewumi 1997), the body as lived is always at work in the transmission and 
transformation of socio-political and historical practices. As Moira Gatens puts it, 
'Identical social 'training, attitudes or, [ ... ] conditioning acquire 
different significances 
when applied to male and female subjects, (1996: 9). In this way, the 
biological fact of 
femaleness (menstruation and potential for pregnancy), and the historical and cultural 
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discourses, combine to constitute the subject. The body is not simply a physical entity, 
but one coded through and affected by networks of power relations. Therefore, we cannot 
understand 'the domestic' unless we acknowledge how the lived body constructs and is 
constructed by it. Moreover, negotiations between the public and private are thoroughly 
cultural and historical in nature. Several writers have suggested that the division between 
the public and the domestic sphere as gender constituting was only marked out as such 
from the seventeenth to early nineteenth century with the opposition of sexual spheres 
and the growing distinction between the private world of domesticity and the public 
world of work. The public/private distinction is not a universal one, and even in 
nineteenth century Europe, contemporary studies suggest that the boundaries between 
public and private were blurred. Therefore, Spillers cannot legitimately take these 
divisions as given, and give it such structuring importance in her account of the "domestic 
economy" of the slave ship. 
In making this claim, Spillers thus denies other contributory factors in the constitution of 
subjectivity such as the performance of specific activities. For if it were the case that we 
learn to be women only in the domestic arena, many of us would not have experienced 
the sexual disparity we feel. As well as identity-formation in the domestic sphere, we 
also learn through the collective actions of others and the kind of activities performed by 
people around us. A slave child learns about her gender identity not only in the slave 
community, but, through the actions and reactions of others around her (White 1985, 
Bush 1990). Numerous examples abound in slave literature that suggest that young girls 
and boys pass into adulthood by learning to be aware of what it is to be sexed subjects, by 
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leaming the different uses for which their bodies will be utilised. This is especially the 
case in situations where very young girls fall prey to the roving eyes of both white 
masters and black male slaves. As bell hooks writes, The female slave lived in constant 
awareness of her sexual vulnerability and in perpetual fear that any male, white or black, 
might single her out to assault and victimize' (hooks 1982). This no doubt contributes to 
how she sees and orients herself in space. As Merleau-Ponty would say, identity is 
therefore both intersubjective and a "pre-personal tradition". With this in mind, I suggest 
that what took place aboard the slave ship is a conditioning of bodies; it is at the same 
time a site for the materialisation of gender differentiation. Despite the juridical 
exclusion of black women from the traditional symbolic order, the dehumanising 
condition of the ship and the oceanic suspension, captive women, still experienced 
themselves within a cultural code grounded in and informed by a physical reality which 
cannot sustain the discursive or legal code governing slave society. 
Spillers' psychoanalytic reading of African-American women's loss of gender distinction 
concludes in modernist fashion with her advocacy of an emancipatory new project. 
This problematizing of gender places [the black woman] [ ... ] out of the 
traditional symbolics of female gender, and it is our task to make a place 
for this different social subject. In doing so, we are less interested in 
joining the ranks of gendered femaleness than gaining the insurgent 
ground as female social subject. Actually claiming the monstrosity (of a 
female with the potential to "name"), which her culture imposes in 
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blindness, "Sapphire" might rewrite after all a radically different text for a 
female empowerment. (Spillers 1987: 80) 
Here, Spillers is calling for African American women to create a new symbolic - apart 
from both the traditional symbolic and from white female American gender construction. 
Although Spillers' seeks lo recast the Lacanian symbolic in the terms of cultural 
domination' (Abel 990: 187), she remains within the Lacanian frame: accepting the notion 
of a subject constituted within the symbolic order as lack. This framework is therefore 
grounded within a fundamentally negative ontology. The alternative framework she 
proposes is that of a monstrous, self-naming black female symbolic that empowers 
women to a more autonomous future. Unlike the 'stability which ensures a cohesive, 
unified speaking subject' (Grosz 1990: 152) in the Lacanian symbolic, Spillers finally 
takes the symbolic to be mutable; a mythopoetic grammar that must be re-worked 
However, in contrast to Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh, this re-working is 
grammatical, explicit and futural, rather than invisible, implicit and continually taking 
place. 
Given that Spillers' aim is to distance herself from the classic Lacanian position, it is 
difficult to assess whether the problem with this modernist project lies with 
psychoanalysis per se or merely with Spillers' adaptation of it. What is clear is that by 
shifting the struggle against white male domination to some future moment and within 
the terms of the symbolic, Spillers comes dangerously close to reproducing the very 
modes of power she contests within the structure of her theorisation. Just as in classic 
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Lacanian psychoanalysis, the symbolic displaces questions of agency away from human 
action and onto a mythopoetic structuring ground, so too does Spillers' account shift black 
women's capacity for self-empowerment onto to some futural (and henceforth deferred) 
moment. The fact that Spillers cannot mark out this project of self-naming in substantive 
terms (indeed leaving its announcement until right at the end of the text), suggests that the 
project in fact lacks substance. Perhaps more dangerously still, Spillers' account of the 
symbolic in historical terms imposes a retrospective attenuation of agency onto African- 
American women. Who is to say that black women since slavery have not engaged in 
just the sort of monstrous, autonomous projects of self-naming that Spillers calls for? 
Since when did being called "Brown Sugar" or "Sapphire" condemn a woman to thinking 
of or naming herself in such terms? Spillers makes the massive assumption that black 
women recognise themselves in these names. In order for any name to have any effect, 
there has to be, at the least, a partial recognition of that name. Given the logic of Spillers' 
argument, I would suggest that recognition of these names occurs only through practice 
and entry into the symbolic. However, this does not offer an explanation of why some 
black people recognise themselves in these names and reproduce their logic and others 
simply do not. By privileging the symbolic order, Spillers is unable to address this 
dialectic between recognition and, refusal and therefore, how the 'logic of practice' 
(Bourdieu 1990) intertwines with relations of power to generate action and change, and at 
the same, its reproduction. This is not to deny the power of naming but to recognise that 
the power to reject or not recognise the name maybe at hand as black women engage in 
the process of naming and renaming themselves. 
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In my view, this is where a phenomenological account has purchase against Spillers' 
psychoanalytic framework. Instead of displacing agency onto the external figure of the 
symbolic (mutable or not), phenomenology stresses the participation agents have in their 
own cultural horizons. Within the terms of phenomenology (especially that of Merleau- 
Ponty), the agent's identity is not constituted out of an originary lack, but emerges out of a 
cultural and historical capacity that is incessantly re-born according to the expressions 
and responses made within its terms. This is not to position black women as capable of 
changing their world absolutely and at every moment -a freedom as ultimate at this 
makes no sense. What it does suggest however is that the cultural horizon shifts 
according to modes of expression that occur on its behalf. There is therefore no need to 
launch a theoretical emancipatory project of the liberation that is "to come"; the work of 
subjectivity, as encountered in the first chapter, is one of active-passive engagement. 
Given this situation, agents can be created by the symbolic order, and at the same, 
construct alternatives that challenge that order. Phenomenology thus teaches us to look 
for those moments when transcendence of socio-cultural limitations has changed the 
paradigms of expression themselves. This might be through a project of a secret history 
or the uncovering of a sub-cultural space that empowered women to reach beyond the 
limits of their world. 41 suggest therefore that a phenomenological framework offers a 
way of thinking about agency that is less absolutist than psychoanalysis. Rather than a 
symbolic that even in its mutable form ultimately denies self-directing behaviour, 
phenomenology demonstrates how historical and cultural horizons are forever being 
disrupted through their re-working. The theorisation of place given in the first chapter 
41 take this up in my discussion of women in Jamaican danceliall culture in chapter four. 
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therefore shows how retentive trace structures of embodied gesture were never totally 
erased by the Middle Passage. Black diasporic women were never completely dominated 
by an imposed symbolic. Furthermore black diasporic women have little use of a project 
of self-naming that cannot flesh itself out in any detail. 
At this point, I think it is worthwhile to show how empowerment and processes of self- 
naming have always been possible (and to give examples of its enactment). In this way, 
we can show how the flows of power and agency are fundamentally ambiguous - and 
exploitable by those who understand that resistance is always a possibility. 
A Critique of the flesh/body Distinction 
Let us return to Spillers' flesh/body distinction. Flesh'refers to a memory of an originary 
African cultural practice. The 'body', in contrast, is formed within the space of the ship. 
The ship functions as another origin -a strange, uncanny home that can only be 
constituted on the basis of what I have characterised as a questionable notion of the 
original (a home of fixity, 'grammar' and set gender rules). The ship is the site of 
discipline and the work of power on the African flesh - turning flesh into body. Spillers 
constructs these two foundational grammars as effectively separate; only occasionally 
brought together, as a syntax and a hiatus that resist each other. I contend that this hard 
and fast distinction between flesh and the body cannot be sustained because they are in 
fact mutually constitutive aspects of each other. As Gilroy argues, we cannot understand 
the "Black Atlantic" merely on the basis of an encounter with western modernity, as if 
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that periodisation was in some sense external. Any theorisation of the black diaspora 
must recognise that something like Spillers' flesh/body distinction is always at work. 
Such a reading favours an understanding of how moments of subjective transformation 
and disciplinary practices co-exist with "flesh" and "body". In this way, we can rethink 
black diasporic identity as that which is constituted out of an intense dialogic engagement 
with both the imaginary or mythic African "home" and the New World 'home' that is 
always in the process of becoming, of being named and violated. 
Contrary to Spillers' claim, the 'hegemonic will' did not simply inscribe itself on a 
passive tabula rasa. In reality, the distinction she sets up between flesh and body was 
complicated by endless struggles over contested spheres of power. As Gilroy makes 
clear, the historical encounter between Africans and Europeans must be seen as a 
'confrontation between two opposed, yet interdependent cultural and ideological systems 
and their attendant concepts of reason, history property and kinship' (1993: 219). This 
may seem an obvious point to make, but because Spillers privileges what was done to the 
body, she is unable to bring the 'body' and the 'flesh' together in a manner which stresses 
mutuality without privileging one over the other. Significantly, she is unable to 
historicise the flesh in the way she does the body. For Spillers, the flesh is the site at 
which African history is arrested or terminated, and the inscribed body is the surface for a 
new metaphysics of history or origin that 'began as the sea began'. Of course, there are 
problems with such a position. First, the claim for a desecrated flesh relies on a notion of 
an unmediated, ahistorical, pristine African past where gender identity was codified. 
Paradoxically, the psychoanalytic framework she adopts also invokes the "flesh" as "pre- 
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gender" even if it does not identify, a pre-oedipal moment before gender is acquired. If 
the original place of "home" (Africa), was gendered than it, too, belong in history, and 
has a past. This would involve changing its function within Spillers organising frame. 
Second, the flesh/body distinction rests on a repressive hypothesis which assumes a 
'hidden' inviolable, pre-discursive moment that occasionally interrupts the symbolic in 
moments of crisis in order to offer a transformative potentiality. Third, she assumes that 
the Middle Passage was so traumatic that enslaved Africans were completely expunged of 
their cultural memories. Moreover, she accepts the absolute, incontestable power of the 
enslavers. The assumption above ultimately leads to a rejection of the centrality of 
memory and traditions in the constitution of subjectivity, even in limit conditions. 
In his essay, 'The Problem of Passivity: Sleep, the Unconscious, Memory' (1963), 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the problem with a psychoanalytic inspired account is that it is 
disembodied. A disembodied theorisation, he suggests, leads to a purely conceptual 
account of memory; memory as "Representation" (or consciousness). Thinking memory 
in terms of representation leads to a dilemma. Memory is conceptualised as either a work 
of conservation or construction. In terms of conservation, memory is conceived of as the 
set of fixed objects that reside in consciousness and as such becomes fundamental to the 
ego. The ego is always concerned to preserve its identity through maintaining the essence 
of the objects of memory. In the case of conservation, the self has a passive relationship 
to memory; the ego stands guard over a memory that comes prior to any of its acts. It is 
this process that is passively returned to in re-memoration. In terms of construction, 
memory is always reworked through the process of recollection. Memory is constructed 
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as an active agency. For Merleau-Ponty, the problem with this second account is that 
some form of memory or object must be assumed. That is, in order to provide a 
satisfactory account of memory as construction, one is forced to assume something like 
conservation. Thus Merleau-Ponty contends that in the work of memory, conservation 
and construction require each other. For Merleau-Ponty, the interplay between active 
forgetting and remembrance involves the body. He writes: 
We might begin by viewing the present as a certain unique position of the 
index of being-in-the-world, and our relations with the present when the 
present slips into the past, like our relations with our surroundings, might 
be attributed to a postural schema which unfolds and shapes a series of 
positions and temporal possibilities, so that the body could be regarded as 
that which answers each time to the question "Where am I and what time 
is it? Then there would be no question of any alternative between 
conservation and construction; memory would not then be the opposite of 
forgetfulness. (1963: 50). 
To account for memory, therefore, requires that the embodied situation (the demand to 
determine the present index of bodily being-in-the-world in the above quotation), is 
addressed. That is, we can think of the constructive, active part of memory as the need to 
think the conditions of the present. And se condly, we can think of the conservative 
aspect as the conditions that enabled the present to be given as present. True memory', 
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Merleau-Ponty writes, 'is to be found at the intersection of the two, at the moment where 
memory forgotten and kept by forgetfulness retums'(ibid: 51). In Spillers' account it is 
possible to unearth a purely conservative account, expressed in negative terms. That is, 
the experience of the Middle Passage destroyed what might have been conserved. It is 
important not to completely homogenise Spillers's thernatisation however, for on 
occasions she alludes to a powerful model that resists expropriation. For example, this 
occurs when she hints at the familial and kinship patterns fostered under slavery. She 
writes that although kinship structures were 'invaded at any given and arbitrary moment 
by the property relations'of the slave system, they however, remain 'one of the supreme 
social achievements of African-Americans under conditions of enslavement' (1987: 74). 
Spillers, however, is unable to pursue adequately this model of a Black Family' that 
resisted the codes of slavery because her analysis privileges a legal and social discourse 
that denies black humanity. 
In contrast, Gilroy's account of the black diaspora emphasises the importance of a 
reworked memory of Africa and slavery in the black diasporic imagination. From this 
position, we can surmise that it is precisely the context of their being-in-the-world, the 
situatedness of the ship, plantation life and post-emancipation experience that 
determines 
the form that transformation and this working through of memory takes. As Gilroy sees 
it, the experience of the ship and the elemental suspension at sea does not represent an 
absolute loss of history or memory, rather it generates new forms of 
history and memory. 
Gilroy, alongside Merleau-Ponty, shows that memory is therefore neither 
forgetting nor 
remembering, active or passive. Nor 
does it involve an ontological contest between the 
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disaggregated flesh and the inscribed body. Instead, memory involves a dialogic relation 
-a preservatory forgetfulness, that is not absolute. Memory is preserved in its forgetting 
due to its trace being reworked. These traces are kept alive through cultural forms - 
religion, song, story-telling, elemental patterns of movement. This way of thinking about 
memory and the elemental suspension at sea permit an analysis of the black diaspora as 
one structured by, and experienced through, difference. This offers a transformative 
difference of memory's constructive dramatisation within a new scene. I shall develop 
this theorisation of memory in the next chapter. 
By distinguishing flesh from body, Spillers closes off any argument that African cultural 
memory survived not only the vicissitudes of the Middle Passage but also the horrendous 
plight of the New World. In contrast, I would argue that it is the presence of such 
memories (that are present as traces) which forces both a recall of the world left behind 
and simultaneously a 'reading'and 'rereading'of the new situation. It is only in this way 
that the slaves could begin to make sense of their plight. At least for the first generation 
of slaves, the codes of the master might have set limits on their activities; it did not 
however determine the content of their activities (Sobel 1987, Thompson 1984). They 
brought with them into their new situation meaningful aspects of their culture which 
enabled them to create what Gilroy has called a 'counter culture of modernity'. Thus flesh 
and body are, against Spillers, interwoven within 'a common fabric of memory and 
inspiration' (Spillers 1987: 75). Indeed, many writers documenting the black diasporic 
experience have suggested that it is the presence of the interweaving of the flesh and body 
that created the need to fight, to eliminate and contest the violence and injustice of the 
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present (Stuckey 1987). Stuart Hall has noted that Africa was present everywhere in the 
New World. He writes: 
[ ... I Africa was, in fact present everywhere: in the everyday life and 
customs of the slave quarters, in the languages and patois of the 
plantations, in names and words, often disconnected from their 
taxonomies, in the secret syntactical structures through which other 
languages were spoken, in the stories and tales told to children, in religious 
practices and beliefs, in the spiritual life, the arts, crafts, music and 
rhythms of slave and post-emancipation society [ ... ]. It is the secret code 
with which every Western text was 're-read'. It is the ground-bass of every 
rhythm and bodily movement. This was - is - the 'Africa' that 'is alive and 
well in the diaspora'. (1990: 230) 
Thus, the continued presence of the 'fleshed body' or the forgotten-yet-retained memory 
of Africa provided diasporic black people the opportunity to act. 'Action', according to 
Lewis Gordon, is'itself a function of subjective and intersubjective encounter' (1995: 50); 
action led to resistance and the creation of new cultural idioms rooted in a restless desire 
for freedom, citizenship and autonomy. Remembrance (whether of slavery or Africa) 
thus became the way resistance was figured. As James Baldwin (1962) remarked, it is the 
presence of the past in the present that made the life of the slaves coherent and bearable. 
The present becomes a (re)memoration of the past, where both African history and the 
New World future are intricately woven in a tapestry of contradiction. This intersection 
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of two worlds was not only a meeting ground of Europe and Africa. It was also where, in 
the space of the ship, different African cultures (sometimes for the first time) came 
together and communicated to each other their anguish, anxieties and, most importantly, 
what they should and would become together. We can say that from the horrors of the 
slave ship, transfon-nation, (re)adjustment, and negotiation was already underway, an 
'aquatic genesis'of new grammar or ways of being. The captives were already engaging 
in creating the terms of New World cultures and identities. 
Following Gilroy then, the ship, as a bridge connecting several geographical and cultural 
contexts, acts against any easy return to the comfort of an original home. For the 
'original' home, as suggested in Gilroy's citation of Nietzsche, can never be returned to 
unproblematic ally. Returning to the original moment is rendered impossible. Therefore 
when a return does take place, the original home is always experienced differently 
because of the transformations of time. Through the work of the body's emplacement, the 
'original' home itself is constructed differently. This attention to history does not remain 
locked in the past: imagining the present home in the work of transformation involves re- 
imagining and reconstructing the 'original home' itself. Hence, in Merleau-Ponty's 
account of transformative embodied memory, the origin can only be present as a trace. 
The imagination of the past involves its difference; what is conserved does not stay the 
same. Thus a feeling of belonging to a place across time always has to be conceptualised 
imaginatively (Morrison 1990, Harris 1970). It is here that the value of Gilroy's 
emphasis on the ship as an imaginative vessel can compliment Spillers' exaggerated 
account of a disrupted origin. For Gilroy, the ship is the pre-eminent site of a profound 
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connection to an African past, but it is also within the flow of suspension that connection 
is disrupted into webs of interchanging differences. The ship does not mark a loss of one 
history, but the beginning of many histories. Thus, once we begin to think about the ship 
as a site for the transfiguration of memory and the historical, the absolutism of origins 
and objectification governing Spillers' account is challenged and replaced by Gilroy's 
focus on the various quest for subjective agency by diasporic black men. 
It is now possible to understand that it is only on the basis of decorporealisation that 
Spillers can claim that the ship is in effect not a place, and is not a site of significance or 
gender signification. At the core of Spillers' attempts to impose a distinction between 
flesh and the body is the very attempt to decouple biology from the realm of culture and 
discourse. The 'flesh' tries to operate in a sort of pre-discursive realm. The 'flesh' is 
therefore distinguished from the 'body', which is taken to lie within discursive realm. By 
collapsing or intertwining this distinction I am able to claim that the lived bodies on the 
slave ships were then always at work in transforming what was given as a set of disparate 
histories, cultures, customs and languages, binding them together in anticipation of the 
new world experience. 
Beyond Gilroy & Spillers 
So far, Gilroy and Spillers have been placed in a productive dialogue with each other, 
however, the core criticism that must be levelled at both their accounts is the deep-level 
Eurocentrism which affects their thought and is unregistered within it. By way of 
conclusion, I shall articulate pointers that suggest ways beyond and outside of their shared 
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historiological horizons. 
It is clear that both Spillers and Gilroy tell their stories from a European perspective. 
This is evident in the way that the periodisation involved in both accounts starts from the 
moment of the slave trade. Whilst this is important, it has the inevitable consequence that 
that which is prior to or outside or parallel to this moment is left undertheorised and 
marginalised in terms of the historical frame imposed upon the subject matter. The 
danger of any historiological periodisation is that any historical dynamic outside the 
frame is underplayed and undermined, unless specific attention is placed back upon it 
from within the work. Unfortunately, both Gilroy and Spillers are not so cautious as to 
attend to that which lies outside their frame of reference. The outcome is an account of 
African history prior to the Middle Passage that is nafve, essentialist and devoid of any 
attention to internal difference. In other words, both accounts succumb, against the 
wishes of their respective authors, to the very Eurocentrism they are in part struggling 
against. 
Worse still, this unconscious Eurocentric periodisation is placed alongside a geographic 
Eurocentrism. The slave trade and its ramifications are told from the perspective of 
European and North American cartography. For Spillers, the black diasporic identity is 
constituted through an exclusion from European symbolic realm. In Gilroy's case, the 
Black Atlantic refers to the concealed constitutive other of European modernity. What 
Gilroy is unconscious of is the possibility of the history of the African slave trade told 
from another perspective other than that of one conditioned 
by the starting point of 
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European modernity. It never occurs to Gilroy (or to Spillers for that matter) to imagine 
that there is a history of the slave trade told from the perspective of the African continent. 
This omission, according to Laura Chrisman, 'makes totalising claims for itself, so that 
the identity and experience of New World slave-descended black people is somehow, by 
default, seen to contain or represent all modem black experience' (1997: 58). No one will 
want to deny that slavery is as much a part of the history of Africa and Europe. However, 
its singular focus in Gilroy and Spillers'text, has the effect of marginalising the centrality 
of colonialism and other constitutive factors in the formation of black diasporic identity. 
Implicit within Gilroy's argument is the assumption that hybridity and discontinuity are 
"gifts" bestowed upon Africans only through their encounter with Europe. This is 
especially evident in his use of terms such as "pre-slave history", "anti -modernity", "pre- 
modem", "outside modemity" throughout the text -a curiously uncritical (and historically 
totally inappropriate) terrn. If Gilroy wants to impute a level of transform ativity and 
discontinuity to African cultures before slavery, he certainly does not spell it out or give it 
any prominence. This lack of attention is surely telling. Gilroy's privileging of slave 
trade discontinuity entails that he ends up repeating the very same afrocentrist theme he is 
keen to criticise: the reification of a pure and untainted vision of Africa prior to European 
contact. This view, implicit or not, must be contested. As the Beninois philosopher, 
Paulin J Hountondji, has written, in the context of Africa "discontinuities", "revolutions", 
"pluralism" or what James Snead (1984) calls the "cut" are not in the first instance always 
externally generated. They are in fact first generated from within. Hountondji suggests 
that it is important to recognise that 
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pluralism does not come from any society from outside but is inherent in 
every society. The alleged acculturation, the alleged 'encounter'of African 
civilization with European civilization, is really just another mutation 
produced from within African civilization, the successor to many earlier 
ones about which our knowledge is very incomplete, and, no doubt, the 
precursor of many future mutations, which may be more radical still. The 
decisive encounter is not between Africa as a whole and Europe as a 
whole: it is the continuing encounter between Africa and itself. (1976: 
165) 
The history of the slave trade told from the perspective of a continent's ongoing unfolding 
across time would re-position the Eurocentrism that plagues Spillers and Gilroy within a 
different Afrocentrism - far from essentialist - attending to specific historical dynamics 
between cultures and classes on African soil. Perhaps the blindspot of grand historical 
narratives (like that of Spillers and Gilroy) is that of geography. Indeed, the relation 
between a metaphysics grounded in geography and a marine ontology is deeply 
ambiguous in Gilroy's Black Atlantic. At the superficial level, it is clear that he wants to 
substitute an interstitial account of black identity floating upon the sea through 
innumerable journeys for one grounded in any particular territory. The question is 
whether he succeeds in this project or whether he merely gestures towards it. With the 
appropriate quotes from Nietzsche, it is clear that Gilroy wants to leave the soil behind in 
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his quest for anti- anti -essenti ali sm. I would contend however that he fails manifestly to 
outline or commit his thought to an aquatic ontology. The structurations of identity 
emerging from his text are much more juxtapositional than that. Rather than an aqueous 
between, Gilroy ends up with a between that is merely between one land and the next - 
from an ontological point of view extrinsic difference rather than intrinsic difference. 
The Black Atlantic turns out to be a new kind of territory rather than a suspension of the 
territorial itself. This juxtaposition is revealed in the way his black intellectuals roll over 
the ocean to play the European game. Rather than a history that is neither American nor 
European, Wright, DuBois and company end up being the counter-cultural figures of 
European modernity, the shadows within its territory rather than the water forever beyond 
its shores. Absent from Gilroy's account are the other sources and other connections that 
such figures made within history. Martin Luther King's Hegelianism is stated, but 
Gandhi's influence on his theories of non-violent action is repressed. As Dayan 
comments, It should give readers pause that Gilroy's "reconstructive" project mentions 
Mannoni but not Cesaire, Lacan but not Fanon'(1996: 11). It would appear that cultural, 
intellectual exchange and hybridity is ironically constructed in purely European terms. 
The only borrowing or hybridity discussed within the text is a European hybridity, as if 
hybridity is exclusively the product of an encounter between Europe and Africa. The 
notion of a hybridity beyond or before this (of the sort Hountondji mentions) is 
completely missing from his thought. 
5 
5A 
suitable beginning for this project of a non-Eurocentric theorisation of black diasporic experience 
would be to return to the sea in a non-juxtapositional sense, that is, not just between two bits of land but as 
the aqueous condition of being, a fluid mechanics suggesting an identity forever beyond the 
land and the 
threat of territorial recaptures like that of a refigured European modernity. 
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A similar sort of underlying Eurocentric error infects Spillers' text. A way into this 
Eurocentrism is achieved by focusing on the emphasis she places upon grammar in 
Mama's Baby. As a parallel to Gilroy's unconscious return to the land and to extrinsic 
difference, Spillers'text is motivated by the desire to return to the structure of an "African 
grammar" as the focus of an unsubstantiated redemptive project. In arguing for a 
gendered identity that slavery temporally denied, Spillers also assumes that gender 
signification was an organising principle in Africa pre-European slavery. Although 
Spillers attempts to extricate culture from biology, in her insistence on the loss of gender, 
she imports biology back into her account. Several anthropologists have argued that 
II gender", as an organising principle in Western society, is based on the link made 
between physical embodiment as an expression of an essential identity. They have 
argued that in non-western cultures, personhood is not necessarily established through 
biology, but through their positioning in social relations and the performance of 
appropriate activities (Moore 1994, Strathern 1998). In her recent book The Invention of 
Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender discourse (1997), Oyeronke 
Oyewumi points out that prior to colonisation among the Yorubas of Nigeria, the body 
was not the 'basis of social roles, inclusions, or exclusions' (1997: x). Nor was social 
thought and identity constituted around biology. Instead, the social organisation was 
defined in terms of 'seniority, which was based on chronological age'(ibid: 14). For this 
reason, Oyewumi posits the absence of gender categories. 
In light of this account, 
Spillers' theory of a gender identity eroded by slavery appears as a retrogressive 
projection of an Anglo-European paradigm upon 
that which it strives to understand. In 
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this case, the notion of an original gender structuration that has been violated starts to 
betray its origins within a specific cultural frame and specific socio-political needs. 
In summary, I contend that, against Spillers' argument, black female identity is always 
being reworked and is always in the process of becoming. Spillers represses the way in 
which embodied difference is transformed across time and in the space of the Middle 
Passage. A central concern of this chapter has been to rethink the ship and the elemental 
suspension at sea and their position within black diasporic discourse. I have begun to 
fabricate an antiphonal structure -a political and imaginative space conditioning black 
Atlantic diasporic experience that is neither Eurocentric or Afrocentric (in the 
conventional meaning of the words). I shall return to antiphony in the next chapter. The 
suspension of the sea disrupts a fixed identity, history and memory (and their 
hybridisation through extrinsic difference) in favour of a transformative dialogue, where 
traces of the past occur both in the context of the journey by ship and in the context of a 
conversation with the diasporic "home". I have done this by combining what I take to be 
the important insights of Spillers - her attention to the historical specificity of painful 
journeys - minus the absolutism of her account, together with the cultural synthesis of 
Gilroy, minus his de-economised relativism. Between activity and passivity, joy and 
pain, I have begun to suggest an antiphony of the active-passive and a pain that is 
expressible as joy. These themes will return throughout the rest of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Diasporic Memory As Rhythmic-Gestural Patterning 
How can one understand such a torture and how tolerate the pain of 
these dislocations? Why the mercilessness of these bars and this 
detailed destruction of the body proper? Why this frantic return to the 
scattered limbs? Does the spectre of death lurk in dance? [ ... 1. 
Memory, however, preserves the hard odours of embrocations and 
restores the fabulous antiquity of gymnastics. From what mists of time 
does this absence return to us? (Michel Serres 1995: 39) 
In the last chapter, I argued that the black diaspora is dialogic in form. Black identity is 
neither faithful to its origins nor absolutely deracinated. Instead, it occupies a plural 
middle ground between retention and recreation. This antiphonal existence has been the 
resource for the transmission of sedimented cultural memories and what in another 
context David Hecht and Timothy Maliqalim Simone have called a 'workable sense of 
plurality' (1994: 36). Although the responses the body has to new environments are not 
necessarily part of conscious awareness, they are materially present to the diasporic 
subject through what Toni Morrison has called "rememory"': through bodily traces and 
practices. As will be evident throughout the argument, I want to contest a "biogenetic" 
explanation for diasporic retention in the strongest terms as necessitating a physically 
I By rememory, I am following Morrison's usage in her novel Beloved. She describes rememory as an 
event or action that is remembered by a subject or community who were not necessarily 
involved in the 
original act, but for whom the act continues to 
have a profound effect on their lives. As Seth, talking to her 
daughter Denver states: 'Someday you be walking down the road and you hear something or see something 
going on. So clear. And you think 
it's you thinking it up. A thought picture. But no. It's when you bump 
into a rememory that belongs to somebody else'(1987: 
36). 
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reductivist account of the body. Genetics speaks of "flesh and blood", whilst the account 
offered here will stress the irreducibility of embodiment. The traces of movement, 
experience, tradition and identity that are re-patterned in each new present of the diaspora 
will be explained in terms of an assemblage of antiphonal habit-memories, rather than 
DNA. 
Of course, this existential account is itself a story of origins, their relentless fon-nation 
and deformation, and as such it is genetic - an existential genetics rather than a purely 
biological genetics. This existential genetics is generated principally by the body's 
enigmatic gift of memory and the rhythm of existence. The rhythm of existence is a 
movement between freedom and constraint, stasis and change, biology and culture. And 
as Monika M Langer, writes, 
That movement ceaselessly carries anonymous biological existence 
forward into personal existence in a cultural world and conversely, 
allows the personal and the cultural to become sedimented in general, 
anonymous structures. (1989: 34) 
I suggest that it is the tangible presence of these existential sediments that occasions the 
perpetual 'frantic return to the scattered limbs' (Serres 1995: 39), to unknown memories 
of time when time was a restlessness that recalled the absence 
lurking in the pulsating 
pelvis. This mode of time recalls the moments when 
living was uneasy and the living 
struggled to dance and (re)write new narratives of a 
futural yearning as they filled the 
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gaps (sometimes "In a Silent Way" - Miles Davis). Here, we arrive at an absence that 
returns as the body moves gracefully ungraced across the present to reveal new rhythmic- 
gestural patternings that open up possibilities for the emergence of future desires. 
Occurrences or events from the past actualised in the moment constitute these desires. 
Again and again, the enigma of the body's memory and its capacity for rememoration. 
But this is too much poetry, and much too soon. We must ask first: what is diasporic 
memory? How is it a form of creative existence? How is it figured or expressed? What 
is the nature of the expression? Can this expression of memory be understood as lying 
within the faculty of cognition, or is it beyond psychology? Is diasporic memory the past 
presented as an object of knowledge or representation? Is memory first and foremost of 
the individual, or does it involve a dynamic negotiation between collective horizons and 
embodied agents? How can memory explain the culture of perpetual innovation, 
creativity and transformation prevalent across the black diaspora? 
This chapter aims to explore this nexus of questions in three ways. First, I argue that 
memory cannot be theorised purely in terms of the language of cognition or reflective 
consciousness. I do so by proposing a theory of memory that privileges the role of 
embodiment, rather than the mind. Second, I begin to address the question of body 
memory by introducing the idea of rhythm ic-gestu ral patterning as a way of 
understanding the work of memory in the black diaspora. Third, I 
focus on how 
rhythmic-gestural patterning expresses both creative and 
historical imperatives. I do this 
by positing the notion of a formal structure that ensures the vital creativity of the 
black 
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diaspora. At the end, I introduce the main theme of the following chapter by arguing that 
this formal structure is always different in each situation of expression - according to the 
pragmatics of survival. 
The Limits of Memory as Cognition 
The argument in this chapter is that memory, within a diasporic context and as a form of 
expression, lies both prior to and within a cognitive or representational epistemological 
paradigm. I do not wish to deny that diasporic memory, through various representational 
devices or what Paul Connerton (1989) refers to as the inscribing practice (oral or written 
testimonies, objects such as old photographs and souvenirs), may indeed at times involve 
objects of personal or collective folk-historical knowledge. Rather, my focus here will be 
to explore aspects of diasporic re-memorations that are not subject to conscious retrieval 
or easily understood in terms of representation. The diasporic memory I want to explore 
here is not the set of images, stories, objects of knowledge or narrative arabesques that 
can be drawn upon through reflection. Instead, the kind of memory under discussion 
conserves the past as bodily trace, sedimented habit, cultural patterning, or as the ghost of 
a rhythm buried deep within the body. This form of memory is not passively transmitted 
within and across generations; rather a dynamic relationship emerges wherein the past 
constitutes and shapes the present by way of present needs and desires. Therefore, the 
past, as Merleau-Ponty writes, can be 'wholly active and wholly passive' 
(1962: 428) at 
one and the same time. For example, phenomena such as styles of walking, mannerisms, 
dances, religious rituals, facial expressions and glances, social manners, touch and 
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conventional gestures such as handshakes or flicks of the eyelid are often involuntary, 
beyond the grasp of consciousness' (Bourdieu 1977: 94) - at the same time as being 
available for conscious stylisation. The memory being referred to here is often called 
'tacit' knowledge -a form of largely non-reflective comprehension. The theory of tacit 
knowledge or habit-memory implies that our embeddness within a structure is not always 
open to self-reflection. As Bourdieu writes, 'It is because agents never know completely 
what they are doing that what they do has more sense than they know' (1990: 69). 
It is in this way that we can begin to understand the prevalence of certain transcultural 
expressive phenomena, such as the habit of "Cut-Eye" and "Suck-Teeth" amongst 
diasporic black people and continental Africans (Rickford and Rickford 1976). Such 
cross-cultural habits (though modified) indicate the extent to which African traits have 
survived in the diaspora. These expressive traces constitute what Connerton has called 
incorporating practice: 
a smile or a handshake or words spoken in the presence of someone we 
address, are all messages that a sender or senders impart by means of 
their own current bodily activity, the transmission occurring only during 
the time that their bodies are present to sustain that particular activity. 
(1989: 72) 
In my view, it is such deeply embodied forms of collective rememoration that reveal 
diasporicity in its richest sense. For Elaine Scarry, these sedimentations are so powerful 
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that they are 'less easily shed, than those disembodied forms [ ... ] that exist in verbal 
habits or in thoughts' (1985: 109). While many of the languages of Western and Central 
Africa have been forgotten or mutated or undergone a process of incorporation, the 
movement and rhythms of diasporic body patterns retain elements of African embodied 
expression in a much stronger form than their linguistic counterparts 2. Melville 
Herskovits writes that 'dance itself has in characteristic form carried over into the New 
World to a greater degree than almost any other trait of African culture' (1941: 76). 
African kinaesthetics, especially gestures from Kongo and Yoruba culture, reappear again 
and again in diasporic black cultures. 
In Four Moments of the Sun, the Africanist art historian Robert Farris Thompson and 
Joseph Cornet write of the relationship between the gesture that accompanies the song 
Stop in the Name of Love by the Supremes and telama, a gesture found among the Kongo. 
During the performance of Stop in the Name of Love, the Supremes would place their'left 
hand on hip, right hand or palm before the body' (1981: 175). The Kongos believed 'that 
placing the left hand on hip presses down all evil, while the extended right hand acts to 
11 vibrate" the future in a positive manner. Important women used this pose at dawn to 
"vibrate positively" the future of town warriors (ibid: 172). Thompson and Comet write 
that that the Supremes were '[ ... ] striking the very pose 
Kongo elders used to stop 
misbehaviour at a traditional dance' (ibid: 175). This retention shows that the political 
and cultural identity of the body cannot be easily changed in the same way as verbal 
forms of expression. 
20f course there is ample evidence to suggest many black dialects still have a significant phonological and 
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From this perspective, body memory can also be thought of in terms of an horizon or 
framework of identity in the present - the very locus of identity and survival. As David 
Michael Levin writes, The body is a living symbol of tradition because it knows 
instinctively that it must embrace creative metamorphosis in order to survive'(1985: 173). 
As I will argue shortly, diasporic memory itself is a sort of open possibility - an invitation 
to participation, (inter)involvement and emergence. In general, we cannot help but be 
surrounded by memory - it is the warp and woof of our being in the present, the invisible 
ether that is consumed through each breath. Alongside cognitive capture, memory-as- 
bodily-habit is fluid, presenting dynamic interpersonal opportunities for agents that 
respond to an ongoing situation without necessarily referring to it through words or 
textualisation. 
Before going further, it is necessary to stress that the privileging of embodied 
memoration over other approaches to memory does not imply that those other approaches 
are insignificant; nor does it suggest that we discard hermeneutical analysis in favour of a 
purely somatic account. There is still a place for an interpretative account of body 
memory, so long as it does not fall into the serniotic trap that is currently fashionable 
among deconstructionists and psychoanalytically inspired theorists. In this respect, focus 
on body memory is a response to its relative neglect in much recent scholarly work. The 
trend has been to favour a personal or cognitive approach to memory, to the neglect of 
morphological continuities with the Niger-Congo family of languages (see Maureen Warner Lewis 1996) 
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habit-memory (Connerton 1989). That habit-memory has received little attention 3 from 
theorists has to do with the fact that remembering is generally associated with a "mental 
act" or a "mental occurrence" (ibid: 23). The connection between memory and habit is 
perhaps not as obvious as other aspects of memory, especially in light of a background 
theoretical context of intellectualism 4 and hermeneutics. An intellectualist take on 
memory is, according to Mary Warnock, 'inadequate by itself to the concept of memory' 
(1976: 2). Memory, she argues, needs to be understood in terms of the organic 
intertwining of body and mind, psychology and physiology. She states, 'it is high time 
that we stopped talking as if there were mental entities, or mental events, on the one 
hand, and physical entities or events on the other [We need to] find a language which 
does not take such a dichotomy for granted' (ibid: 2). 
Beyond memory as a merely personal or cognitive act open to hermeneutic or 
representational modes of transmission, I will argue that memory is embedded within a 
collective ontological structure of bodily being in the world. To remember or to 
rememorise is to inhabit a cultural and historical horizon of possibility for action and 
emotion in the present: 
To remember is not to bring into the focus of consciousness a self- 
subsistent picture of the past; it is to thrust deeply into the horizon of the 
3There has very recently been an interest in habit-memory amongst theorists influenced by the work of the 
late French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. There is a connection between this thought and Merleau-Ponty: 
both are strongly influenced by Henri Bergson, in particular his book Matter and Memory (199 1). 
4See distinction between Merleau-Ponty's idea of empiricism and intellectualism in Phenomenology of 
Perception (1962). 
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past and take apart step by step the interlocked perspectives until the 
experiences which it epitomizes are as if relived in their temporal 
setting. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 22) 
Here, we have a dramatically active account of rememoration, a destructive re-enactment 
that loosens the ties of past experience to past situations so that the experience can be a 
resource for the present. So much more than a representation of the past in the present, 
memory in this sense refers to the unfolding of ritualised repetition, the process whereby 
linear time is disrupted and the past flows into the present. Memory is dynamic rather 
than passive, fluid rather than static; in alchemical terms it is more mercury than earth. 
This is because memory is a gathering of what Merleau-Ponty calls 'habit-body' and 
'momentary body'(ibid: 254,82) -a combination of temporal layers that offsets the inertia 
of tradition against the potentiality of the moment. Again, to paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, 
memory is an index of the body's present being-in-the-world. Merleau-Ponty writes, 
The part played by the body in memory is comprehensible only if 
memory is, not only the constituting consciousness of the past, but an 
effort to reopen time on the basis of the implications contained in the 
present, and if the body, as our permanent means of 'taking up attitudes' 
and thus constructing pseudo-presents, is the medium of our 
communication with time as well as with space. The body's function in 
remembering is that same function of projection which we have already 
met in starting to move: the body converts certain motor essence into 
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vocal forms, spreads out the articulatory style of a word into 
phenomena, and arrays the former attitude, which is resumed, into the 
panorama of the past, projecting an intention to move into actual 
movement, because the body is a power of expression. (Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 181) 
Through rememoration, time becomes allegorical: a story about the present existential 
situation recounted in a different way. Memory therefore operates through the subject's 
capacity to express and respond to its existential context. This is not to say that recall Is 
essentially an act of individual volition. Instead, as encountered in the first chapter, new 
events, emotional states, shifts in location and actions in the present often trigger 
memory, invoking a past that is disguised from itself as it takes up another guise and 
another situation. The historian Lawrence W. Levine has argued that the resilience of 
Africanism in the diaspora is deten-nined less by its 'ability to withstand change, which 
indeed may be a sign of stagnation not life, but by its ability to react creatively and 
responsively to the realities of a new situation' (1978: 5). It is precisely because memory 
(individual or communal) is formed within the motivations of a new situation and new 
power relations that it is said to be selective, malleable and open to confusion, lapses and 
change; and neither fully active nor fully passive in terrns of agency. As such, the 
individual or a community is able to imagine, configure and refigure the past differently, 
becoming an expression of present and future conditions, needs and desires. As Pierre 
Nora writes, 
147 
Chapter 3: Diasporic Memory 
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It 
remains in permanent revolution, open to the dialectic of remembering 
and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and 
periodically revived [ ... ]. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, 
a bond tying us to the eternal present (1989: 8) 
Shifting Sites of Memory 
The position I want to develop contrasts itself with the two accounts of the black diaspora 
encountered in the previous chapter. Beyond Gilroy's historico-cultural notion of the 
Black Atlantic - the Atlantic Ocean as an historical locus of cultural hybridisation and a 
primary element of the black diaspora -I will emphasise that just as memory is not frozen 
in time, the investment in sites of memory and history can also change. Reflection upon 
black diasporic experience must attune itself to the existential dynamics of memory being 
shifted, as new situations are privileged. For example, my adolescent memories of 
childhood may be located around the neighbourhood I have yet to leave; in later life this 
memory is itself reworked as the neighbourhood becomes part of a much larger cultural 
and cosmic context. Arguing for shifting sites of memory does not in any way deny the 
importance of the Atlantic Ocean or slavery in black diasporic identity and 
rememoration. It merely imposes the need to recognise how sites of memory and events 
(for example direct or indirect colonial rule, multiple migrations, gender relations, etc. ) 
are grafted upon old sites and old events, complicating any privileged position ascribed to 
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the Atlantic and slavery as the site and object of diasporic forms of remembrance. As B. 
Jewsiewicki and V. Y. Mudimbe argue, 'recollection is neither an account nor a list [ ... I 
but a meaningful configuration of selected, negotiated events around "sites of memory"' 
(1993: 10). Such places help to organise and legitimate collective and individual memory 
by connecting present experience to the past through a reworking. Often, the process of 
legitimisation is undertaken by critical history and theoretical reflections. As was argued 
in the previous chapter, what for Spillers was held to be the undifferentiated space of the 
slave ship was transformed into a place and given significance through the emplacement 
of African bodies. Through a critical reflection, the slave ship becomes a place of 
experience and memory, not just an anonymous, delimited space. The slavers' hold 
becomes a marker for subjectivities in process, reflection and movement. It is however 
never static; in time, other sites of memory present themselves, displace and co-exist with 
this apparently primal site. Places turn into palimpsests. This ensures that the question 
of black diasporic origins remains a complex one, open to interpretation by each 
generation of critics reflecting upon the place of their present. For Gilroy, as for the 
Afro-Caribbeanist Richard Price, 'slavery forms the single most important referent' 
(David Scott 1991: 263) of black diasporic practice of remembrance. In contrast, 
contemporary Afro-centrics focus on Herskovits' work in the late 1920s where 'Africa 
forms the single most important referent' (ibid: 263). Scott further argues that when 
we think about the origin or the 'first-time' of the black diaspora, it is always 
differentiated and invested with different meaning even as a unitary referent is invoked. 
He writes, 
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For example, the "first-time" of Rastafarians in Jamaica [ ... ], turns on 
the central figure of slavery; but it is likely to be inscribed with a 
different set of ideological investments, reflecting its own specific 
historical and political conditions. What would be at sake here is less 
whether we can measure the extent to which this diasporan community 
of Rastafarians retains an accurate memory of any verifiable 
preemancipation event than the ways in which this figure, slavery (and 
those figures metaphorically and metonymically connected to it), 
enables (or prevents) establishment of positions in a cultural and 
political field. (ibid: 278-279) 
Black diasporic memory must therefore always be situated within the arena of a cultural 
and political horizon of possibility, as much as it is referred to in terms of an objectfor 
cultural critique. In the last chapter we saw how Gilroy settled upon the exceptional 
journeys of diasporic "race men" such as Richard Wright, W. E. B. DuBois, Frederick 
Douglas and the rest in order to weave a counter tradition of western modernity that, at 
the least, complicates conventional accounts. I want now to focus upon how these same 
hybridisations form part of a generalised and more anonymous background fabric of 
black diasporic experience that is available to black diasporic agents prior to reflective 
awareness. This manoeuvre away from the object of cultural critique and towards an 
existential analysis has important ramifications back upon the 'historical' itself. Most 
significantly, what is challenged is the allegedly foundational character of such events as 
slavery as the all-encompas sing rupture of 'modernity' and the hub of black memory 
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(Alasdair Pettinger 1994 and Joan Dayan 1998). Again, I am seeking to rupture the 
Eurocentricism, that is the unconscious organising principle of both Spillers and Gilroy's 
texts. While an account of the individual journeys across the time and space of the black 
diaspora is important to an analysis of diasporic black experience, it is crucial that we 
integrate it within the wider context of the nameless expression of black agents displaced 
across the Atlantic. 
The position being established here will also distinguish itself from the foundational 
thernatics at work in Spillers' account. Against the primal trauma of the Middle Passage, 
through an existential analysis that focuses on lived experience and the transformative 
potential of the present moment, accounts of black diasporic memory can begin to 
become more nuanced and sensitive to multiple lieux de memoire, different existential 
contexts and different political -economic imperatives. Beyond the obvious context of 
collective memories of slavery, we can take a particular cultural phenomena, such as the 
Cuban dance rumba, and begin to detail all the cultural, historical, political and economic 
factors that are woven together to constitute its existence as an opportunity for Cuban 
lived experience and transformative agency. In Rumba: Dance and Social Change in 
Contemporary Cuba (1995), Yvonne Daniel undertakes such a task. Beyond situating 
rumba within the history of slavery and white supremacy; she argues that it has to be 
thought in terms of the productive encounter between 'African heritage from Spain 
through Moorish contact and its African heritage from West and Central Africa'(Daniel 
1995: 118). Daniel argues that the local context of the Cuban revolution in shaping 
rumba (and its appropriation by the State soon afterwards as a symbol of cultural 
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nationalism), in opposition to its other history as a sub-cultural vehicle of expression for 
the disfranchised poor, have also to be considered. In Daniel's terms, all these different 
configurations are so thoroughly entwined that what constitutes rumba remains in process 
of becoming as it incorporates other forms such as break dance steps and the moon walk 
step associated with Michael Jackson and [the introduction] of acrobatic double and triple 
flips'(ibid: 9). 
Between Gilroy and Spillers, this account of black diasporic memory as active-passive 
agency also challenges the prevalence of inscriptive modes of articulation. An 
existential-phenomenological account of memory attempts to dig beneath the discursive 
and textual layers of rememoration, demonstrating that memory is not written indelibly 
upon the skin. Rather, memory is more like chalk as it scratches itself across the surface 
of a blackboard; its powder leaving palimpsests that become part of the grain of the 
wood. Diasporic memory may in part be traumatic, and in that sense Toni Morrison's 
description in Beloved of the chokecherry tree scar read by Denver on Seth's back is an 
apt figuration of its status as an insidious trace of a collective wound. Indeed, the bullet 
track holes favoured in dancehall fashion are a symbol of the continued violence in the 
daily lives of many diasporic black people. Figures other than the inscriptive must 
however be brought into being if the primal scene of trauma is to be transfigured by the 
work of the present. In Morrison's novel itself, the other event that gestures towards 
transfiguration is the joyous affirmation of the skin that occurs in the clearing scene; 
acting as a temporary autonomous zone of a transformative scene of the rememoration of 
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the flesh. In the clearing, an open space in the woods, Baby Suggs offered a redemptive 
sermon to the waiting community: 
"Here, " she said, "in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; 
flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder 
they do not love your flesh. They despise it. They don't love your eyes; 
they'd just as soon pick em out. No more do they love the skin on your 
back. ... ] And 0 my people they do not love your hands. Love your 
hands! Love them. Raise them up and kiss them. Touch others with 
them, pat them together, stroke them on your face 'cause they don't love 
that either. [ ... ] You got to love it. This is flesh I' talking about here. 
Flesh that needs to be loved. Feet that need to rest and dance. (Morrison 
1987: 88) 
As with the general sway of this thesis, I shall be concerned in this chapter to show that 
the traumatic effects of past events (whether experienced directly or not) do not operate 
either as fixed givens or as determinative - even if they continue to have powerful effects 
on the psychic, material and social experience and attitude of black and white people. 
The traumas that are chalked into the present can become part of other movements, other 
desires and other futures, rather than being merely lines that dictate what is to come. 
Thus, against Spillers' 'psycho-judicial' fatalism (the dispersion of the family as a loss of 
grammar and dehumanising naming practices as a form of wound), I will, mark out the 
patterns of hope as they are formed through the historical traces lurking within the 
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present. I will do this by privileging patterns of embodied praxis as important 
transmissions and transformations of these traces. 
Memory as Rhythmic-Gestural Patterning 
In order to carry out this task of reinvigorating an account of black diasporic memory 
with expression, agency and transformative potential, I now want to develop and unpack 
what I call "rhythmic -gestural patterning" as the formal framework for change and 
refiguration in the context of a generalised racial oppression. Rhythmic- gestural 
patterning is the conduit for organising a cultural dynamic that is neither homogeneous 
nor absolutely plural; it is neither personal nor collective nor a union of two mutually 
exclusive entities - but somewhere between all these binaries. Rhythmic- gestural 
patterning is, to borrow from Merleau-Ponty, a movement of existence 'which at one time 
allows itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts'(Merleau- 
Ponty 1962: 88). In sum, rhythmic-gestural patterning is a way thinking of about 
memory within the interstices of soma, space and time. 
This union between sound and movement, space and time is constituted here as an 
attitude and a style of being. This style speaks through the motile body. The snake-like 
bouncing swagger of young black men on the streets of major western metropolises; the 
gutteral laughter of black women encountered in markets in Kingston, Havana, Lagos and 
London; the different bodily praxis that characterise black youth cultures such as rap and 
dancehall, are all cases in point. In this spatio-temporal stylisation of the body, there 
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emerges a speaking through the body that ruptures the limits of verbal language in such a 
way that the privilege assigned to discourse and textuality as the most important 
expression of human consciousness is challenged (Gilroy 1993: 74). 
Rhythmic -gestural patterning therefore highlights the way black diasporic communities 
use such body forms as a medium for communicating, recounting and re-enacting 
memories of jubilation and strife and for asserting individual and communal attitudes, for 
making sense of and filling the gaps opened up by oppression. These patternings are 
expressive of the minutiae of lives lying outside the dominant culture, according them a 
distinctive place in the diasporic existential imagination. The African-American 
philosopher Comel West would suggest that such patterning acts as the site for the 
creation and emergence of a black intellectual tradition that is organically linked to and 
rooted in the everyday practices of black communities. 5 
Against and outside a textualist serniotic filter, the rhythmic -gestural pattemings that I am 
describing here are the work of the body, the work of love and desire, of improvisation, 
of orality, of survival, of journeys, of collective anonymous self-preservation, and of a 
pleasure that knows its pain. Within the still-standing antique walls of white supremacy, 
these pattemings are the dance of remembrance, of death, of suicide, of hunger, of anger, 
of bitterness, of shame, of woundedness and frustrated dreams and dreaming. These 
5 Comel West writes that "there are two organic intellectual traditions in Afro-American life: the Black 
Christian tradition of preaching and the black musical tradition of performance" (1991: 136). He suggests 
that although both traditions are linked to the life of the mind, they are oral, improvisational, and 
historical. 
For West, these traditions, unlike black literate intellectual tradition has the weight of 'institutional matrices 
over time and space within which there are accepted rules of procedure, criteria for judgement, canons 
for 
assessing performance, models of past achievement and present emulation, and an acknowledged 
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patternings are continuously revisited, rehearsed, reworked, and reinvented for the 
emergence of new variations that match new situation. In doing so, rhythmic -gestural 
patterning frames the mood for connections across and within a time-space matrix in 
which dissipated bodies with their scattered histories flow out into the world in an effort 
'to remake the world in their own image' (Baldwin 1951: 50). 
Through the body, memory is cauterised from the brain, from images and surfaces that 
make sense or are judged by the rules of sense. A different language of memory will 
need to be invented, incorporating rhythm, gesture and the 'gift' of the wound (Slattery 
2000). Memory in the body is not clear, logical, subject to the rules of the excluded 
middle or of non-contradiction. An embodied approach to memory calls up a language 
that has a different order, or indeed a non-order that emerges from out of a self as it is 
layered within the folds of tradition. Although the word "patterning" connotes a form of 
logic and order, as we shall see, it is a form of ordering which is nonetheless not logistic 
or deterministic. Body memory is what in another context James Snead calls 'the return 
of the pre-logical past' (1984: 71) an existential dynamic that can only be articulated 
within the dynamic play of the past-present future. 
Habit-body and Momentary body 
One way of thinking about the pre-logical somatic past is through the body's ability to 
perform an action or skill. For instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle or perform a 
succession and accumulation of superb accomplishments' (ibid: 136). 
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particular dance move is not given to me as a conscious trajectory or mental schema 1 
6 refer to at each moment of performance (Connerton 1989) . Knowledge of these skills 
are acquired through repeated action and engagement which, according to Pierre 
Bourdieu (1990), become learned dispositions that are reproduced in different social 
fields and situations. Once acquired, the body is capable of drawing on other resources 
(such as video replay of the action) to improve on techniques and devise strategies that 
can be incorporated into their existing repertoire. For example, I don't watch videos of 
other dancers so that I can learn afresh how to do a particular movement. Rather, in 
watching them, I hope I can pick up tips that will complement and improve my own 
dance vocabulary. The more skills I learn the more sedimented they become. And so the 
story goes on for the transmission of habits at large. As new expressive forms get 
consolidated into habits we again often encounter difficulties trying to explain how we 
perform them to others. 
Let me use example from my own personal experience. Whilst I was in Jamaica, I really 
wanted to learn how to do the butterfly'- a popular dance in Jamaican dancehall culture. 
Butterfly involves taken the pliei position, the weight spread through the entire feet, then 
the knees moves in and the bottom protrudes outwards. It is the same action as a 
breaststroke in swimming, only in the lower region. Difficult, but once mastered I am 
told it is effortless. However, I did not find this to be the case. The more I practised the 
clumsier I felt. To mask my ineptitude I would frequently import and mix movement 
6 Apparently, in training, footballers are now being complemented with microscopic analysis of each action 
on video, available for constant re-viewing. This kind of analysis is however only available to professional 
players, who already possess the necessary skills and physical aptitude. In other words, this example does 
not suggest in any way that learning through habit is weakened by technological innovation. 
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vocabularies that are extrinsic to the butterfly, but not entirely inappropriate in the hips 
and pelvis of a skilled butterflyer. The difficulties I encountered had to do with the fact 
that I was trying to learn a move alien to my body. My two teachers, the Jamaican 
choreographer LAntinotte Steine and my young eighteen-year-old housemate, kept 
saying: "just keep on practising", "stop thinking", "you concentrating too hard. Let your 
body do the thinking. Let your body talk to you". "You English or somethin"'. "Practise 
more". "Don't concentrate, and your body will take you there". I wanted the movements 
to be broken down to its last components, but my teachers appear incapable of 
articulating the movements in any clear verbal form. All they could do was to 
demonstrate and invite me to follow. I am usually quick at picking up new dance steps, 
but for some reason butterfly completely eluded me and, needless to say, the more 
frustrated I got the less I practised. 
Of course, acquired corporeal dispositions such as doing the butterfly cannot be grasped 
intellectually - they can only be imbibed through continuous practice and mimesis. 
'Habit', Connerton writes, 'is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the 
body; and in the cultivation of habit it is our body which understands' (1989: 95). Of 
course, habitual forms of somatic understanding are often used in the service of power. 
In his text Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault provided numerous examples of the 
workings of power to alter the habitual body to produce another way of being in the body 
that conforms to regimes of power. He argues that through various institutional regimes, 
the body, mind and emotions are disciplined and transformed into useful "docile bodies". 
In the last chapter, through Spillers' analysis, we saw how African agents turned from 
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being liberated subjects to commodified properties. Through being named, branded, 
acquiring language, labour training, Christi anisati on and racialisation, the African subject 
is, according to G. M. James Gonzalez, 'fully transformed into a slave, an object of utility' 
(1997: 131). However, despite this transformation, diasporic black people persistently 
resisted this habituation. This is evident in the persistence of African kinaesthetics in 
social and cultural habits. For example, the predominance of flexed knees and pelvic 
contractions as the bases for different black social dance forms, the importance of 
angularity in stance or art and detached facial expressions which Robert Farris Thompson 
refers to as the 'aesthetic of the cool'in African culture all constitute the continuation and 
modification of cultural sediments (Hurston 1933, Thompson 1966). We can begin to see 
how cultural horizons are embodied and continued. 
In the same way that we can easily acquire a habit, we can also transform it, revealing 
another way of being in our body and world. Habit-memory is therefore only sustained 
through continuous use or in the absence of negating external forces. Habit is never 
absolute; it is always in competition with other habits that are at hand to displace it when 
not in use. As Elaine Scarry argues, a habit that has been cultivated over a lifetime can 
become radically lost, or unmade, in situations of prolonged infliction of physical pain: 
The arms that had learned to gesture in a particular way are unmade; the 
hands that held within them not just blood and bone but the movements 
that made possible the playing of the piano are unmade; the fingers and 
palms that knew in intricate detail the weight and feel of a particular tool 
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are unmade; the feet that had within them by heart' (that is as, as a 
matter of deep bodily habit) the knowledge of how to pedal a bicycle are 
unmade; the head and arms and back and legs that contained within 
them an elaborate sequence of steps in a certain dance are unmade; all 
are deconstructed along with the tissue itself, the sentient source and site 
of all learning (1985: 123) 
The above shows that while habits are not always amenable to change, they cannot be 
thought of as frozen, prescriptive, mechanical and unchanging. On the contrary, habits 
have '-something of the moment of existence' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 84) which give 
them meaning. This momentary existence or spontaneity of the body allows for an 
alternative mode of habituating our body. The dialogue between the "habit-body" and the 
"momentary body" involves a switch between passivity and agency. Whilst traditions 
may become entrenched, these considerations entail that we need not accept or indeed be 
bound to the reproduction of pernicious and oppressive patterns of being. No matter how 
entrenched our collective habits are, there is always the possibility of a rupture, the 
potential to establish new ways of being habituated, and of differentiating oneself from 
the community in this way. If I remain solely in my habit-body, I have not learned or 
incorporated my engagement in and with the world. Therefore, my world remains 
outside the theatre of existence and I have not taken up the rich possibilities that are 
available within my world historical-culture. I am therefore suggesting that habit is not 
essentially levelled-off or of the banal. Rather it allows for the possibility of pre- 
reflective attunements to the world becoming dynamic. While habit very often 
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reproduces oppressive normative patterns, it can also be the ground of expression and 
freedom. For instance, a voice that learns to sing the blues can become a voice that takes 
the blues tradition further along its history. The history of each genre of expression can 
therefore be told in terms of how a new voice led to the ruptures at work in the evolution 
7 
of tradition . Again, Simone has argued that the over-emphasis on white racism and its 
distortion of black sociality tend to obscure the different ways 'the Black World has been 
circumventing, mediating and counter-manipulating that racism for several centuries' 
(1989: 157). 
Merleau-Ponty has argued that when we reduce habit and, by extension, tradition into an 
unchanging temporality, we are in fact repressing the body in its moment of existence, 
denying the plurality of the world. In choosing sediments over momentary existence, 
instead of their interplay, 'I forgo my constant power of providing myself with "worlds" 
in the interest of one of them, and for that very reason this privileged world loses its 
substance and eventually becomes no more than a certain dread' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 
83). The switch between the momentary body and habit body therefore allows for an 
account of the oscillation between stasis and fate on the one hand and fluidity and 
possibility on the other. This antiphony is the key to understanding the creative 
contribution and adaptability of the body-instrument. It is precisely through being 
habituated to the world or place that one can, through expression and a switch to the 
momentary body, begin to change it and generate an alternative way of being in the 
world. 
7 See Judith Bradford and Crispin Sartwell's (1997) 'Voiced Bodies/Embodied 
Voices'in Race/Sex: Their 
Sameness, Difference, and Interplay (ed. ) Naomi Zack Routledge: 
New York 1997 
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Of course, the mercurial nature of the habit-body is not always a conduit for the good. 
An adaptive notion of habit does not spell redemption, let alone imply an intrinsic force 
of benevolence or redemption. Creative transformativity at the corporeal level can be 
used for malign purposes just as much as for benign ones. For instance, the body can 
adapt itself to a situation by re-inforcing a reactive reflex, transforming the body-image 
of the other from one position to the next. According to Iris Marion Young, because the 
dominant culture defines and associates certain groups with their bodies and bodily 
characteristics, 'Those who experience such an "epidermalizing" of their world [ ... ] 
discover their status by means of the embodied behaviour of others, in gestures, a certain 
nervousness that they exhibit, their avoidance of eye contact, the distance they keep 
(1990b: 123). Young therefore, argues that explicit forms of race hatred and grotesque 
forms of stereotyping can be modulated within the pre-conscious somatic layer, or 
'dwelling in everyday habits and cultural meanings' (ibid: 124) becoming less overt, more 
subtle, and ultimately more insidious. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to show how the body's active/passive instrumentality 
relates to tradition. In many respects, tradition is habit writ large. Whatever local 
relation our bodies may have to particular habits, rituals and places, they are always 
circumscribed by the wider field of the tradition itself. The writer Ralph Ellison's first 
love was music, in particular jazz. This mastery of or attunement to the form allows him 
to express how jazz mutates through individual participation. 
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The delicate balance struck between strong individual personality and 
the group during those early jam sessions was a marvel of social 
organisation. I had learned too that the end of all this discipline and 
technical mastery was the desire to express an affirmative way of life 
through its musical tradition and that this tradition insisted that each 
artist achieve this creativity within its frame. He must learn the best of 
the past, and add to it his personal vision. Life could be harsh, loud and 
wrong if it wished, but they lived it fully, when they expressed their 
attitude toward the world it was with a fluid style that reduced the chaos 
of living to form. (Ellison 1955: 189-190) 
The antiphony between individual and group in jazz therefore is both the mirror and 
framework for the larger relationship between the momentary body of performance and 
the tradition itself. The body renders tradition discontinuous through continuing it. Just 
as recollection and forgetting may both conserve memory only by constructing it anew, 
so too a tradition may have to mutate by way of changed circumstances in order to 
survive. As an elderly Malian Imam puts it, when discussing the ending of the practice of 
female circumcision: 'Change must discover unexpected reasons for its existence; it too 
must be surprised at what it brings about. Only in the tension between the old and new 
does the elaboration of a moral practice occur'(Hecht and Simone 1994: 17). Tradition is 
therefore not a blueprint; it is more an open resource, a mutable corporeal lexicon, a rag- 
bag of unforeseen potentiality. As Hecht and Simone continue, 
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African traditional societies, far from embedding individuals in stolid 
norms and procedures, generate their own highly plural and contradictory 
forms, engaging different peoples and activities over a broad landscape. 
(ibid: 39) 
In this sense, tradition itself is not fixed in advance, handed down by some authorial 
lineage. Tradition is an alchemy of the body as the body is an alchemy of tradition. 
Tradition and its bodies are mutually constitutive. Ultimately, in black diasporic 
expression, nobody knows at any point who is doing what to whom, or what is doing 
whom to what. When Charlie Parker played the break in "A Night in Tunisia" that some 
say started Be-bop, we cannot say whether jazz was breaking with itself through the man, 
or whether the man was breaking with himself through jazz. One suspects indeed that 
jazz was breaking with itself as the man was breaking with himself. In either case, the 
tradition is forgotten and renewed according to the different needs and demands 
presented to it. 
It is perhaps necessary to reiterate here that what is transmitted or remembered through 
rhythmic-gestural patterning is not a cognitive structure. Rather, tradition and memory 
operate first of all as "tacit knowledge". The body's being-in-the-world ensures that this 
tacit knowledge does not operate as a fixed schema. That is, as the body adapts to new 
situations, or interacts with the other, the ways in which it draws upon and transforms the 
tradition itself will differ. It is in this way that a dynamic account of the body's 
habituated adoption and adaption of its tradition bears similarities to a hermeneutic 
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account. The tradition is in a sense "interpreted" by the body through the difference of 
the present. The theorisation offered here is therefore akin to a corporealised 
henneneutics: a 'thrice told tale' of the body. A story is told by the body, and in the 
telling, this story repeats and transforms the original, leading to a different tale of the 
body, to be told again differently in the future. However, the difference between the 
dynamic traditionality offered here and conventional hermeneutics is that the body's 
transformation of its life-world is not first of all mental or representational. 
Once more, the language of essentialism, anti -essentialism or Gilroy's "anti-anti- 
essentialism cannot work within this conceptualisation of body memory. The body 
simply does not respond to its sedimented horizons in the same way that a historian or 
sociologist musing over hybrid cultural artefacts does. This is not to say that the body 
does not respond to those same cultural artefacts or indeed make of itself a cultural 
artefact, as I will argue in the next chapter in the case of women in danceliall culture. It 
is merely the case that the body's memory starts from itself, within the horizons of the 
incarnated present relation with a community of others, rather than starting from a 
speculative or intellectualist distance. Thus, diasporic memories of the body must begin 
with the ambiguous existence of the body in the present, rather than from the alleged 
clarity of a logical operation. 
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Rhythms of Existence 
Just as children leave a universal world of cries and movements only to imitate their first 
environment, so too does body memory in general continually mime its world-historical 
environment. In his book Mimesis and Alterity, Michael Taussig writes, The ability to 
mime, and mime well [ ... ] is the capacity to other' (1993: 19). Ideally, to embrace 
otherness is to embrace selfhood and the possibility for cultural reproduction. Through 
my encounter with the other, I learn, grow and I am altered without being consumed by 
the other. Of course, these ideals may at any point be subverted by the asymmetries of 
power. I may be seduced, or I may seduce; I may appropriate without reference, or I may 
be appropriated without reference. If we bracket the ever possible intervention of power 
distortions here, we can say that the body's expressive capacities emerge out of this 
mimesis - understood not simply as the art of copy or repetition, but as Alberto Perez- 
Gomez states, as the 'expression of feelings and the manifestation of experience through 
movement, musical harmonies, the rhythms of speech' (1994: 14). As with the body of 
the child, the adult takes up the sense of her cultural horizons by renewing the body's 
power to adapt them to new circumstances. The sense of the world is directed through 
the body in the moment prior to linguistic behaviour, not through a primordial 
conceptualisation or a mechanically produced rationalisation but through the world 
understood as patterns of movement and rhythm. 
The momentary body of habit becomes an agent of change through repetition and rhythm. 
Rhythm inhabits every level of being. To that extent it is in fact a form of fundamental 
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ontology. From the rhythms of the planets and the cosmos producing on earth day and 
night, tides and weather, to the rhythms of the viscera and organic life, to the rhythm of 
the music of joy and sorrow - and all the pulses of motion between, rhythm lies at the 
heart of things -a rhythmic seed within the flesh of the world. The Senegalese poet 
Leopald Senghor writes, 
Rhythm is the architecture of being, the inner dynamic that gives it 
form, the pure expression of the life force. Rhythm is the vibratory 
shock, the force which, through our sense, grips us at the root of our 
being. It is expressed through corporeal and sensual means, through 
lines, surfaces, colours and volumes in architecture, sculpture or 
painting; through accents in poetry and music, through movements in 
the dance [ ... ]. In the degree to which rhythm is sensually embodied, 
it 
illuminates the spirit. (Quoted in Jacqui Malone 1996: 32). 
Along parallel lines, Henri Lefebvre (1996) has produced exquisite analyses of the world 
understood first of all not as a spatiality nor as a temporality but as a rhythm: through his 
notion of rhythmanalysis. Rather than seeing the urban form as static or frozen in space 
(as with a plan perspective), Lefebvre allows the urban its rhythms - the flow of traffic, of 
certain activities repeating daily - school children leaving schools, shopkeepers opening 
shops and so on. Rhythm for Lefebvre links bodies into a hetergeneous collectivity, and 
therefore 'all gatherings of bodies are poly-rhythmical, that is composed of various 
rhythms, each part, each organ or function having its own in a perpetual interaction which 
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constitutes an ensemble or a whole' (1996: 230). The philosophical suggestion behind 
Lefebvre's poetic analysis is that we ought not to privilege a spatial ontology over a 
temporal one (or vice versa), nor should we persist with a Cartesian autonomous 
individuated subject. As I shall show in the next chapter, the sheer creativity of dancehall 
culture cannot be seen purely as a product of African-Jamaican cultural heritage; the 
culture does not exist in outside of a relation to other cultures and other times. Dancehall 
culture can therefore not be thought as purely spatial or temporal. Like many other urban 
forms or bodies, dancehall is irreducibly spatio-temporal in a dialogue within and 
without the group. Rhythm then becomes another way of naming an irreducible spatio- 
temporality. As Lefebvre writes, 
every rhythm implies the relation of a time with a space, a localized 
time, or if one wishes, a temporalized place. Rhythm is always linked to 
such and such a place, to its place, whether it be the heart, the fluttering 
of the eyelids, the movement of a street, or the tempo of a waltz. (ibid: 
231) 
In this way, the diasporic body, as with the urban form, can be viewed from a rhythm- 
analytical perspective. Rather than freezing the body within a time slice, as if the body's 
form is first of all like a sculpture fixed in space, rhythmanalysis shows that the body's 
fleshy materiality always manifests itself through movement. Motility is the dance of 
becoming being; the intentional arc or postural schema that generates embodied action is 
a form of the body's time. 
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Of course, the rhythm of the body often begins with, or is excited by, music. And in 
theorising the black diaspora, the role of rhythm as an organising principle in aesthetic 
and existential life must be engaged with. Dancing is the visible and physical 
materialisation of rhythm. Thompson notes of West African and diasporic dance, 'it is 
one of the dancer's aims to make every rhythmic subtlety of the music visible' (1966: 
89). All black musical expression is culturally inseparable from its visual and physical 
responsiveness in dance movement, creating a conversation between music and 
movement. The aesthetic appreciation of diasporic music is based on its capacity to 
move, incite, excite, soothe, converse, compete, listen and respond to the body in dance. 
A good dancer is said to be the listener who has heard, understood and interpreted the 
music and then supplies the beat, inserts her own individuality to the silences and the 
gaps opened up in the music. Conversely, a good musician is said to be capable of 
dancing to and within each beat. Thus, as Chernoff suggests, 
The One who "hears" the music "understands" it with a dance, and the 
participation of the dancer is therefore the rhythmic interpretation [ ... I 
described as the aesthetic foundation of appreciation, the essential 
foothold on the music, so to speak. (1979: 143) 
Within diasporic dance social spaces, a musical performance is judged by the extent to 
which both the audience and musicians are moved towards the dancefloor or moved to 
dance in the mind. As Richard Waterman puts it 'Essentially, [ .... ] African music, with 
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few exceptions, is to be regarded as music for the dance, although 'the dance' involved 
may be entirely a mental one' (cited in Frith 1996: 135). Therefore, music that can move 
people physically through the dancing experience is highly regarded by black people. 
This is particularly the case in a context where music, the body and pleasure are closely 
interlinked with the community's social and aesthetic structure. 
This association between music, body and pleasure cannot be seen as an instinctive or 
'natural' disposition among African and diasporic communites, nor is it the expression of 
an ecstatic abandonment which (pan) African rhythmic -gestural expressions are 
8 
predisposed to . Rather, the turn towards dance must be understood within the context of 
a cultural horizon that takes collective rhythmic- gestural participation to be an important 
vehicle for the actualisation of aesthetic, social and ancestral values. But what is it about 
black music that speaks directly to the body? How does the music induce a speaking 
through the body? 
For Leopold Senghor, rhythm is what defines and unites all black cultural styles - music, 
dancing, walking and talking. He writes: 'The organising force which makes the black 
style is rhythm. It is the most perceptible and least material thing' (cited in Chemoff 
1979: 23). The emphasis on polymeter or rhythmic complexity has been recognised as 
what distinguishes African music (despite the differences in instruments, tonal 
organisation and vocal styles [Chemoff ibid: 40]) from modem European music, where 
8 According to Jacqui Malone, 'self-abandonment and frenzy have no place in this environment. A social 
event is an occasion to show character, to become ancestral, to exhibit control, composure, and good taste 
(Jacqui Malone 1996: 19) 
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harmonic and melodic progression is privileged. For AM Jones, 'Rhythm is to the 
African what harmony is to the Europeans, and it is in the complex interweaving of 
contrasting rhythmic patterns that he finds his greatest aesthetic satisfaction' (cited in 
Chemoff ibid: 40). This is not to say that European music always lacks rhythmic or 
percussive traits and African music always lacks a rich melody or harmony. Rather, the 
difference is an outcome of contrasting and distinct aesthetic sensibilities emerging 
within different traditions and different histories. 9 
Rhythmic Gestures 
It is thus that rhythm begins through gesture, through movements of the body directed 
into sense. A hand rises, a pelvis rotates, and the opportunity for remembrance and 
repetition begins. This opportunity for remembrance can be observed in the emphasis on 
angularity in styles of walking, greetings, dress and performance of the black diaspora 
(Malone 1996: 34). Writing in the 1930s, Zora Neale Hurston writes of the retention of 
African gestures among African-Americans: 
After adornment the next most striking manifestation of the negro is 
angularity. Everything that he touches becomes angular. In all African 
sculpture and doctrine of any sort we find the same thing. Anyone 
watching negro dancers will be struck by the same phenomena. Every 
9 The introduction of musical notation appears to be central in changing the history of European music. In 
his book Improvisation: Its Nature and Practice in Music (1992), the British free jazz guitarist Derek 
Bailey charts the demise of improvisation within the European classical tradition since the seventeenth 
century. 
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posture is another angle. Pleasing, yes. But an effect achieved by the 
very means which a European strives to avoid. (1933: 297) 
It is in this sense that Merleau-Ponty's assertion that 'my organ of perception [involves] a 
thought older than myself, of which those organs are merely a trace' (1962: 351) maybe 
understood. Before the knowledge or experience of the subject comes to bear witness, 
the body begins to take up a stance or a pattern of gesture through the movement of 
repetition and the repetition of movement. The body remembers and only later does the 
subconscious mind awake, if at all. In the face of restrictive dynamics within the habitus 
and limitations imposed through asymmetries of power, the task ahead in this thesis is to 
allow this pre-personal work of the body to attain the status of agency and name it as a 
mode of resistance and erotic communion. 
The embodiment of memory through rhythm is expressed through gesture. Rhythm and 
gesture need each other in order for rememoration to enact itself, prior to thought. The 
repetition of movement can only take place when that movement has an order or a 
schema and is expressive of something. Mimesis, as the expression of feelings, requires 
an intentional arc of gesture that gathers the body within the realm of meaning. Without 
gesture, the movement of dance has no signification. Gesture is the meaning towards 
which any dance form moves and around which it is organised; gesture is the destination 
of any dance. Gesture is at the same time retrospective, it is always the attempt to 
communicate back towards previous modes of expression as a way of signifying the 
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difference of the present. Although pre-linguistic, the rememoration at work here is 
nonetheless a sign - an arc of meaning that communicates with itself and to others. Even 
the slightest gesture emerges within the field of meaning and communication: to gesture 
just is to communicate something with the body to an audience. 
It might seem at first sight strange that the body is deemed able to communicate with 
itself prior to conscious awareness. This sentiment dissipates once we consider such 
phenomena as psychosomatic disorders, where the body communicates a problem that 
has arisen out of emotional or psychic distress before it is named as such. The case of 
self-harming as an expression of something that is not known to the subject (and 
therefore remains incommunicable even though the body communicates), or the case of 
yoga where emotions are released through the practice of different positions (known as 
asanas) show that the body has a consciousness that is pre-reflective, aware of the world 
prior to the world being thought. 
Cultural Patterns 
In order to attain the full sense of rhythmic gestural patterning it is crucial to see that this 
marriage between rhythm and gesture is itself a patteming, the establishment of the form 
of re-memoration. The pre-logical dynamics of memory are not absolutely disordered. 
Denying that there is a logic'to memory is not the same as advocating complete random 
redistribution of the effects of the past within the present. The form body-memory takes 
is always somewhere between determinism and chaos, conformity and 
disruption; the 
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difference that repeating the past within the present makes is therefore partly ordered, and 
partly without precedent. How is this so? 
As already noted, the point is to see that rememoration takes place against the backdrop 
of a cultural horizon. As the body takes up its potential within the present moment, 
certain figures, rhythms and gestures are gathered pre-reflectively as possibilities for 
action. The learning and mimesis of childhood grants the subject a set of pre-dispositions 
to grasp and express in a certain way. Tracy D. Snipe writes that in dance cultures such 
as those of the black world 
children are taught the critical awareness of body aesthetics, and how to 
express a wide variety of emotions like anger, grief, sadness, love, and 
hatred through dance [ ... ]. Moreover, 
from infancy to adulthood the 
young are taught the spiritual or secular significance of a dance and so 
form an acute dance consciousness that is retained throughout life. 
(1996: 66) 
This ordering or disciplining of the body is not absolutely determinative however, for the 
body's occupation of the present is another way of referring to the rupture of time in the 
space of the now. Although different traditions are more or less responsive to internal 
tension and change, in general we can say that the present moment is not closed or 
fixed; 
it is a site of openness, where things may be done differently on the one 
hand, and on the 
other the site for the perpetuation of tradition. In this respect, the ordering of the present 
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is met with openness to a bodily spontaneity 10 which fulfils the present's rupture. The 
body can improvise its way out of the past, as a jazz musician can take the repertoire and 
deform it, in order to make a new melody out of the same rhythm or play the same 
melody to a different rhythm. To dramatise the point: the body enters the space of the 
present, and through gesture and dance, the present ruptures what has been given by the 
past. The body follows a pattern of walking or speech, and finds itself again within a 
new scene and gets altered. A repetition is differentiated from itself and the circle of 
tradition continues, as it is de-centred, yet again. 
Through the differential movement of patterning, rhythm and gesture come together to 
establish another relation to the cultural horizon. The intentional arc of gesture points 
always towards the present, where things are open to change. A patterning emerges as a 
rhythm and a bodily inflection enfold themselves within the circumstances of a new 
present. The difference that is produced within this active matrix of memory is therefore 
almost inevitable. Again, while variations in openness occur across cultures, in general 
the existential situation of the present is always new; therefore the way in which the body 
moves towards the situation using resources passed secretly and without words from 
generation to generation will be always new. The young girl passes secrets of the body 
onto her child as she becomes the mother of new possibilities of mimesis and expression. 
10 It should be noted that spontaneity here is not a flight of fancy that has emerged 
from nowhere. Rather, it 
emerges from the full awareness of the forms and discourses informing the culture or tradition in which we 
are embedded. As Levin citation of Govinda indicates, 'spontaneity is 
built on practice ... it is a product of 
long-repeated actions in the past ... which 
have become so ingrained in one's nature that they need no further 
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Differential Repetition 
So far I have been suggesting that the past becomes a series of repeated movements open 
to differentiation through the possibilities opened up in the present. In order to take this 
point about memory, difference and repetition further, we need to see how the 
transformative possibility contained within it has become part of the structure of black 
diasporic culture. As I have shown, the present is a site of openness, and therefore the 
site of a potential rupture and transformation. This possibility of change is guaranteed 
metaphysically to any culture or tradition. However, as I have suggested it is absolutely 
crucial to understand at this point that transformation is not automatically given. There 
is no inevitability to a tradition being re-worked, tweaked, inflected or whatever. From a 
metaphysical point of view, the present is necessarily transformative only in the virtual 
sense. Things could stay the same, the revolution (televised or not) need not happen. 
What is required for things to change and for the present to lead to transformation is that 
there is a desire and_fulfilment of this metaphysical promise. There must be an energy or 
a cultural dynamic or a set of existential conditions that intervene within the present to 
take advantage of this openness, and for the virtual transformativity of the present to 
become an actuality. Again, even if these conditions are in place, transformation is still 
not guaranteed. Beyond desire and existential opportunity, as I have emphasised above, 
power structures may still inhibit adaptations: internally, the structure of collective habit 
may be impeded by conservative forces, and externally, the culture may be almost 
completely restricted in its expression through political mobilisation. 
decision or effort of will'(1985: 213). 
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It is at this point that the specificities of a culture and existential situation become key. I 
suggest that in the case of black diasporic culture the metaphysical openness of the 
present is often fulfilled by actual transformation. Many observers of African and black 
diasporic cultures have written about the role of repetition in these cultures as organising 
principles for dealing with issues of agency, aesthetic, social life, invasion and habits of 
being in the world Drewel 1992; Gates 1988, Levine 1978). 1 suggest, therefore, that it is 
the emphasis placed upon repetition and difference that in many cases (though not all) 
entails that for black cultures the present will see some form of alteration of the given, 
through what Leroy Jones has called the 'changing same'. Difference and repetition are 
not just metaphysical possibilities in black diasporic culture; they are actually practised 
and are central to the culture's understanding and preservation of itself. 
The emphasis placed here upon actual transformativity within black cultures is not 
intended as a disavowal of the fact that cultural and historical sedimentations are 
reproduced (often in the most conservative manner); the point is rather that 
transformation can only be obtained through processes of inertia. The logic of 
transformation must therefore be clarified as an intertwining of sameness and difference 
(as Jones' phrase suggests). For something to change requires that there are 
characteristics of that object that stay the same; otherwise if transformation were "total", 
the object would cease to exist. For example two people can perform the Sango Dance 
Bata and we recognise it as such; however, as each performer inflects the dance with her 
own world-historical agency, a noticeable difference will be observed without the 
formal 
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element of Bata being lost. As Margaret Thompson Drewal writes, "in order for that 
which is repeated to comment on the past, it would have to maintain some recognisable 
relationship to it"(1992: 5). Therefore, the emphasis placed above on the openness of the 
present can be actualised only in the context of layers of sedimentation, internalisation 
and naturalisation against which the transformation can take place. We must rethink 
spontaneity as that which takes place only when embedded within a given historico- 
cultural frame, rather than as a pure spontaneity without ground. 
But how does this space of openness and spontaneous potentiality within the field of 
inertia become an actuality within black culture? What are the factors that have enabled 
black culture to rise to these metaphysical possibilities and to inaugurate the 
transformative path of repetition and difference? The answers to these questions have 
already been given, in summary form. As was stated above, "an energy or a cultural 
dynamic or a set of existential conditions" intervenes to fulfill the possibilities for 
transformation. The task at hand now is to unpack these factors and specify how they 
operate within black diasporic culture, even when relations of power and force of 
tradition - internal and external - militate against change. 
In terms of energy and cultural dynamics, James Snead's work suggests a way forward, 
particularly in terms of his analysis of repetition and 'cut'. The cut is Snead's way of 
referring to repetition and difference. The cut is also known as the "return beat", or the 
"breakbeat". For Snead, repetition allows each culture to assess and respond to internal 
and external changes and progress. However, the extent to which repetition is denied or 
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accepted, repressed or highlighted in any culture will depend upon how progress or 
transformation is perceived (1984: 59). According to Snead, in recent European cultures, 
repetition is denied in favour of difference, 'defined as progress and growth' (ibid: 60). 
The dominant European model therefore involves a perpetual transcendence of the 
present in favour of the future. In this model, progression undermines repetition, eroding 
the possibility of the gathering of memory along the way, let alone transforination. In 
contrast, discontinuities and ruptures of black culture are central to repetition, as a form 
of "cutting back" to the beginning. If we bracket Snead's problematic clefting of 
European and "black" culture, linked as it is to an equally problematic reification and 
essentialising of discontinuity as it is played out in different terms across the two cultural 
spheres of European and black, then we can focus on the insight Snead's analysis 
provides in terms of the patternings of the black diaspora. According to my reading of 
Snead, difference embedded within a return to the beginning is cut into black cultural 
reproduction as a sort of deeply-grounded facticity of being. This cutting back to the 
beginning is corporeal and spatio-temporal. Now, one way of reading this focus on the 
cut could be in terms of essentialism - the cut as an intrinsic property of blackness etc. 
However, another way of understanding the cut is in terms of historico-cultural 
sedimentation. The cut is not biological or in the genes; it is the ongoing and constantly 
mutating residuum of patterns of being that have gathered across and through time and 
culture. The cut is what is left to black people in the wake of the movements and 
expressions of those that came before. The cut is therefore a 
form of practice. 
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The Actuality of Transformation 
In the following section I want to explore what I have called the actualisation of 
transformativity and 'the cut' as being produced by cultural forms. This will involve 
temporarily bracketing the existential background through which these forms are enacted 
or made flesh. However, once I have sketched out these forms, in the next chapter, I 
shall close the brackets against existence and begin to highlight how the conditions of 
black diasporicity are equally as important factors in the resulting forms of expression as 
the formal elements themselves. 
So, to begin with the expressive practices of the black diaspora. The first question that 
arises is, what are these practices, and how do they emphasise repetition and difference? 
The practices of the "cut" can be understood within the parameters of what Robert Farris 
Thompson has described as the 'five traits' of West African and Diaspora rhythmic- 
gestural patterning: 1) the dominance of a percussive concept of performance; 2) 
polymeter; 3) apart-playing and dancing; 4) antiphony or call and response; and 5) the 
non-musical songs of social allusion/ dances of denson (1966: 95). 
I have already discussed what Thompson calls the percussive concept of performance 
above. To an extent, this particular trait shapes and animates all the other four traits. 
However, it should be noted that rhythm involves not only the sound but also the method 
by which the sound is created. For example, the methods of apart-playing and the 
antiphonal relationship between musicians and dancers informs the creation of diasporic 
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music. It is important to note that Thompson's five traits do not posit an unchanging, 
pure original presence. Rather, they suggest an already always disruptive and 
transformative potentiality. " Here, transformation is achieved through perfonnance. 
Every performance repeats elements of the tradition in which it is situated, whilst opening 
the potential for transformation. 'Repetition', Drewal writes, allows us 'to understand the 
transformational capacity of performance praxis' (1992: 1). Apart-playing, as we shall 
see, is essentially ontological, incorporating the self and other dancing, intersecting, 
interpreting, altering and differentiating each other. I will argue that apart-playing is the 
incessant matrix of innovation that produces adaptation. It is this trans-cultural formal 
structure of black diasporic expression that facilitates a memory born of survival, 
mutating across time. The key point is that it is the formal elements of expression which 
maintains survival for black diasporic agents - across seas, time and destitution. This is 
not to argue that form alone determines adaptability - as we shall see in the next chapter, 
the formal itself must be grounded. 
Let us continue with our examination of Thompson's traits by comparing European music 
with African. Meter is the standard unit of measuring time in modem European music. 
Generally, each instrument in an orchestra shares the same meter (Erik Davis 1999, 
Chemoff 1979). Davis writes that 'the shared rhythm is counted evenly and stressed on 
every main beat' (p3). In contrast to the African model, rhythm is said to be simpler and 
11 As Henry Louis Gates notes, to name a black tradition 'is to rename each Of its antecedents, no matter 
how pale they might seem. To rename is to revise, and to revise is to Signify (1988: xxiii). 
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subordinated to harmonic and melodic complexity in European music (Chemoff 1979, 
Frith 1996, Manuel 1995). 12 
African music on the other hand is described as polymetric. Polymeter refers to different 
metrics, or forms of measure, taking place at once. Instead of slavishly following a 
single beat, African music begins by playing with the time of the music itself or listening 
out for the offbeat accents produced by other musicians/instrument. The syncopation or 
the space between beats and off-beats tempts the musician to fill the gap opened up, 
adding to the existing rhythms to produce a complex shifting whole. Polymetric practices 
are therefore forms of expression where in a group situation, each player or performer 
concentrates on their own rhythm or movement, responding to the other performers by 
integrating their changes within their own terms. ' 3 As the great African-American bassist 
Charles Mingus writes in his autobiography Beneath the Underdog, '[ ... ] imagine a circle 
surrounding each beat - each guy can play his notes anywhere in that circle and it gives 
him a feeling he has more space. The notes fall anywhere inside the circle but the 
original feeling for the beat isn't changed' (1962,35 1). Although, in itself, the individual 
rhythm might be quite simple, once combined with other rhythms a complex syncopated 
pattern of beats soon emerges. 
12 However, there are numerous cases where this is not the case. We can think of Western musicians such 
as Stravinsky or Steve Reich, whose musical compositions are rhythmically complex and make use of 
repetition. Similarly, not all forms of diasporic black music emphasise rhythm in their music. 
As Manuel 
notes of raggae dancehall, the music has 'spare instrumentation and less-complex rhythms, the musical 
accompaniment taking a back-seat to the deejay's vocals'(1995: 173) 
13 An individual musician playing unaccompanied may also play polymeterically. 
For instance, the 
ferocious playing of the African-American pianist Cecil Taylor often 
involves highly complex percussive 
effects on one instrument. 
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According to Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, the difference initiated by a 
group of musicians is what generates rhythm and 'not the repetition, which nevertheless 
produces it: productive repetition has nothing to do with reproductive meter' (quoted in 
Davis 3). Polyrhythm is therefore not the same as polymeter. Whilst polyrhythm 
suggests many beats at once in a rhythm, polymeter advances a stage further by 
suggesting different units of measure themselves playing at the same time. Whilst 
polyrhythm may involve different rhythms playing around the same time signature (4/4 
time), polymeter involves different meters themselves playing apart (say a rhythm in 3/4 
playing next to a rhythm in 6/8). For Deleuze and Guattari, rhythm is critical, 
heterogeneous and 'always undergoing transcoding', unlike meter which is dogmatic and 
'operates in a homogeneous space-time' (ibid: 3). 
As stated above, this self-and-other arrangement need not be solely percussive or 
communal. Just as a complex drumbeat can be separated into different elements working 
differently to produce a whole, so too can the dancing body become 'polymetric. ' The 
dancer uses different parts of her body to mark out, respond and emphasise different parts 
of the polymetric whole, at which point she tries to supply another rhythm. A good 
dancer listens out - just like the musician - to two or more rhythms or a "hidden" 
beat and 
attempts to comment on and replicate them, supplying a motile presence to the 
suppressed beat. Just as the rhythmic patterning of the music is never linearly constant, 
that is, it is always swinging or cutting back and forth, so too the dancer's body is never 
constant. The dancing body can move in and out of a gentle slow wining to a more 
explosive motion. 
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It is important to note that there is no single form to black expressive polymeter. The 
fluctuations in the dancing body that mirror the rhythmic counterpoints in the music vary 
according to cultural, regional and social styles. In some cases, the hips can be isolated 
from the rest of the body, producing rhythms that play against the background of other 
rhythms in other parts of the body. As a form of dance, the body itself splits into 
different elements. Polymeteric expression can therefore be described as apart-playing. 
As already noted, in a group, each artist plays apart from the others in order to play with 
them; with the dancing body, the hips may play apart from the rest of the body. Apart 
playing/dancing means that the performers do not try to play or dance the same piece 
simultaneously, rather they play different things all together. Focusing on his or her own 
part in the ensemble, each musician helps to create the meaning of the polymeteric whole 
by working "separately together". Working separately together has another purpose: it 
allows individuals to improvise, innovate, introduce difference and add their own identity 
to the polymeter. 
In the same way that musicians play apart in order to establish unity, dancers also dance 
apart to establish a unity. Dancing apart does not necessarily mean the absence of 
physical contact; rather, it involves the ability to maintain a separateness while 
contributing to a fluid interdependent whole. By dancing apart the dancer is able to 
dialogue with or challenge the improvisation introduced by the musicians as well as other 
dancers as she dances alone. The dancer, for Michel Serres, never dances alone. Every 
dancer always dances with an absence, an other, however unselfconscious. 
Serres writes, 
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'when the dancer dances alone, he still and always dances with music' (1995: 46). In the 
same way that a dancer always dances with music, the musician (especially in live acts) 
also relies on the dancer to initiate variation in the polymeter. 14 Therefore, at the core of 
rhythmic -gestural patterning is the dialogic interchange between the past and the present, 
self and other, repetition and differentiation, sound and motion. Thompson writes: 
The master drummer (or drummers) plays alone, intent upon 
improvisation; the master dancer (dancers), intent upon following or 
challenging these improvisations, also dances alone. And the drum chorus 
interacts by repetitive patterns, which means that a certain amount of 
performing together balances the apartness. But the critical fact seems to 
be this: West Africans perform music and dance apart the better to ensure 
a dialogue between movement and sound. (1966: 94 my emphasis) 
Here then, the voices of expression are inherently plural, bouncing back and forth across 
each other. There is a sort of paradox inherent within these traits: no voice is entirely 
itself by itself (for it is always produced through listening or watching the other), and yet 
each voice stands apart, maintaining its apartness, its separation or gap from the whole. 
The cut is a cut that cuts both ways - cutting into listening by making it active, and 
cutting into expression by making it passive. This self/other process can extend to 
identity politics. Writing about the need for white people to see that their life and what 
14 As Chemoff writes, 'If you are playing for dancers, you can follow those who can stay close to the 
beat: 
their movements are clear, and it is indeed easier to improvise on a drum when someone 
is dancing well. 
Without dancers, many drunu-ners cannot bring forth a wide range of variations, and 
in this regard we can 
suggest that the dance probably played one of the important inspirational roles in the 
development of jazz. 
In Highlife music, because some people like to dance to different instruments in an orchestra, many 
musicians, to help their creativity, like to pick someone who is dancing to their 
beat and play styles 
according to the dance (1979: 147). 
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they are and will become is tied to the fate of black people, Timothy Maliqalim Simone 
writes, 
The pulling away from another person is as important in the process of 
creative understanding as is the joining with them. A sense of interaction 
is maintained only as long as interactants acknowledge themselves as 
different and the difference is not construed as prohibitive of the 
interaction. [ ... ] the function of the interaction is not to callibrate, regulate, 
or homogenize the effects or outcomes but to cultivate, albeit, redistribute 
the difference. Each person is altered, but not for the purpose of 
equalizing or synthesizing each person's impact on the other. The 
oscillation of separateness and togetherness is a dynamic yet to be 
imagined in the context of American race relations. (1989: 196) 
It has often been said that Africans acculturated themselves rapidly to New World ideas, 
values and structures. This capacity to swing back and forth to embrace separateness and 
togetherness I suggest emerges out of the antiphonal structure of the Africanism in 
diasporic black cultures. In musical terms, antiphony is the repetitive element developed 
from a dominant conversation (ie a background or hidden beat) where there is a switch 
back and forth from solo to chorus or from solo to an emphatic instrumental reply 
(Chemoff 1979: 55). Such a device pervades much diasporic music, gestural, and oral 
patterns. Listen to the opening sermon in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man: 
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II 
"Brothers and sisters, my text this morning is the 'Blackness of 
Blackness' And a congregation of voices answered: "That blackness is 
most black, brother, most black.. " 
"In the beginning... " 
"At the very start, " they cried. 
"... there was blackness" 
"Preach it... " 
and the sun" 
"The sun, Lawd... " 
11 was bloody red... " 
I said black is... " 
"Preach it, brother... " 
11 ... an'black ain't". (1952: 9-10) 
Chernoff writes, 'The chorus or response is a rhythmic phrase which recurs regularly; the 
rhythms of a lead singer or musician vary and are cast against the steady repetition of the 
response' (1979: 55). Antiphony is also true of dance. Citing J. Van Wing, Thompson, 
describes the antiphony in dance among the Bakongo peoples of present day Congo thus: 
There are always two bodies or two groups of bodies in movement: a solo 
dancer in front of a group, or an individual before another in a group, or an 
individual before another in a couple, or two groups placed in front of the 
other. They perform periodic movements that are like questions and 
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responses. (cited in Thompson 1966: 95) 
Antiphony 'is a means of putting innovation and tradition, invention and imitation, into 
amicable relationships with one another' (ibid: 98) Numerous examples of antiphonal in 
dance abound. In breakdancing, like its Brazilian antecedent Capoeira, there is always a 
solo performer inside a ring who performs exquisite acrobatic spins in order to 
communicate with and invite another breaker to attempt to challenge and match up their 
routine. In dub dancing, whether it is a solo win'ing or partnering, it always presupposes 
the presence of another to whom one communicates or with whom one dances with. 
Finally, songs of allusion and dances of derision are in addition moral in content. Their 
aim is both to reconstitute performatively a subject's action whilst leaving them open to 
ridicule. In songs, there is a satirical word play which suggestively rebukes transgressive 
behaviour whilst shaming it. Thompson has argued that dances of derision are common 
traits in many forms of West African dancing. Dancers can often imitate and mock, with 
exaggerated details the minutiae of an action with an uncanny cruel precision. Camille 
Poupeye calls them "satire in action". Kaigh describes them as "dances of domestic 
oddities" (cited in Thompson). A recent example from dancehall culture is the popularity 
of the dance known as "Mr Bean". So named after the British comic of the sairne name, 
the dance involves twitching and spasms. "Mr Bean" is a mimetic symbolisation of 
deformity on the one hand, and on the other, the ability to contort the body with such 
precision bears testimony to the agility of the dancer. Such dances of allusion can also 
be 
read as a commentary on what is visibly present to the dancer, 
but also act as a reflection 
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on the distortion and the violence of the existential scene. Songs of allusion and dances 
of derision are, for Thompson, the embodiment of a community's self-regulative devices 
and the self-consciousness of the wider society. Thompson notes that this last trait is so 
powerful that the formal colonial authorities of present day Republic of Zambia outlawed 
any dancing which is intended for ridicule. "As chapter 20, section 7 of the former law 
implies: No person may organize or take part in any dance which is calculated to hold up 
to ridicule or to bring into contempt any person, religion, or duly constituted 
authority'( 1966: 96). For Thompson, this shows the power of the 'words that are made 
flesh' in African dances. 
All these five traits -a percussive or rhythmic sense of performance, polymeter, apart- 
playing, antiphony, and songs and dances of derision, cluster around each other to 
describe the form of black diasporic expression and existence. Whether it is jazz, the 
women in half-handstand gyrating their buttocks in dancehall, the breakbeat of hip-hop 
and the mutant polymeter of jungle, two or more elements clash to produce a complex 
whole. Given this situation, the played-apart space of black expression is less a visual 
space than an acoustic space: the noise-space that surrounds the whole of the body admits 
of more complexity and plurality than the visual field that directs perception to that which 
is in front. With acoustic space, the proximity of noises retain their separation, whereas 
with visual space, synthesis inevitably produces unification of otherwise separate 
elements. 
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Ultimately, in black culture, apart-playing is ontological. Polymeter is derived from a 
discourse between self and other, immanence and transcendence, suggesting an intimacy 
between polymeter and polytheism. This can best be explained if I situate myself in 
relation to the other as second person. My rhythm or identity works only by adapting 
yours, and yet I maintain myself within my own rhythm -I do not fall into yours. The 
otherness of your performance is kept in its otherness (I do not merely copy your rhythm, 
or the movements of your body), and yet, this otherness becomes my own, as my inward 
moment is decentered from itself. 
Antiphony produces criss-crossings between the elements of the whole, generating 
incessant difference and adaptation. This ontological structure of apart-playing or the cut 
applies to itself as a whole; it receives its other, and responds to it, rather than curling up 
into a shell of conservation and homogeneity. Thus when a culture based around 
antiphonal form travels (despite the condition), it tends to travel well, clinging to, calling 
and responding to new contexts. New voices get interwoven into the mix. Here, I hope 
that my argument begins to become clear. Through the formal devices of apart playing, 
the inherent possibility of transformative diasporic memory gets locked into a frame of 
actualisation. The other is included and responded to, and again the form mutates across 
contexts, Oceans and destitution as a new form emerges. Apart-playing therefore 
represents an openness to alterity which ensures both continuation and alteration as that 
openness embraces different forms of alterity. 
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As I suggested above, while apart-playing and the differential repetition of embodied 
memory constitute important formal elements of the black diaspora, a purely formal 
account can only go so far. Such an account does not give us the grounds for 
transformation - it only gives the means by which that transformation takes place. To 
supplement a formal analysis, it is necessary to embed it within an existential context. 
The key thing is to see that it is not the form of a culture alone, but the existential context 
and expediency in which the form is produced which enables adaptation. It might be the 
case that certain formal elements did not survive or travel well because they were not so 
adaptive. As the next chapter will show, the existential context for black diasporic 
peoples is one of enduring physical and metaphysical suffering. The context of global 
hetero-patriarchal white capitalist supremacy puts many black people face to face with 
the force of annihilation - if not on a daily basis then at key points in their lives. At such 
moments, as we shall see, an energy or a spirit of will must be fostered, if survival and 
creativity is to take place. A consideration of the differential repetition of memory 
therefore points the way towards issues of survival and identity. Rhythmic -gestural 
patterning opens a language of rememorational embodied resistance, where a way of 
being-in-the-world is inflected as it is passed from generation to generation: the gestures 
change as the language that emerges out of them change, but underneath, a matrix of 
memory links all the threads together within a common fabric. 
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Chapter 4: Survival and the Imagination: The Eroticisation of Pain in 
Jamaican DancehaH Culture 
In the last chapter I explored the transformation of embodied memory by outlining the 
formal elements of retention structuring the experiences and expressions of black 
diasporic agents. I showed that apart playing and dancing, antiphony (call and response), 
a percussive concept of performance, polymeter and dances of derision are enduring 
characteristics of black expression that sustain the aesthetic paradigms of the African 
diaspora. Towards the end, I began to suggest that this formal account is necessary but 
insufficient. The task at hand to complete the story of diasporic memory is to situate it 
within its existential context. This work of situation complicates the formal accounts by 
making the transmission of form dynamic. A stress on formal elements threatens to 
render what is culturally given static, whereas an emphasis on existential context gives 
dynamism to our notions of both community and body. 
In order to provide an existential ground for the formal cultural patterning which I 
characterised in the last chapter as rhythmic -gestural patterning, I want to begin by 
exploring the work of Elaine Scarry in her ground breaking book The Body in Pain: The 
Making and Unmaking of the World (1985). Scarry sketches out what might be termed a 
phenomenology of pain and imagination, which I will claim can be generalised across the 
historico-existential field of black diasporic experience. In Scarry's account, extreme 
physical pain is posited as a primary model for thinking about 
knowledge and power, 
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urd-naking and creation, voice and soma, identity and its denial, representation and non- 
representation, visibility and invisibility. In other words, Scarry's account can be used to 
articulate a pervasive condition of black diasporic agents. In the midst of existential 
dread, diasporic black communities have worked on their bodies to reveal and combat the 
truths of their circumstances. Against global economic deprivation, hetero-patri arch al 
constraint, the ongoing consequences of the history of slavery, neo-colonialism, the 
violence of class inequality and Christian conservatism, diasporic black people have used 
the very vehicle of positioning as a resource to contest their social status in their struggle 
to keep alive viable modes of being. In such circumstances, 'survival' transcends the 
conventional- crisis-vocabulary of basic need or environmental limitation. Rather, 
'survival' refers to desire and the limits of the imagination and the deepest reserves of the 
psyche. Prior to merely physical need, survival is ontological. Survival concerns the 
affirmation of being in the face of denial and the threat of annihilation. In the context of 
the Jamaican poor, survival involves trying to get beyond social death, trying to transcend 
the legacy of slavery, to derive meaning in a context of meaninglessness. Survival 
implies the attempt to fuse the metaphysical, the spiritual and the existential in a way that 
allows diasporic black people to assert themselves (Nettleford, personal interview 1999). 
This has created a situation where black diasporic agents continuously 'imagine an 
undominated fruition and to live within existing dominations equipped with a 
determination to do more than survive'(Simone 1989: 158). 
I will argue that the sheer desire to tame and conquer the subtle horrors of black life is 
one of the impluses that animates and motivates creativity and the continuation of the 
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forms of African expressive practices in the diasporic context. In a socio-historical field 
characterised by the trauma and brutality of global white capitalist supremacy, people of 
the black diaspora have responded (and are forced to respond) in terms of the creative 
imagination. The engine of this creative response is the corporealised imagination. As I 
suggested in the introduction, it seems that there must be something other than the 
theorisation of power and the modes of resistance to it. The vulnerability of merely 
resisting power is that that resistance will become reactive - unwittingly reproducing the 
oppressive legacies of power by internalising its frame of reference. However, if power 
is viewed initially as capacity and as empowerment, rather than as imposition, this leads 
to a creative response that transcends the often restrictive and implicitly annihilating 
conditions that authority places upon the marginalised. In this way, hegemonic power is 
not first of all resisted; rather, the frame of reference is itself negotiated or refused 
because its terms do not reflect entirely the norms and practices of the marginalised 
groups. This is a heady refusal that requires strength, commitment and bravery. In the 
first instance, such responses require creativity and an impassioned imaginative capacity 
to think "outside the box" of the terms of reference of oppressive power itself. 
Through the practices and processes of embodied imagination music, dance, sports, 
gestures, speech, religion, fashion, humour, culinary practices black diasporic agents 
engage with trace- structures of African expressive practice which accommodate 
continuity and experimentation. These preferences impact on how we think about black 
agency. Thus, in the context of socio-political disregard for black humanity and urban 
marginalisation, the body's imagination engenders various responses: subversion, 
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perversion, addiction, vulgarisation and immense creativity. Through the rest of this 
chapter, I will show how such cultural practices as adornment, the fetishisation of the 
body and 'the most staggering excesses' can sit comfortably with 'the most exacting 
physical discipline and assertion of will'(Ralph Ellison 1962: 230). In other words, I will 
show how the apparent antinornies of excess and discipline occur characteristically side 
by side in different forms of black diasporic expression. 
A Phenomenology of Pain and Imagination 
The Embodied State of Being-in-Pain 
An aspect of the existential context of black experience can be summarised in terms of 
what Gilroy has referred to as the ontological 'condition of being in pain' (1993: 293). 
Rather than being merely a physical condition, we need to understand that pain involves 
an alteration of the subject's world and powers of agency. Elaine Scarry argues that the 
body's pain resists linguistic objectification. This resistance to language is linked to 
pain's lack of referential content in the external world. Most psychic, perceptual and 
somatic states allude to an object in the world: 'as desire is desire of x, fear is fear of y, 
hunger is hunger for z; but pain is not "of" or "for" anything - it is itself alone' (Scarry 
1985: 162). Physical pain is however unique. It admits no object, making it unshareable. 
In the absence of externalisation, there is no other reality besides the intransitive cruelty 
of the pain. As a state, pain is thoroughly of the body. Its presence returns the body's 
experience to that primal moment prior to language, agency, meaning, culture, and 
195 
Chapter 4: Survival and The Imagination 
subjectivity. As such, Ihe relative ease or difficulty with which any given phenomenon 
can be verbally represented', Scarry writes, 'also influences the ease or difficulty with 
which that phenomenon comes to be politically represented'(ibid: 12). 
For Scarry, the difficulty of articulating the body's pain has political and perceptual 
consequences, especially when the human body is appropriated for and conflated with 
debased forms of power (ibid: 14) such as torture and war. According to Scarry, voice 
and soma are inseparable: a fact intrinsic to the effects of war and torture. To inflict pain 
and simultaneously elicit information from the tortured is to participate in the diminution 
of their world. Intense bodily pain is language and world destroying. To be in intense 
pain is to occupy a position of incarnate silence, 'to have one's sphere of extension 
contracted down to the small circle of one's immediate physical presence' (ibid: 207). 
This contrasts with the situation of the powers behind the torture. Here, the voice of 
authority, working through the victim in appropriating his or her speech, is displaced, 
disembodied and afforded agency, self-extension and limitlessness. As Scarry writes, 
To have a body is to be describable, creatable, alterable and woundable. 
To have no body, to have only a voice is to be none of these things: it is to 
be the wounder but not oneself woundable, to be the creator or the one 
who alters but oneself neither creatable nor alterable. [ ... ] Consequently, 
to be intensely embodied is the equivalent of being unrepresented and 
(here as in many secular contexts) is almost always the condition of those 
without power. (1985: 206 - 7) 
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Scarry's phenomenology of pain raises the question of mapping the limits of agency. 
Does her account suggest that to be in intense pain is to experience psychic implosion 
without any redress in the direction of expression? Does pain of this kind reduce its 
victim to being absolutely abject and passive? Is pain always experienced as absolute 
negation or are there ways of subduing or superseding it? How can pain be brought out 
from the silent and silenced body into shared objectification? How can a violated body 
become a defiant, cherished body? 
A Prelude to a Kiss 
For Scarry, pain's intransitivity is not absolutely a negation of agency; rather, it is its very 
objectlessness that can give rise to imagining, resistance and the conditions for creation 
and the gathering of the fragmented body. The imagination is therefore offered as pain's 
only object: While pain is a state remarkable for being wholly without objects, the 
imagination is remarkable for being the only state that is wholly its objects'(Scarry 1985: 
162). Structured through objects, the imagination allows for pain to be transposed 
outside of itself and to be projected onto cultural artefacts. Through projection onto an 
object, the body's pain can quit the interior landscape of the body. The imagination 
therefore supplies the ecstatic structure of transcendence from the body denied by pain 
and suffering. 
For example, for those in acute famine regions, imagining food or water across the border 
may act as an imperative to move towards the source of food. Again, within Jamaican 
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dancehall culture, the insufferability of life and its structural constraints push women to 
try to combat limitations and deprivations through the discipline of dancing and the 
excess of bodily adornment in what the Sufi underground anarchist Hakim Bey calls a 
"temporary autonomous zone" (Bey 1991) of corporeal imagination. The intensity of 
pain is thus temporarily abated. Therefore, 'state and object co-exist as ongoing 
counterparts' (Scarry 1985: 167). That is, the object (food, tools, companion) directly 
eliminates or releases in part some of the aversive intensity of the state/sensation (hunger, 
injury, loneliness) as the afflicted work towards alleviating their suffering. Imagination 
can therefore act as "a prelude to a kiss" (Duke Ellington), a prelude to the transformation 
of an existential situation. Rex Nettleford (1985) has argued that by drawing on the 
imaginative intellect, enslaved and colonised black people constructed an alternative 
world-view separate from their enslavers. They mobilised collectively to produce 
change, to outwit their oppressors and wage successful rebellions that have shaped the 
present. He further notes that these rebellions and modes of resistance have taken various 
forms, from open revolt, artistic creativity to eschatological return. 
In the same way, the generic body in pain (or "Babylon" as it is spatialised in the 
imaginary of Rastafarian discourse) becomes the source of creative redemptive territorial 
or imaginative return, and the overture to the construction of disruptive practices and 
fantastical dreams. As noted in previous chapters, there is a logic or structural dynamic 
between this condition of Babylon and what gets created or imagined. 
It is no mere 
accident that fantasies of redemption arise in the midst of existential dread. 
For diasporic 
Africans, the imagination has therefore been and continues to be an important site 
for 
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rejuvenation, re-memory and self-actualisation. The imagination is a practice in the 
reinvention and assertion of an alternative way of being; and a process that allows the 
black body in pain to begin to move away and beyond its suffering and hurt. At the same 
time, the agent can eschew the authoritative, epistemic and politico-economic structures 
that reproduce oppression by drawing from endlessly mutating cultural traditions. The 
active process of imagining is a path towards self-ob ectification that establishes the path 
of collective action, self-preservation and empowerment. 
Although each other's missing counterpart, pain and the imagination still operate 
solipsistically at the level of the individual. This is however overcome through work. 
For Scarry, work' can be synonymous with both pain and creation, as it involves and 
engages both the holistic (physical and psychological) body in action. Through work the 
circuits of interiority associated with pain and imagination collapse, producing and 
materialising objects that had only being previously imagined. For instance a new dance, 
a style of walking, a cultural pattern is brought into our midst, through the work of the 
imagination and the imagination of work. In this way, work becomes the form of 
redemption. Although imagination is of the intentional individual, the structure of 
1 Scarry is however aware of the different situations that pushes the attributes of work towards the negating 
fact of pain and the more positive aspect of work through the creation of artifacts used in constructing a 
world. Scarry writes: The more it realizes and transforms itself in its object, the closer it is to the 
imagination, to art, to culture; the more it is unable to bring forth an object or, bringing it forth, is then cut 
off from its object, the more it approaches the condition of pain. So as an example of the one extreme, is 
the fact that the collective artifacts of civilization - its painting, poems, buildings - are habitually referred to 
individually as "works". Indicative of the opposite extreme is the fact that historical moments when work 
has been identified with suffering have been moments in which those persons performing the activity of 
work have been separated from the benefits of the objects that are the products of that activity. Slavery, 
whether occurring in ancient Egypt or in the nineteenth-century American South, was an arrangement in 
which physical work was demanded of a population whose members were themselves cut off 
from 
ownership, control, and enjoyment of the products they produced. So, too, the nineteenth-century 
British 
factory world is one in which work is described as approaching the condition of pain'(Scarry 
1985: 170) 
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making real or the actualisation of the imagined object is essentially a collective act 
grounded in the desire to fulfil communal values. It is also part of a continuing 
negotiation between collective socio-cultural practices and the fields of possibilitv 
opened up in the encounters with others. Perhaps an individual might have imagined a 
new dance movement, as in the danceliall dance 'Bogle'coined after Bogle, a member of 
the famous danceliall posse, the Black Roses Crew, and an energetic choreographer of 
dancehall dances. However, the way a dance such as the Bogle gets taken up is always 
collective. This is because as a dance Bogle is incomplete: it is only one component of a 
wider choreography of movement available to the dancers. Bogle gets taken up and 
(re)incorporated within the structure of a wider repertoire of movement which is a 
product of local and trans-local relations, continuity and experimentation. Therein lies its 
power, beauty and innovation. African diasporic communities insist on the collective 
effort; the creativity of an individual working within and as part of the group is actively 
encouraged. Imagined objects or movements are therefore only comprehensible within a 
web of interconnecting relations which provide the impetus for their transmission and 
transformation across space and time. In this way, cultural artefacts are not the exclusive 
creation of an individual or selected 'genius', but the production of collective relations 
that continually spawn new forms of the previous archetype. The living body of tradition 
is ruptured and renewed through the passage of time. For Scarry, as within the black 
diaspora, creativity is the means to redemption from suffering and affliction. 
Scarry's thesis on the phenomenology of pain raises pertinent questions for the argument 
want to develop here. If we are to understand the significance of the perfoniiing 
black 
200 
Chapter 4: Survival and The Imagination 
female body in dancehall culture, how can we attend to the historical and existential 
situation that forms and informs the female body in this culture, without undermining the 
place of pleasure and erotic expression in the women's life? Or, to put it the other way, 
how can the pleasure of the body in dancehall be understood without losing sight of the 
conditions of pain and oppression out of which it arises? 
In this chapter I will suggest that the positioning and use of the body in this culture must 
be seen as both an attempt to give expression to unarticulated pain and the need for social 
recognition denied by Eurocentric cultural values of the middle and upper class 
Jamaicans. Women in dancehall refuse the questioning frameworks of authority referred 
to above, opening the "sub-culture" to non-reactive modes of expression. Somatic power 
is used to contest the silences surrounding female sexuality and the atrocities that have 
been and continue to be committed against the black female body. In stating the situation 
in this way I do not wish here to perpetuate the orthodoxy whereby the black female 
diaspora is solely structured and determined by oppression and victimisation through the 
signifier of the body. On the contrary, the thrust of the argument here is to show how the 
underclass and the working poor in (urban) Jamaica attempt to bring creative expressions 
to bear on their experience of pain, negation and oppression by working with it, recycling 
it, and transforming it so that it becomes a source of power (bell hooks 1991: 8). Thus, 
through a combination of place (the dancehall), practice (dance, display, kinaesthetic 
attitude) and imaginative modes of embodiment (adornment), I will suggest that 
existential and phenomenological pain is eroticised, re-membered and re-figured as joy. 
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What I want to do now is to suggest that Scarry's thesis can be generalised and is 
existentially present in situations other than war and torture. There lies a myriad of 
circumstances both historically and in the present where a POlitico-historical -institutional 
matrix leads to conditions of suffering and pain. In particular, I shall begin to suggest 
that the black diasporic body exists by and large in conditions of affliction and suffering 
which create a situation of hopelessness, despair and dread. However, in line with 
Scarry, I will also suggest that the pain of black diasporic circumstance is not absolute. 
In fact, this very condition generates the exigency to express suffering and acts as the 
grounding for non-reactive imaginative and creative transcendence. 
From Existential Dread to Pain Avenue 
Through a focus on Jamaican dancehall culture, I will show how black women transform 
and are transformed by the flexing inflection of their bodies in an erotic recognition and 
celebration of community, tradition, memory and the absurdity of life. But first, I must 
ask, what do we mean by diasporic black pain? In this thesis the factors for black pain I 
refer to are not discrete, nor can they be isolated under one schema. Rather, they form a 
web or matrix which is articulated, organised and experienced differently in each 
diasporic location and across time. There is no pre-deternlined effect or response or 
name for the sets of factors that combine to create a feeling of pain and existential 
dread 
among black people. Global white supremacy has a thousand faces, not one of which 
fullY captures the phenomenon in its entirety. The factors which 
frame or structure black 
Pain are so thoroughly intertwined that any attempt to present a single causal reason 
leads 
202 
Chapter 4: Survival and The Imagination 
to a multitude of other factors. For example, economic concerns are intimately related to 
material circumstances, which are themselves entwined within cultural frameworks, 
which are themselves related to an evolving discursive history which is linked to the 
mediating power of what is conveyed by the epidermis (Fanon 1967). However, what we 
can say is that one of the factors which produces black pain - white supremacist thinking 
and practice - has 'become deeply embedded in [ ... I cultural and institutional beliefs and 
practices' (Hayes 1996: 18), travelling beyond the borders of the Western metropolis to 
infect the world. These can and do have powerful decisive effects on the capacity of 
black people to exist in the fullness of their corporeal being. Lewis Gordon has argued 
that what he calls 'anti-black racism' has such a devastating effect on the everyday life 
world of all black people that class mobility does not mediate it or provide sanctuary 
against its viciousness and violence: 
as much as the black middle and upper classes may try to identify with 
being bourgeoisie, their situation of being over-determined from the 
outside confronts them everyday: department store monitors, police 
officers who stop them for driving too slow, frightened white colleagues in 
elevators, white control over key segments of the private sector, purported 
acceptance "in spite of their color, " "exceptionalism" in terms of their race, 
and so on. (1995: 179-80) 
Moreover, not only do black diasporic subjects have to deal with the 'psychic wounding 
inflicted by racist aggression' (hooks 1995: 135) but they also have to come to grips with 
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their own private and internal existential anguish and torment. The episodic private 
misery and pain common to all human beings is the outcome of the anxieties and 
vulnerabilities brought on by the inescapable fear and fact of the aloneness, mystery and 
the force of birth, love, and death (Baldwin 1962: 316). Of course, black people are 
frightened by the tragedy of life just like everyone else and strive to conquer it. It is 
therefore necessary that any discussion of black pain must address how both outer 
violence and inner fear combine to produce 'feelings of overwhelming powerlessness and 
despair [ ... ] in the psyches of black folks' (hooks 1995: 137). 
So, rather than trying to point at a particular regime of torture or exploitation, in the case 
of black people, the figure of Scarry's torturer is depersonalised and gets spread across 
the field of socio-cultural, sexual, economic, historical forces. The existential situation in 
the contemporary black scene is one of a suffused torture and anguish, where the 
devastating reality of "racist reasoning" (Gilroy 1987: 11) and practice continue to define, 
delimit, and disfigure all aspects of black social existence (Hayes 1996: 18). Black 
people continue to live under conditions which persistently challenge, inhibit, and 
threaten selfhood, agency, and the capacity to create a meaningful and viable self- 
representation outside the culture and discourse of absolute negation. Fanon's account of 
the colonial regime in The Wretched of the Earth suggests that self-negation was an 
essential part of colonial domination: 
Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and 
emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted 
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logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures 
and destroys it. (1961: 169) 
For Scarry, to be represented is to have an incarnate present. Feminists and theorists of 
the black diaspora have argued that in Western iconography, women and black people are 
materially over-represented and associated with pure physicality and biology. In 
contrast, white middle class men are able to circumvent corporeality through the 
acquisition of voice, in equal measure as the colonised or oppressed groups are reduced 
and relegated to the embodied silence. In this way, those conceived as irrefutably 
embodied are visibly marked out for enslavement, oppression, cultural manipulation, 
distortion and are made the source of hierarchical classification of human worth (Mercer 
1987, Spelman1990). However, as Scarry has noted and the argument here is 
emphasising, no condition of suffering and oppression is ever passively accepted. Black 
people persistently make efforts to give expression and bring resolution to their pain 
through 'the construction of new cultural alternatives, in which identity is created and re- 
created as part of an ongoing and dynamic process' (Alexander 1996: 18). As Comel 
West (1982) is keen to point out, the African- American church has long been a source of 
redemptive community and care for those afflicted by American white supremacy and 
what Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb (1972) in another context have called the 
hidden injuries of class. Nonetheless, the black diaspora continues to engage in 'endless 
struggles over the definition of what their lives and blackness will mean'(Simone 1989: 
158). Unfortunately, expressions to externalise pain are often misnamed as black rage'or 
as madness and cannibalised (Fanon 1961). Such cannibalisation of black pain acts to 
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deny the 'effects that racialising practices have had and continue to have on social life' 
(Alcoff 1999: 32). 
In his essay Notes of a Native Son', James Baldwin wrote: I think that the past is all that 
makes the present coherent and further that past will remain horrible for as long as we 
refuse to accept it honestly' (1955: 376). In this passage, Baldwin is calling for an 
historical understanding of the present. The past Baldwin directs us to is 'the Negro's 
past, of rope, fire, torture, castration, infanticide, rape; death and humiliation; fear by day 
and night, fear as deep as the marrow of the bone' (ibid: 376). Through the temporal 
intertwining of past and present through historical understanding, Baldwin proposes that 
the contemporary painful present of the black situation is seen as a form of repetition and 
continuance - rope and fire in a different guise. When we look at the contemporary 
situation of the black diaspora, we see a corresponding temporal intertwining. The 
endless suffering and oppression of the present repeats and returns the black body to that 
inaugural entry into the modem world system - slavery and colonisation - through the 
differentiations of history. Black people's lives continue to be under-valued, over- 
determined by lack and a series of negativities that conspire to deny black humanity; a 
denial of the right to exist in and beyond the surface of the epidermal, a form of bad faith 
(Gordon 1995). 
Once existential pain is seen up close, Scarry's thesis about the effects and responses to 
pain becomes more pertinent still in terms of the black diasporic situation. For example, 
the continued value placed on skin colour as an important aspect of social mobility still 
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exerts its own peculiar influence and particular form of violence on the psyche of 
Jamaicans (Douglas 1992, Barnes 1999). Although class is an important social 
distinction in Jamaica, this is often articulated 'through the idiom of colour shade and can 
reflect biologized notions of race' (Austin-Broos 1994: 218). Class, colour/race, and 
gender in combination constitute what Austin-Broos has called 'Jamaica's discourse of 
heritable identity' (ibid: 218). This discourse of heritable identity perpetuates and 
reproduces the cultural logic of plantation society, wherein upper class white values and 
morality dominate the socio-cultural and economic landscape till the present. Norman C. 
Stolzoff's recent work on dancehall culture bears this out. Stolzoff argues that while the 
black lower classes constitute the main producers and consumers of dancehall culture: 
[the] upper echelons of dancehall production are controlled by white, 
Asian, and racially mixed middle-class and upper-class men, the middle 
rungs by brown and black middle-class men (with a few powerful women 
as well), and the lower strata by black lower-class men (with women 
filling well-defined positions subordinate to men). (Stolzoff 2000: 116) 
Dissatisfied with the continued legacy of plantocracy, many lower class Jamaicans have 
become more vocal and confrontational about 'the failure of the postcolonial promise to 
give black people their symbolic and material due after centuries of colonial domination' 
(Bames 1999: 287). This is expressed most keenly in the arena of cultural output among 
lower class Jamaicans: music and dance. The "rhythm of social life" (Henry 1997: 159) 
glimpsed from these rich and vital cultural forms, indicates that the existential situation of 
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many Jamaicans is desperate and worsening. Their lives are over-determined by lack and 
a series of impoverishments that violates the order of existence and autonomy. Soci al 
markers of progress and well-being such as economy and education, wealth and health, 
employment and housing and protection from violence continue to be a beautiful dream 
deferred as Jamaica is violently and unequally plunged into the global economic system 
under the benevolence of the great White fathers: the World Bank, IMT, WTO, and other 
elite neo-colonial institutions (Harrison 1997, Antrobus 1989). Because of inappropriate 
social planning by the Jamaican government as well as gang-organised clients of the two 
major political parties - PNP and JLP - the policies introduced have created a situation 
where terror, poverty, mass apathy, police brutality and dehumanising practices are the 
order of the day (Lacey 1977, Eyre 1986). This situation, coupled with a historical denial 
and violation of black existence, has helped to foster a condition where oppression, 
anxiety, distress and dread are the cosmic dance of everyday life. 
Is it any wonder that Rastafarians will claim "dread" (Chevannesl995, Friday 1983) as a 
subjective and objective affirmation of their existential condition and its transcendence? 
According to Paget Henry the term "dread" describes 'the experience and conquest of a 
certain of kind of terror [ ... ] the unjust and 
impersonal conventions of Jamaican society 
that threaten the identity of many of its members with insignificance' (1997b: 158). In a 
world where anti-black racism continues to malign the soul and infect and inflect other 
social relations in the Caribbean (as elsewhere in the black diaspora), "existence in black" 
(Gordon 1995) is still informed by this consciousness. As Spillers writes, 
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Even though the captive flesh/body has been "liberated"J ... ] the dominant 
symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of 
naming and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of 
captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor 
historiography and its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is 
"murdered" over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and 
anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise. (1987: 68) 
As already noted, Scarry distinguishes the experience of physical pain from other sentient 
states in that it is intransitive and has no object. The real import of Scarry's work in terms 
of the project of this thesis is that it articulates the experience of generalised oppression 
for black people. Diasporic pain is intransitive because it has no delimitable object or 
discrete manifested source. Rather, the matrices of white supremacy, gender and class 
relations, lead to a ubiquitous field of inequalities whose start and end is impossible to 
discern. Thus, the pain of inequality has no object, or rather, it is 'anonymous' 'showing 
itself in endless disguise' (Spillers 1987: 68). For instance, when a problem exists in the 
world -let's call this problem x- there is an attempt to analyse and understand the 
problem. A set of solutions are suggested, one of which -y- is agreed to be the best 
possible solution given the nature of x. In this way external problems can be localised 
and resolved. In the case of pain however, Scarry's argument is that no such x exists in 
any discrete form. Therefore, no such y can exist. The situation is therefore prima facie 
hopeless. In the same way, ingrained structural racial, sexual or class oppression (of 
either the subtle or unsubtle kind) is without x and therefore without y because it is part 
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of the pattern of everyday life. Even in the case of candidates for x being suggested (like 
a Paul Condon or the Metropolitan police, or the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD), slavery, or bourgeois ideology) each of these localisations carry with it the 
dangerous assumption that if a policy or response of 'y'is adopted then a general solution 
will emerge. Such a perspective fails to acknowledge something like Stuart Hall's idea of 
the different modality in which race is structured, and how different modalities - class, 
gender, generation, region etc. - affect the bodily experience of being-in-the-world. 
It is the very nature of oppression that its ubiquity admits of no location. Any discrete 
example of racial oppression is, in fact, merely a symptom of an underlying dynamic of 
injustice embedded in the life-world of the perpetuators and victims alike. Echoing Paulo 
Freire, Audre Lorde writes that 'the true focus of revolutionary change is never merely 
the oppressive situations which we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which 
is planted deep within each of us' (1984: 123). To focus only on the oppressor or on 
individual cases and solutions is therefore to distract attention from the more fundamental 
nature of the problem: our complicity in its reproduction. For instance, although the 
Metropolitan Police might accept that there is institutionalised racism within its ranks in 
the aftermath of the Stephen Lawrence enquiry, we should not be deluded into thinking 
that racism is finally localised through this admission. A host of explanations can be 
located for the cause of pain; the fact is that, whatever causal explanations are offered 
will be insufficient, unless attention is paid to their reproduction. As Raymond Smith 
argues, black suffering and anguish 'is not caused by slavery but by the 
forces that 
reproduce the social systems established after slavery' (1992: 257). 
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It is at this point that black existential pain most closely resembles Scarry's pain as 
hopeless, internal and without object. Moreover, in this situation the victim of white 
supremacy colludes with the white fantasy that the oppression is of the black subject's 
own doing, having "a chip on their shoulder" is mirrored by internal objectless anger. It 
is at this stage of redoubled alienation - experiencing conditions of oppression and then 
internalising them - that we can begin to comprehend in more detail how Scarry's point 
about disempowerment as a response to pain operates in the black existential context. In 
the condition of hopelessness, with no discrete set of remedial actions available, the 
rejection from the world that Fanon (1952) expresses so eloquently rebounds onto the 
subject as an all-pervasive form of powerlessness. As nothing can change the way of the 
world, the very point of change itself is rendered futile and meaningless. In this 
condition there appears to be no longer any rational motive for action that can get a grip 
on the ubiquity of the problem. It is thus that we begin to see the social problems that 
blight black diasporic communities in truly existential terms. Rather than a depressingly 
long series of statistics or reports, the conditions of oppression as a form of embodied 
experience are understood in terms of the negation of the possibility for critical and 
creative resistance and positive constructive strategies. 
However, as has been stressed all along, any account of the phenomenology of black pain 
will remain incomplete without a corresponding account of the continuous and persistent 
efforts to assert and express the agency of black humanity. Simone has argued that to 
focus solely on black pain without acknowledging 
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the many ways the Black World continues to replenish and nurture itself 
becomes simply another means of denying its value, thinking, and feeling. 
As such, [ ... I citations of exploitation exists as another manifestation of a 
racial apparatus that diminishes the applicability of black cultural 
productions to white lives. (1989: 158) 
Black people are not and have never been absolutely powerless in the face of their 
sociological and existential situation. The very condition of pain and misery generates 
the exigency to create alternative, viable and meaningful individual and collective 
expressions, and a sense of self outside of, in relation to, and beyond the history and daily 
experience of oppression. Making this point does not involve romanticisation: for every 
mode of redemption there is self-inflicted abuse in the black diasporic community - 
addiction, black-on-black violence, vulgar materialism, self-hatred and, perhaps most 
insidiously, the epistemological crime of ignorance - about black history and culture. In 
many ways, these afflictions are still not forms of passivity - they are rather signs of 
black agency gone awry. It is as if the imagination has responded to the crisis of selfhood 
imposed by white supremacy by being infected with it. 
It is at this point that we can begin to see how formal aspects of retention have proved to 
be Significant somatic resources in the struggle against existential deprivation. An 
important part of the effort to assert and confirm the active capacity of black embodied 
agency has been the role played by creative expressions, in the form of ritualised 
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performances of daily life, or rhythmic gestural patternings. Rather than black creative 
expression being gathered necessarily around the romantic heroism of revolutionary 
fervour, I want to suggest that the most active response against black pain take place at 
the level of embodied everyday life and practices. It is thus that the formal elements of 
African practice begin to be explained within the context of a collective existential pain. 
As I will argue in a moment, it is within the rhythm of the dernotic that resistance is 
brewed, stirred, and delivered. We can observe this in the stylisation of the body's 
movement, gesture, speech pattern, adornment and habits of being-in and taking-up 
space. Resistance and creativity are instilled and distilled within the patterns of ritualised 
daily routine or habitual existence that might go unnoticed in the pass-over of life. 
Everyday life as a form of black resistance should not be viewed as a form of levelled off 
blind following, but as a form of re-identification and re-situation on its route to new 
forms. 
To combat oblivion and insignificance, we see and hear the cries of the urban poor 
articulating the conditions of the Jamaican body in pain. Whether this is the I-and-I of 
Rastafarian affirmation of individual and collective existence, or the dancehall clashes 
between bodies in motion, or words travelling at the speed of bullets, we see attempts to 
heal the traurnatised body, to proclaim and affirm the body's potential for creativity and 
joy. We begin to see Scarry's point: in every situation where the voice of power and 
authority tries to muffle the voice of the body in pain, the pained body makes efforts to 
move away from the silence of the afflicted. In Jamaica as elsewhere, black diasporic 
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agents make use of their own corporeal power. The work of the imagination engenders 
resistance and redemption beyond the epistemic frame of discursive power structures. 
Dancehall Culture: An Expression of Diasporic Creativity 
Contextualising Dancehall Culture 
Dancehall refers to the actual physical space in which the guttural ghetto pulse of ragga 
music is performed. Ragga music is reggae's grittier, tougher, meaner offspring. This 
music is played either in an open air space with a stage and sound system or within an 
enclosed space. Dancehall is also a generic term for a whole array of cultural phenomena 
that emerged in the 1980s till the present that includes music (locally called "dancehall" 
or internationally, "ragga") and that inspired fashion, film, food, drink attitude and even 
language (Francis-Jackson 1995). The key organising factor in dancehall is the social 
event of going to a dance (as is generally called "sessions" or "bashment"). Here, 
different posses of DJs, Selectors and their sound systems compete with each other in 
what is known in Jamaica as "clashes". It is on these occasions that fashion, music and 
attitude re-work themselves according to the very latest styles - of movement, adornment 
and song. The centrality of the intertwining of place and the body as figuring and re- 
figuring human activities is therefore accentuated in the term "dancehall"; both the 
grounding for the body and its raison d'etre. The dancehall complex returns the body to 
its ground, its reason, and its sensual materiality: music (aural), adornment (visual), 
dancers "bubble" together or navigating through the crowd (touch), sweaty bodies and 
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drugs (taste). The culture is one of homage to the body and the power of place to support 
the body, its desires and creativity. The dancehall offers a cultural space in which 
participants can momentarily escape the misery and violence of daily life. However, it 
should be noted that dancehall does not always provide a safe space for its participants. 
As Tracey Skelton notes, 'gang feuds often spill over into the space of the dance and the 
police may "invade" at any time and carry out random body searches and arrest' (1998 
146). 
The near inexpressibility of pain to which Scarry refers, together with the growing 
dissatisfaction and disillusion with the abject poverty and violence which persistently 
wreaks havoc on Jamaicans, and the desire to assert and to claim agency in a social 
context that looks at them with indifference, manifests itself in a unique way in this 
culture. The struggle to integrate voice and soma gains full expression and gathers 
momentum in the performance of pain and pleasure in dancehall culture as performers 
and audience engage in a reading and re-reading of the Jamaican body-politic through the 
erotics of the carnal. Michel Serres writes that we 'all come to dance in order to read 
without speaking, to understand without language' (1995: 40). Here, the singing voice 
and the dancing body, alongside the pained and defiant body, engage in a secret dialogue 
that is 'at once banal and profound' (Lefebvre 1991: 395), where instructions to move in a 
certain way are responded to by bodies which further incite and excite the DJs in a round- 
dance of phono-somatic affirmation. 
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The unification of voice and soma that spits out from the gutters of Kingston ghettos is an 
articulation of lives that refuse to be defeated by poverty, violence, and the pseudo- 
Victorian watchful eye of middle-class moral norms. In its place excessive forms of 
adornment, song and dance engender a healing balm to soothe the blows of dereliction. 
Writing over thirty years ago on "rudies" (the precursor to contemporary dancehallers), 
Garth White wrote that, 'dance provides relaxation which takes the form of a muscular 
orgy, in which the most acute aggressiveness and the most impelling violence are 
camalized, transformed and conjured away' (1967: 42). Within dancehall culture, 
dancing is a way of releasing tension and pressure, constituting and asserting being-in-the 
world in a society that looks down at the producers and consumers of this culture with 
indifference, indignation, and contempt. This guttural form of expression offers one of 
the few means of voicing/dancing the conditions of oppression at a time when the masses 
had become disillusioned with the post-colonial promise of a better life. 
In the 1980s a new wave of change swept through Jamaica. The democratic socialist 
administration of Michael Manley finally gave way to Edward Seaga's neo-liberal free 
enterprise government amidst much political violence that accompanied the campaigns, 
stirred up as in Latin America by the CIA. Seaga wasted no time in delivering Jamaica 
into the hands of Western Banks, the United States government and other international 
institutions such as the IMF. In so doing, Seaga's administration accepted all the 
stringent measures advocated by the World Bank and IMF and restored 'the military and 
economic foundations of U. S. superiority [ ... ] incorporating the 
Caribbean Basin 
countries into the U. S. military-industrial complex' (Deere et al cited in Harrison 1997: 
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456). The previously nationalised industries were de-nationalised, there were drastic 
cutbacks in public employment and social programmes, price regulations and food 
subsidies were abolished, free trade zones were created, the national currency was 
devalued, the power of trade unions were undermined and production was geared towards 
exports (Antrobus 1989). This situation exacerbated the living conditions of the majority 
of Jamaicans and was reflected in the increase in unemployment, dramatic rise in costs of 
living and reduction in government expenditure on social services (ibid: 20). The social 
consequences of this included a boom in international drug trafficking, widespread use of 
guns, drug abuse and violence, including violence against women. 
According to Stolzoff, the changes in the politic al-economy were also mirrored in the 
socio-cultural sphere. The masses were encouraged to reject everything associated with 
Michael Manley and the 1970s. This invariably led to the rejection of the Rastafarian 
inspired reggae. With its radical critique of global capitalism, its chronicle of the poverty 
and deprivation of masses of Jamaicans and its connection to the suffering of blacks all 
over the world, together with its biblical celebration and call for a return to the African 
motherland, reggae no longer held its power for the generation disillusioned and 
traurnatised during the upheavals of the seventies (Fairweather-Wilson 1994). 
Furthermore, unlike reggae's fusion of American R&B and soul music with Caribbean 
rhythms and instrumentation, the new dancehall style favours more sophisticated digital 
recording, remixing and sampling. DJs "skanking" or "toasting" over dub plates in 
Jamaican patois came to embody this new change. The music of resistance in reggae that 
found such strong international resonance was replaced in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
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with the locally grounded phenomena of dancehall DJs and mobile sound systems. 
historically an important part of Jamaican popular culture. Although in the 1980s, ragga 
DJs continue to be social commentators, with increasing unemployment, ghettoisation 
and social violence, the DJs became more introspective and retreated to more local 
concerns. They narrowed down their interest from politics and spiritual redemption to 
topics of materialism, sexuality, the gunplay of gangsterism, hedonism and their own 
verbal prowess (Stolzoff 2000, Cooper 1993). This was the moment when Jamaica's 
popular culture moved away 'from the militant confrontations and dreams of paradise in 
Africa and towards having the best time possible in the here and now - that is in the 
dancehall' (Stolzoff 2000: 99). Ironically, this movement away from Afrocentric 
discourse in speech was accompanied by a movement towards African tropes of bodily 
retention by dispensing with the strictures of Christian morality through dance 
movements, and towards African tropes of polyrhythm via indigenous folk music. This 
shift in popular culture also marked a linguistic shift - away from the intelligible English 
of reggae towards the less obviously discernible patois inflections of the ghetto. This 
retreat to the local and folkloric should not however be viewed as a gesture of insularity 
or ethnic absolutism, as is often claimed by critics lamenting the overthrow of the 
internationalism and diasporic black solidarity of reggae music (e. g. Gilroy 1987). 
Rather, I suggest that we view it as a transformative return to Jamaican folkloric culture. 
Ragga music borrowed the rhythms of Afro-Jamaican religion - Pocomania and Kumina - 
and the musical forms of mento and burru using drum machines. When the musicologist 
Kenneth Bilby asked Wayne Armond of the Kingston based reggae band Chalice where 
Jamaican popular music was moving, he had this to say: 
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What it is encompassin' is very old Jamaican music - mento, Poco, you 
know, all the ethnic music from early Jamaica, only this Is now being 
played on a drum machine, but the influences are valued [ ... I You hear 
them in dancehall music. Not the old Studio One beats, further back than 
that. Before reggae, before even the advent of ska or rock steady, I'm 
talking about the things they call burru, way, way back from my great- 
grandfather in slavery days, that's what we are talking about. (1997: 32) 
This cultural-historical-linguistic shift within popular culture disturbed relations between 
class conflict on the island and Jamaican cultural exports. Instead of reggae, which the 
middle class and light-skinned Jamaicans came to accept as part of Jamaican national 
culture and its biggest cultural export, ragga music and its offshoots in fashion and dance 
were perceived by uptownies 2 as the antithesis of culture and civilisation. For Cooper, 
the sound that emanates from the DJs and sound systems was seen by upper class 
Jamaicans and the foreign press as unintelligible and pure 'noise' (1993: 136). The 
unintelligibility of the words in ragga music together with the near-naked forms of female 
clothing and the overtly sexual movements of the dancers and entertainers further 
2 The distinction between uptown and downtown as a signifier of class is more complicated in urban reality 
even though Jamaicans tend to ignore the complexity and tend to talk more about social differentiation 
signaled by this division. For example, in Kingston there are areas of extreme poverty standing cheek-by- 
jowl with affluent suburbs. Uptown is the suburbs of Kingston and it is 'associated with such symbols as 
the ruling establishment, the government, official nationalism, Euro-American cosmopolitanism, 
mainstream Christian morality, a belief in education and hard work, respect for the older generations and a 
disdain for black lower classes' (Stolzoff 2000: 231). Downtown refers to the inner city ghetto areas 
generally occupied by darker-skinned lower classes (but not always). It is associated with black 
nationalism, Afro-Jamaican culture, Rastafari, the informal economy, criminality, gangsterism, respect for 
the younger generation, and a disdain of uptown culture and political leadership' Obid: 23 1). 
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confirmed to the ruling elite, the cultural inferiority and immorality of the lower class 
(Stolzoff 2000). The comparison between ragga and reggae raises the possibility that just 
as reggae was initially seen by many upper class Jamaicans as vulgar, so too the 
ambivalence that dancehall produces for many Jamaicans gradually change to 
acceptance. Whatever the case, dancehall's position within Jamaican society is 
fundamental - all Jamaican have an opinion about it. Stolzoff writes, Vancehall is not 
only important to poor blacks, but central to the society as a whole, because Jamaicans of 
all races and classes define themselves in relation to it' (ibid: 6). 
One way dancehall has aroused debates in Jamaica has been through the focus on and 
popularity of sexually explicit lyrics. Although within dancehall music there are songs 
about ghetto violence and critiques of debilitating social policies associated with the 
lyrical legacy of Bob Marley (Francis-Jackson 1995), songs which focus on the 
sexual/gender/ personal/fleshy existence dominate the genre. In a society that is still 
influenced by Christian puritanism and the sexual conservatism of Rastafarian ideology, 
danceliall music has responded antithetically with "slackness" - the celebration of 
sexuality and obscenity. It is heterosexism at its worst. However, slackness is not 
without contradiction. At its heterosexual best women's carnal beauty and economic 
agency are celebrated and at its worst devalued. 'Homosexuality is gloriously vilified in 
graphic excremental imagery' (Cooper 1993: 142). Slackness is a somewhat aggressive 
and regressive mode of expression which underclass Jamaican DJs use to vent the 
miseries of existence and their exclusion from full participation in hegemonic masculinity 
and its attendant economic power. It is the voice of the urban poor, but it is a voice that 
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is determined to silence the voice of other dispossessed and powerless groups in Jamaica, 
especially its marginalised homosexuals. Cooper has argued however, when located 
within the context of a profoundly puritanical society, the misogyny and homophobia 
becomes potentially subversive: 
Slackness is potentially a politics of subversion. For Slackness is not mere 
sexual looseness - though it certainly is that. Slackness is a metaphorical 
revolt against law and order; an undermining of consensual standards of 
decency. It is the antithesis of Culture. (ibid: 141) 
In an interview with Imani Tafari Ama, the Jamaican dub-poet, Mutabaruka argues that, 
far from being anti-establishment, dancehall slackness is pro-establishment, reflecting 
and reproducing the prevailing values of the dominant society: The lewdness, the 
downgrading of women, the slackness, materialism, gun violence. The establishment is 
not against any of these things that dancehall personifies' (1994: 8). While female erotic 
potentiality is celebrated in the lyrics and the discourse of sex is brought out in the open, 
its misogyny, glorification of violent eroticism and homophobia does not depart radically 
from the hetero-patriarchy of the wider society and conscious reggae. Thus, to see it as 
politically and culturally subversive is to fail to see how slackness functions at the 
expense of women and gay people. We need not view everything emanating from below 
as radical or subversive. To do so is to completely disregard the violent implication it has 
for other less fortunate groups and the ways in which it re-affirms and colludes with the 
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very structures it challenges. It should, however, be noted that slackness is only one of 
many dancehall styles. 
One of the problems of focusing on the verbal aspect of the culture is the tendency to 
overlook the non-verbal. With the exception of Stolzoff's recent book Wake The Town 
and Tell the People: Dancehall Culture in Jamaica (2000), rarely is attention paid to the 
performative, kinaesthetic aspect of the culture. In particular Yhe body in dance and the 
dancefloor itself as a space of spectacle and display'has been neglected (Cooper 1993: 5). 
Cooper suggests that this inattention to the non-verbal elements of the culture constitute a 
limitation in her own work. While the verbal aspect of the culture is important, it 
however privileges and perpetuates male activities and experience to the exclusion of 
women. In common with other cultural scenes, the focus on the production of dancehall 
music in most commentaries - the DJs, the promoters, the label owners etc. - is at the 
same time a focus on danceliall as a discursive phenomenon emerging from out of the 
men that control that production. What I find 'potentially subversive'is less what Cooper 
calls the 'verbal maroonage' of the DYs manipulation of language than the presence of 
women in this culture who are flouting conventions and 'refusing to be civilised' 
(Beverley Skeggs 1994). Beyond an attention placed on ownership of or access to the 
means of production, I contend that women in danceliall possess a different form of 
power - that of creative autonomy expressed through vocal encouragement, adornment 
and highly stylised movement. 
The focus on the verbal in analysis of dancehall culture has parallels with Richard 
Sennett's descriptions of the symposium of ancient Athens where women (except 
for 
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concubines) were excluded. Not so dissimilar to the activities of DJs in dancehall, the 
symposium was an occasion where 
Men prepared poems, jokes, and boasts [ ... I so that they could show off 
skills [ ... ]. The balance between competition and camaraderie sometimes 
tipped out of control and the symposium degenerated into a violent brawl. 
((1994: 77) 
Excluded from the male activities, Athenian women created a gynocentric space on the 
rooftop during the unofficial festival dedicated to the youthful god of sensual pleasure - 
Adonis. On the rooftop, women made anonymous contact with each other in a 
momentary lamentation and celebration of the carnal and the death of the king of female 
pleasure. They danced, drank, and sang for and with each other. During the Adonia, 
women shielded themselves from the eye of power and 'recovered their powers of speech, 
[and] spoke their desires' (ibid: 78). Unlike the symposia, which depended on the power 
of oratory, in the Adonia, women expressed themselves through their bodies. During the 
Adonia, 'dancing and drinking [took] the place of complaint, or of analysis of the 
condition of women in Athens (my emphasis ibid: 79/80). 
Some of the principles operative in this festival are principles that are also important in 
everyday diasporic resistance: non-official, invisible, everyday forms of communion, 
involving tactile, ambulant bodies in motion at the margins of mainstream culture. I want 
to draw out three intertwined issues from this scene of antiquity that has relevance to 
dancehall culture. 
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First, the space created by the women was neither a political space nor a launching pad 
for rebellion' (Ibid: 80). Rather, it was a marginal space that women transformed into a 
safe, productive and alternative environment in which they 'momentarily and bodily 
stepped out of the conditions imposed on them by the dominant order of the city'(Sennett 
1994: 80). Although only temporary and marginal, the Adonia was nonetheless powerful. 
The space created here was not intentionally political or necessarily transfon-native of the 
social order. Rather, the Adonia concerned women responding emotionally and giving 
expression to their situation through their capacity to get in touch with their own 
eroticism. Because it was seen as politically insignificant, there was no attempt at civic 
suppression. Yet, these transgressive women made men uncomfortable. 'Contemporary 
writers like Aristophanes in the Lysistrata derided the sheer noisiness, wailing racket, and 
drunkeness of the event, treating with contempt women who had departed from their 
accustomed silence'(ibid: 79). 
Secondly, cloaked in darkness, the festival of Adonia was not only an invisible space, it 
was also 'an anonymous, friendly territory'where women came together to communicate 
their desires and let themselves go in the community of strangers in the temporary 
autonomous zone of mutual affirmation. It is not an enduring autonomous zone, it is 
momentary and peripheral. In this invisible and marginalised territory, the power of 
mythos is celebrated over the privilege position ascribed to logos in the symposia 
3. 
3 According to Sennett a distinctive difference between logos and mythos is this: logos connects 
things ... sets the stage for a person making connections: there 
is an audience judging the person arguing, and 
the audience is suspicious [ ... ]. In all forms of 
logos, [ ... ] the speaker 
is identified with his words; they 
belong to him and he is responsible for them. ' Mythos on the hand does not require the speaker to 
be 
responsible for his or her words. Hence the Greek remark, "This is not my tale, but I have 
heard it 
elsewhere". The distinction between logos and mythos is played out in the carefully prepared speech of the 
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Third, Adonia was a festival of female eroticism, sensual self-pleasuring and 'a 
celebration of desires not otherwise fulfilled in women's lives'(ibid: 77). Through the joy 
in dancing apart or together, women made love to and with the space they had created, to 
an ideal, absent-present lover (Adonis). In this zone, the Adonia lifted for a few nights. 
the restrictions and restraints normally exercised were abandoned. 
The Space of Women 
Like Sennett's perspective on ancient Greece, I want to focus on the gynocentric aspect of 
dancehall culture. Recognising that the streets they live in have become a battle zone 
(Chevannes and Levy 1997), many underclass Jamaican women turn to the only thing 
they have rights over - their body. The black body that was a signifier for oppression 
now becomes a shield that wards off potential attackers, protecting them from the tyranny 
of official culture and ghetto violence as they call themselves into being. According to a 
commentator in the film The Dark Side of Black by the Isaac Julien, The body is being 
celebrated because the body is the only place where the powerless can exercise their 
power in a world indifferent to their suffering'. Women in dancehall have very limited 
access to the production of ragga music. Against this, through dance and vocal 
encouragement, women are able to control and shape the lyrical content of the music that 
in turn shapes the career and popularity of the DJs and their sound-systems. Cooper 
symposia and the freely uttered words of the unseen speaker at the rooftop. (81/82) 
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notes one disgruntled male letter writer to the Jamaican The Daily Gleaner on Friday 13th 
January 1989: 
A good show, until two DJs [ ... ] displayed their vulgarity, and certain 
females, if I must call them so, jumped and shouted to their delight to hear 
certain sections of their body being described most disgracefully. The DJs 
were urged on by these women who had the most outrageous outfits that 
can ever be worn on the face of this earth. Something is definitely wrong. 
Could it be illiteracy or stupidity. (1993: 161) 
As a social space, dancehall is therefore a place that inaugurates a different form of 
practice: a transgressive corporeal engagement. The dance or "session", and the female 
body in particular, came to embody upper class anxiety over the moral status of the of 
black lower class and the 'ongoing struggle over high culture and low, respectability and 
riot, propriety and vulgarity' (Cooper 2000: 350). Just as in late 18 th and 19t" Century 
Europe where femininity was divided between women considered modest and chaste 
(typically upper class) or vulgar and obscene (working class or black), a similar 
bifurcation operates in the Caribbean. The European upper class ideal is transplanted 
within uptown mores, with an accompanying aesthetic transfer - the ideal uptown look 
for Jamaican women is a white look: slender, restraint, calm, flowing long (straightened) 
hair. In the same way, the alignment of working class women and black women 
operative in the west described by Sander Gilman (1980) gets reproduced in Jamaica - 
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both are derided as vulgar, uncontrollable and dangerous. Writing in the Jamaican 
newspaper The Daily Gleaner, Andre Fanon has this to say about dancehall: 
Dance-hall becomes a danger when the dance-hall syndrome is made into 
a way of life [ ... ]. Dance hall [ ... I under-develops our women who feel 
that they must learn to 'wine' and 'cock out' their posteriors as champion 
bubblers. Dance hall as a way of life emphasises the unproductive 
elements in society. If not channelled, dance hall will create a class of 
people which is incapable of doing anything productive. (1988: 14) 
Many participants in this culture feel that the above reflects, yet again, upper class 
misunderstanding and intolerance of their culture (Walker 1994). As one of Walker's 
interviewees flatly stated: Dancehall is ghetto girl's entertainment [ ... ] our nice time, It is 
our culture, our way of expressing ourselves, so nobody should care how we do it' 
(ibid: 19). Although excluded, the black female body is reconstituted as a form of agency. 
Self-consciously vulgar, women flaunt their bodies in glorious recklessness, unperturbed 
by the image of the slender ideal that haunts every woman in occidental contemporary 
culture (and their uptown sisters); unmoved by Christian patriarchal righteousness and 
the discourse of reputation and respectability explored by the Caribbeanist Peter Wilson 
(1969). In her column in the Gleaner, Norma Soas writes, 
For dancehall mavens there is no such thing as a "figure fault". Not for 
them are life-threatening diets, gruelling work-outs at the gym, or 
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constricting corsets. They exhale with abandon. What some women 
remove with liposuction, the dancehallers expose, aided by spandex tights, 
cycle shorts and midriff tops, determined to let nature run its course. 
(1998:?? ) 
These women freely expose and display physical excess with pride and playfulness, 
redefining it as a locus of beauty, power and sensuality. The exposure of female flesh, 
especially the ageing, fat, pregnant body, is considered grotesque, vulgar, unrestrained, 
dominates Jamaican society. According to Mary Russo (1986), to display the body (as 
dancehall women do), is to make a spectacle of oneself. It is precisely this spectacle that 
the women reclaim and valorise as they reject Middle class Jamaicans' acceptance of the 
White Western civilising system which attempts to contain the expression of women's 
sexuality through the moralising discourses of conduct: politeness, respectability, caring, 
duty and responsibility' (Skeggs 1994: 108). Skeggs' description of the female rappers 
BWP (Bytches With Problems), who assert their sexual power and autonomy through 
what she calls the "demand discourse", has parallels with the self-confidence of dancehall 
women. They allow their bodies to speak their 'demand discourse' by displaying it, 
flaunting, exhibiting, flouting conventions, in order to publicly explore insatiable 
longings. In this self-conscious display of the body and the weaving of the body's story 
in motion, dancehall women powerfully subvert convention. This motile adornment 
raises ontological issues concerning active and passive agency. Some readers might view 
the display of the body in this culture as capitulating to that "Sadian imagination" (Carter 
1979) which objectifies and exoticises the black female body in western culture. 
In 
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contrast, I suggest that rather than seeing objectification as first of all the activity of the 
voyeur's gaze or imagination, it is more appropriate to say that it is a process that 
originates from the women involved. That is, women actively open and surrender 
themselves to the "eye of power" in a way that enables them to actively assert their 
subject position. In this way dancehall women expose and reveal 'spectatorial complicity 
in the production of objectified bodily images as well as culture's sexual politics and its 
double standards in the representation of women' (Czekay 1994: 96). 1 suggest then that 
these women are aware of their objectification and they use their objectified state as a 
strategy to assert their subjectivity as they (re)construct themselves as embodied beings. 
Consumption as a Matrix for Survival 
It has been said that women's greatest contribution to dancehall has been through fashion. 
The dances or "sessions" are the 'social space in which the smell of female power is 
exuded in the extravagant display of flashy jewellery, expensive clothes [and] elaborate 
hairstyles' (Cooper1993: 155). Clothing and consumption is part and parcel of what it 
means to survive, to have an identity, to occupy a position of prestige in a context of 
negation and social exclusion. Here, there are parallels with other forms of excessive 
survival in different settings. The case of the Congolese Sapeur (the cult of haute 
couture among the poor in the Congo) described by Jonathan Friedman (1994) is not so 
dissimilar to dancehall. In this case appearance is identity, and consumption is about 
self-maintenance: 
Consumption is a life-and-death struggle for psychic and social survival 
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and it consumes the entire person. If there is a fundamental desperation at 
the bottom of this activity it is perhaps related to the state of narcissistic 
non-being generated by a social crisis of self-constitution. (1994: 106) 
With little financial means and no socio-economic status, dancehall women nevertheless 
outperform every other sector of Jamaican society in terms of the sheer extravagance of 
their adornment. In the face of death and the nihilism of their surroundings, something 
like Friedman's consumptive narcissistic non-being emerges with virulence. At work in 
Friedman's argument is a critique of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the definition of class- 
identity operating through distinctions in taste. In the case of the Sapeurs in the Congo 
and dancehall women, a far more destabilising dynamic is unleashed than one that merely 
acts to differentiate itself from the rest of society. The clothing and comportment of 
dancehall (as with the Sapeurs) threatens to jam the whole field of distinctions itself 
through strategies of vulgarised mimicry (of conveiritional conceptions of feminine 
comportment) and hybridisation. Paulette McDonald's description of women's fashion in 
this scene is worth quoting at length, 
[ ... ] women come out in outfits that show their 
bellies; they cut out holes 
at strategic parts in their shorts (called batty-riders in the language of 
Erotica); and they wear tight, body-hugging dresses with cut-out designs 
all the way up their armpits, suggesting that they have nothing on 
underneath [ ... 1. It does not matter 
if the women are fat. Black-skinned 
women go in for blonde wigs. They dye their hair in a combination of 
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colours - burgundy, green and orange. They wear chunky jewellery - 
earrings designed in the shape of the Jamaican map, a dollar sign, a razor 
blade. (1993: 8) 
As with Friedman's analysis of the Sapeurs, the excessive consumption of dancehall 
women in terms of adornment therefore unfixes the taste boundaries of socio-economic 
distinction, creating a destabilising ambivalence that threatens and spreads across the 
whole field of distinction itself. Investment in adornment fits into a wider black diasporic 
cultural expression. Zora Neale Hurston has suggested that The will to adom'constitutes 
'the second most notable characteristic in Negro expression' (1933: 294). The will to 
adorn, she argues, is not an attempt to meet conventional standards, but to satisfy the soul 
of its creator (ibid: 294). Importantly for women in dancehall culture, it is a way of 
projecting their aesthetic judgement onto the world. 
At first sight, the experience of women in dancehall culture appears to be strangely 
dislocated from the rest of Jamaican society. It is as though this culture springs out like 
an alien life-form complete with its own entirely separate dynamics of existence, like 
fungi on a tree. Dancehall seems to be the very antithesis of the hegemonic conservative 
cultural and ethical situation in Jamaica, and as such, appears to have no cultural and 
historical context whatsoever. In contrast to the neat suburbs of Mona, Hope Pastures 
and Red Hills, whose tidy lawns and calm roads mimic the middle class suburbia 
enclaves of middle America or middle England, the dancehall scene springs forth with 
mutant abundance, in a flash of garish wigs, guttural screech-speech, lame and sequins 
stretched all too revealingly across exuberant expanses of black flesh. 
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This dislocated appearance is however just that - an appearance. Any more than acursory 
examination of the dancehall complex reveals deep cultural historical connections at 
work in its constitution, demonstrating an attuned dialogue with a hybrid array of cultural 
elements. This amalgam of cultural forces is nowhere more evident than in terms of 
adornment. Synthetic fibre sits comfortably with natural fibre; a fine delicate Indian 
bridal nose ring in the shape of a gun is mixed with large gold ear-rings as patches of 
stretched materials, spandex, batty riders' frame the body. It is in the surface of 
adornment that the creative subjectivity and agency of women at the core of the 
phenomenon can be understood. The fabric and cut of dancehall fashion bear direct 
relations to the Jamaican masquerade tradition of Jonkonnu and Pitchy Patchy'. Here, 
women are clothed in strips of material gathered together to give the appearance of a 
jumble of loose layers of fabric. From here, we can begin to understand a key point 
about dancehall culture: that it is far more closely connected to the deep tissues of the 
Jamaican folk tradition than has been considered. 
Old characters like Pitchy Patchy have their counterparts in contemporary 
dancehall. The best jeans (stone washed or plain) are made to look ragged 
with designer-looking patches of varying colours, with strategic rips or 
strips hanging like the organised raggedness of traditional Pitchy Patchy. 
(Nettleford 1995: 16D) 
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Female adornment is thus grounded in a dense hybrid matrix of borrowings and 
repetitions, creating a truly diasporic culture of exuberant excess that is at once deeply 
embedded within a Jamaican folkloric tradition and at the same time a differential reprise 
within the longer span of diasporic continuity. It is in terms of this hybrid 
contextualisation of female adornment that we can begin to understand the subversive 
agency of resistance at work in dancehall. In the context of the conservative and 
moralistic society mentioned above, dancehall adornment invokes a visual subversion by 
returning to the subterranean sources of a certain strand of Jamaican folk culture. This 
subversive resistance cannot be understood as conforming to a Cartesian politics of 
conscious resistance. Instead, it is better viewed as an unconscious narcissistic resistance 
engendered by the will to survive and satisfy the soul under the daily threat of 
annihilation. 
Finally, this examination of the issue of adornment in dancehall begins to unravel a 
specific but ingrained contingent relationship between the question of "survival" and that 
of the imagination, expression and identity. Here, we find marginalised elements of a 
Marginalised society, impoverished, vulnerable, violated, in the midst of an urban and 
spiritual decay inflicted ultimately by the abstract authority of western capital and 
European class ideology, engaging in the most staggering excess. At this point, we are 
faced with a puzzling question: how can this basic subversion of the need/imagination 
opposition occur in such extreme circumstances? The expectation is quite the opposite: 
that it is only in the case of material comfort that questions of need and survival can be 
233 
Chapter 4: Survival and The Imagination 
forgotten or displaced. In this case, how can the dancehall complex erect itself in such a 
decayed ecology? 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to turn the expectation that excess follows 
material abundance (and its inverse, that attenuation follows material depletion) on its 
head. It is clear that instead of emaciated abjection, women participating within the 
dancehall complex respond to their socio-political context with excessive modes of 
expression. It is thus that the 'survival' at work in dancehall conforms to what can be 
called the logic of the mask: instead of a fixed order of necessity - of the basic physical 
issues of need and demand - necessity is undercut by the subversions of desire and 
expression: 
Among the "people from below" the device of "masking" (in fancy-dress) 
persists with a vengeance. We still have reason to devise masks to 
disguise, to create music to affirm to assemble dances to celebrate [ ... ]. 
The actual dress is important. For the costume is a mask helping to 
transform the persona to do wild and uninhibited things - much tulle, dark 
glasses replacing the old meshwire masks the Jonkonnu characters wore 
and still do, sequins and costume jewellery, beads, baubles of all kinds, 
earrings (knobs or droplets), all reminiscent of the pieces of broken mirror 
on the fancy dress of traditional Jonkonnu! (Nettleford 1995: 16D) 
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As with the Sapeurs, survival becomes the survival of an imagination that refuses to be 
flattened by the forces of diminishment at work beyond the frontiers of the ghetto. 
Unconsciously drawing on historical resources, survival in danceliall culture steps outside 
of the issue of authenticity and steps inside the mask. In this way, a truly radical 
transgression is seen to be in operation: dancehall bears no conformity with even the 
basic existential/social hierarchies of the normative frame. Dancehall women live in such 
extreme circumstances - of crossfire, acid attacks, rape, abuse, and negation that 
fearlessness itself becomes the only mode of survival. It is through the hardship of 
extreme circumstances that fearlessness arises: the toughness of a life that has been 
pushed to the limit and is no longer afraid of death or pain. Having nothing to fear opens 
up the space for senseless act of violence on the one hand and on the other, transgression 
and the pern-iissive logic of the carnival is transcended. It is precisely in this liminal 
situation that women finally can lose any anxiety over the social perception of their 
appearance. Instead of the fear of being deemed a 'skettel' or a tart or seen as obscene, 
the dancehall woman dresses for herself and her community, without care for uptown 
mores and respectability. The dancehall woman finally enters a state of narcissistic non- 
being. 
We see once again that the black body, signifier of abjection and oppression, is, through 
cultural scenes such as that of dancehall, the very means by which redemption may be 
achieved. The women of Jamaican dancehall practice their art in the most hostile of 
circumstances, with each day a literal fight for survival. It is in this ecology of violence 
that such strong and excessive forms of adornment arise, born out of fearlessness. 
Excess 
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becomes an affirmation of being and community, fostered through an exhibitionist and 
monstrous display. However, just as the forms of adornment at work in dancehall 
involve careful (if unconscious) co-ordinations of different cultural frames - Indian, folk 
and western, so too do the movements and rhythms of the dance of dancehall also follow 
patterns of gathering. The excess of adornment goes hand in hand with a discipline of the 
body in movement that works through re-memoration. 
Dance and Eros in Dancehall 
Beyond being a space of hedonist escapism for the impoverished lower classes of 
Jamaican society, what must be understood is that dancehall culture fits within a wider 
cultural frame where dance and its accompanying modes of adornment have always 
occupied a central place in the cultural and psychic survival of black people. As the 
anthropologist Ted Polhemus has written, dance is 'the embodiment of [a] particular 
people's unique way of life - their culture in the broadest sense'. Dance, he continues, 'is 
the metaphysics of culture'(1993: 8). For the black diaspora, dance is a means of cultural 
survival telling the story of struggle in the New World and the continuation of African 
musicality and rhythm (Nettleford 1985). At a period when the enslaved communities 
were denied public use of their African languages, they communicated their pain, sorrow 
and jubilation through dance. According to Nettleford, dance in its New World 
configuration offers 'one of the most effective means of communication, revealing many 
profound truths about complex social forces operative in a society groping toward both 
material and spiritual betterment' (ibid: 19). For enslaved peoples, dance was a way of 
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momentarily transcending everyday life and constructing an alternative reality. In 
opposition to laws that legislated against ownership of the body of the enslaved, the body 
in rhythmic movement was an important source of autonomy. By training and 
disciplining the body through dance, enslaved Africans retained control over their body 
and its disalienation through historical continuity. The relief brought about through 
dancing is therefore not merely egocentric and to be understood through an 
individualistic analysis. In dancing, the community itself in the present and across time 
gets gathered and re-membered against all forces of disintegration. As Sondra Horton 
Fraleigh notes in her work on the phenomenology of dance, dance is inter-subjective, an 
example of being with the other'. Dance'. she writes, 'closes the distance between self 
and other. As the dancer dances for others, she instantiates others in her dance and 
dances the body-of-everyone' (1987: 61). Dancehall is therefore in the broadest sense a 
form of historical and social remembrance -a "genetic" repetition of pain that avoids the 
path of disintegration and dis-memberment by gathering the past and the reality of 
existential dread joyfully: re-membering, putting it together in the context of the dance 
with love and urgency. The body is, thus, one of the primary tools with which the 
powerless can empower themselves: 
The body is the first form of power with which all persons can identify. 
Ontogenetically they discover and master their bodies in time, space and 
effort patterns. Through sight and movement they enter relationships. 
The lived-in body symbolically sustains people's power as they groom and 
adorn themselves, exercise, watch what they eat, and otherwise try to 
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control their bodies [ ... 1. Yet the imagination is free, and dance, an 
activity that depends on flaunting the body, focuses awareness on the body 
and its associations. (Hanna 1988: 13) 
While the music deck at a danceliall social space is usually coded in the language of 
maleness, in contrast, the dancefloor is the arena where women exercise control over 
their body, stimulate sexual desire and call themselves into being. On the dancefloor, 
women allow themselves to feel, to emote, and to enjoy the freedom of their body, as they 
love themselves into afeeling state. Enveloped in the sound, they allow the dancing to 
return them to the eroticism of their body. Whether it is a solo winin'or 'bubbling' with a 
male or female, the dance becomes a speaking through the body, a way of conveying to 
the partner its bodily desires and needs that need not move beyond the dancefloor. In this 
space the restriction on women's display of physical intimacy is recontextualised as 
women win'together, dissolving the gendered role of the pas sive/fernale/fol lower and the 
active/male/lead as women recall the reason of the body, the reason for dancing. 
In general terms, dancing can reconnect us to our erotic potential; it can stimulate sexual 
fantasies that move beyond the dance floor and the dancing partner to exist in something 
like Scarry's realm of the imagination. 4 In her influential essay 'Uses of the Erotic: The 
Erotic as Power', Audre Lorde writes that, the (white) male sexual economy has 
suppressed the erotic 'as a source of power and information' within our lives (1984: 53). 
4 In many ways, the practices of adornment and movement amongst women in dancehall can be seen as 
just 
the sort of redemptive work that was highlighted in the discussion of Scarry's phenomenology of pain 
above. 
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Against such negating forces, it is therefore imperative that women reclaim the erotic as a 
form of power. For Lorde, the erotic must not be conflated with Pornography 'which 
emphasizes sensation without feeling'(ibid: 54). Erotic - the sensual - is an expression of 
sexual arousal and desire, as well as a life-giving force that can energise and nurture us in 
our life, in our work toward changes and in our ways of being in the world. It is an 
expression of 'what is deepest and strongest and richest within each of us, being shared: 
the passions of love, in its deepest meanings'(ibid: 56). As Lorde writes, 
The very word erotic comes from the Greek word, eros, the 
personification of love in all its aspects ... ]. When I speak of the erotic, 
then, I speak of it as an assertion of the life force of women; of that 
creative energy empowered, the knowledge and use of which we are now 
reclaiming in our language, our history, our dancing, our loving, our work, 
our lives. (1984: 55) 
The erotic, according to Lorde, can be healing and empowering. It is not confined to our 
beds; it is that and more. Or, as James Baldwin puts it, 'the , sensual" is not intended to 
bring to mind quivering dusky maidens or priapric blacks studs... [rather it is the 
capacity] to respect and rejoice in the force of life, of life itself, and to be present in all 
that one does, from the effort of loving to the breaking of bread' (1962: 350). The erotic, 
especially as it is expressed in dance and dancing, is not simply a mating game between 
the sexes, it is the ideal of any community. The culture of dancehall is about sex and 
sexuality, of course, but to reduce it to sex is to fail in absolute terms to understand the 
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complex functions the culture plays within society. Once again, to view dancehall as 
organised solely around sex is to repeat the Eurocentric (and nihilistic) view that black 
cultural expression is often simply sexual expression. In rejection of this, we can say that 
the erotic is a mood, a state of being that can express a variety of emotions: joy, elation, 
amusement and intense sadness, and therefore, it is 'the desire to move in fulfilment of 
communal value that motivates dance'(Fraleigh 1987: 58). As Eileen ONeill notes, the 
erotic can reveal 'the gaps and void [ ... I within our sexual discourse' (1989: 70). Once 
we recognise the power of the erotic in our lives according to Lorde, 'we begin to give up 
[ ... ] being satisfied with suffering and self-negation. Our acts against oppression become 
integral with self, motivated and empowered from within' (1984: 58). 
The multiple dimensions of the erotic have led O'Neill to speak of the "eroticisation of 
pain". This is the capacity to 'express sadness and simultaneously to eroticize it' (1989: 
70). The notion of the eroticisation of pain helps to clarify how through dance, women in 
dancehall culture fuse the reality of pain, oppression and everyday pressures that 
threatens to engulf them into a joyous celebration of the body and the erotics of the 
community past and present. Rather than pain being responded to with destruction 
through nihilistic expressions (which sometimes happen), it is embraced and channelled 
pre- reflectively into dancing and imaginative modes of embodiment. The dancing 
woman does not forget or suppress the pain of her existential situation, but rather she 
attempts to inflect it with joy and move towards bodily integrity and somatic re- 
membering. The eroticisation of pain in dance then involves integration, a return 'for the 
hundredth time, [to] that same pain and that same pleasure' (R. Ellison 1961: 23). 
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A question that might be developing in the reader's mind is this: Surely the activities in 
dancehall culture is less about pain and more about pleasure and the escapist affirmation 
of pleasureT My response is that no black diasporic cultural practice or activity (as yet) 
can be discussed outside the history of slavery and the ongoing oppression that animates 
and re-modifies it. 5 As such, one of the key pre-conditions for the manifestation of 
dancehall in its current form has to be the urgency to conquer the social/moral/economic 
destitution that wrecks havoc on daily life. Such a perspective avoids the luxury of 
reading dancehall as solely the pursuit and affirmation of hedonism or a pleasurable form 
of letting-it-all-hang-out. Of course, hedonism plays a central role in dancehall culture; 
the point is to show that there is something else at work in the culture -a history of 
folkloric practices and a dynamic of desire. Further still, any form of creativity to my 
mind seems to require a background of some sort of pain, injustice or existential anguish 
in order to flourish. As James Baldwin wrote long ago, '[ ... I people who cannot suffer 
can never grow up, can never discover who they are' (1962: 376). Or, as the Yorubas in 
Western Nigeria would say, "when the belly is full", creativity is often stifled or eroded, 
or loses its edge. In its stead, decadence, smugness and cultural exhaustion take over and 
is passed off as creativity. The reverse of this might be that when the "belly is too 
empty", what can be imagined is contracted and reduced to the politics of the belly and 
consequently the poetics of the belly is deferred. It is perhaps thus that we can begin to 
5 For exploration of the relationship between historical violence, pain and creativity see Barbara Browning's 
excellent account on the Brazilian Sarnba, where she suggested that the community that produces and 
maintains such an exuberant dance technique is a community that is always hungry with 
lives scattered 
over hills called javelas. Samba: resistance in motion (Indiana University Press: B 
loomi ngton and 
Indianapolis 1995)xxi/xxiii; For a similar account on Rumba see Yvonne Daniel Rumba: Dance and social 
Change in contemporary Cuba (Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis 
1995) 
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an reciate the diversity, richness and deficit of black diasporic , jr P expressive cultures in the 
context of the suffused torture of white supremacy. 
Therefore, as in Scarry's formulation, the reality of pain is pre-reflectively externalised 
through the work of the dancing body in the public sphere. The work of perfon-nance in 
dancehall is the equivalent of Scarry's imagination latching onto an object in the external 
world. To say that the performance of the body in dancehall culture is the affirmation of 
pure pleasure is not only reductive but to fall yet again into one of the key aporias of 
western thought: the denial of the body as the fundamental principle of existence, printing 
and imprinting historical and social meaning upon itself and out into the world. This 
blindspot can never acknowledge that by fusing the reality of pain with Eros, 'the "lived- 
body" can revitalise itself in order to face long bouts of struggle by being put in touch 
with its own undeniable sources of pleasure within itself'(ONeill 1989: 70). 
Like Lorde's account of the erotic's potential to disclose profound truths about our life, 
Judith Lynne Hanna has suggested that dancing can also 'permit futuristic explorations 
and otherwise dangerous uncloseting' (1988: 6). Could dancehall women be using the 
dance to speak to each other, telling stories of lust, desire and pleasure that lies buried 
between their inner thighs? Or, is it a way to act out on the dancefloor the story of 
forbidden love? Are they calling attention to each other's repressed desires? Is it a 
playful affirmation of female bonding and rivalry? 
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In Isaac Julien's film The Darker Side of Black, Inge Blackman points out that in Britain 
dancehall culture is one of the few social spaces black women can be sexual and dance 
with each other in a lustful way not really allowed in any other black culture.... and black 
lesbians participate in this culture. ' This show of physical intimacy exists in the context 
of a musical genre that calls for the repression if not the death of homosexuals. We might 
ask: why are these women permitted to be sensual with each other? Are women 
permitted to dance in a lustful way because the possibility of lesbian desire is often 
sexually arousing to the heterosexual male? Or is it because men have no choice in the 
matter? What investment does it have for the heterosexual male spectator? What is the 
relationship between the body on show in this culture and the expression of female 
sexuality? 
Despite being associated with the body and carnality, women are denied the right to 
autonomous (sexual) pleasure and desire. In different ways feminists have sought to 
'deconstruct the phallic organisation of sexuality and its code which positions women's 
sexuality and signified body as a mirror or complement to male sexuality' (Dallery 1989: 
54). As such, in her influential early text This Sex Which Is Not One (1985), the French 
feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray recasts and re-theorises female sexuality, pleasure and 
eroticism by constructing a female libidinal economy that is distinct from the male 
phallic Order. Like Lorde, Irigaray argues that female eroticism has been repressed and 
denied by patriarchal culture and thus posits a female sexuality that is antithetical to the 
scopic, static disembodied phallic male sexuality. The female sexual pleasure, 
Irigaray 
proposes, is located in the body, and it is plural and autoerotic. This female sexuality is 
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not centred around the penis, but rather, 'women have sex organs just about everywhere' 
(1985: 103). Speaking metaphorically, Irigaray affirms that, woman, 
experiences, pleasure almost everywhere, even without speaking of the 
hysterization of her entire body, one can say that the geography of her 
pleasure is much more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more 
complex, more subtle than is imagined. (ibid: 101) 
In her work, Irigaray argues that male and female desires are distinct and when brought 
together, male desire can only repress the female. Citing Michel Foucault, Margaret 
Whitford points out that, 'the discourse of sex is the locus of the (male) subject's 
subjection' (1991: 150). Hence, in positing a polysexual female desire, higaray attempts 
to dislodge male phallic desire and liberate women from the repression and silences that 
have characterised female desire. She attempts to construct a female sexuality that is 
outside the male exchange economy and this opens up space for a lesbian sexuality. 
higaray's polysexuality enables us to become more aware of our bodies and erotic 
possibilities, to use our bodies to articulate our pleasure and desire. 
This might seem very limiting or contrary to danceliall women whose sexuality might not 
necessarily be conceived outside of the male exchange economy. It is certainly the case 
that women in dancehall often engage in competition with each other, forming modelling 
posses 'in support of a group member who is upset because her matie (Matie is a woman 
who is trying to steal another woman's partner, or the other woman in the man's life) is at 
244 
Chapter 4: Survival and The Imagination 
the dance' (Walker 1994: 34). These conflicts are often a reflection of a tension that 
occurs elsewhere in the community. Thus, far from being a safe place, the dancehall can 
often become a site where conflict is played out and negotiated. However, the Irigarayan 
focus on female eroticism and autoeroticism is echoed in the dances and physical 
attitudes of the women in dancehall culture, where women as active agents in relations 
with others, generate their own eroticism which is both inner generated as it is outer 
directed. 
I am not in any way suggesting that these women are closet lesbians (they could very 
well be! ); rather, I am trying to suggest that in the moment of dancing, reality becomes 
suspended as the dancers allow the sound, the feel of flesh rubbing together to move them 
to another realm of erotic love or lust. I am suggesting that in the process of dancing the 
destructive narrative about the body is deconstructed, unbalanced, and uncreated, only for 
it to be reconstructed, rebalanced, recreated (Schechner 1993). In the flow of dancing the 
status quo can be challenged as women momentarily assume a different persona that acts 
as a release from the pressures of what Michel de Certeau (1984) has called 'the practice 
of everyday life'. Dancehall is therefore as much about the power of place and practice in 
the constitution of transgressive liberatory actions as it is about a motile body in dialogue 
with itself, the community that grounds, and the outside. Women in dancehall use a 
variety of different dance repertoires to articulate their personal experience, the history of 
the black female body in Jamaican society, as they search for a new way of being. I am 
suggesting that the narrative of heterosexual reality of some of these women's lives 
dissolves as inchoate feelings and thoughts mesh together as the women move each other 
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into an orgasmic state of aliveness in temporary zones of the imagination. As Hanna 
asserts: 
Rather than being a precursor to sexual intimacy, dance may be physical 
and psychological sexual sublimation. Orgasmic gratification may come 
from actual or empathic dance involvement. Dance often has the 
excitement, release, and exhaustion characteristic of sexual climax* (1988: 
47) 
Dance not only releases and reconnects these women to their erotic possibilities; it also 
re-establishes the female body's capacity to be both gentle and powerful. No more is the 
passive, muted female of earlier times when Rastafarian ideology had a powerful 
influence on Jamaican popular music; dancehall women stubbornly assert their own 
powerful embodied agency. This show of public agency is reflected in their extravagant 
celebration of the carnivaliesque excess and dance movements that manage to combine 
slow sensuous movement of the hip with strong energetic, and often athletic movements 
that are normally associated with male dancing, without denying their feminine 
embodiment. Instead, they show that the female is both gentle and strong all at once. In 
one dance known as "head-top dancing", we see women in half-headstand with knees 
slightly bent, buttocks thrust upwards gyrating dreams of a new relationship with defiled 
buttocks. As the beat intensifies, various parts of the body move independently to the 
complex rhythms, playing, teasing and displaying the strength and power of their bodies - 
the dance of derision mentioned in chapter three. The image of protruding black buttocks 
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that renders black females in western pornographic imagination as hypersexual and 
inferior (Bush 1990, Gilman 1980) is, re-emphasised and over-emphasised, valonsed and 
displayed as a sign of beauty to be marvelled at. Here, as in Spike Lee's film School 
Daze, the buttocks, are 'displayed as playful cultural nationalist resistance. they challenge 
assumptions that the black body, its skin color and shape, is a mark of shame' (hooks 
1992: 63). Defiantly, the buttocks are thrust in your face as they move independently 
from the rest of the body up and down, shaking excessively, challenging one to look and 
admire, even be aroused by the sheer energy and power that is often obscured because the 
show of power and strength is almost always equated with men. 
In the socio-cultural space of dancehall, dancing becomes a kind of exercise that permits 
the dancers to become more aware of the limits and possibilities of their bodies and the 
way their bodies are distorted and deformed by their socio-historical experiences. As 
much as the dance deconstructs and reconstructs the body, dancing also reconnects the 
body (if only sub-consciously) to its past and present as it struggles to deal with the pains 
and pleasures of life. This dialectic is sometimes reflected in the facial expressions of the 
women as they dance. On the one hand, the facial expressions can sometimes appear 
strained, serious, distant and grimacing; on the other, as the body is enveloped in the 
sound, the painful and detached look becomes more blissful and serene as the women 
give themselves over to the music, letting their bodies become the vehicle to imagine and 
communicate inexpressible rage. But this rage is softened by the possibilities of joy in 
dancing in a somatic exemplification of Baldwin's plea for a transformed historical 
understanding, and the beauty that may arise from it. 
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In this chapter I have sought to place the formal aspects of retention - the traces of apart 
playing, polyrhythm, antiphony etc. - within the existential setting of an enduring 
oppression. At the largest scale, black people within the diaspora continue to be 
oppressed by white supremacy in its myriad forms. Closer in, black communities are 
often vulnerable to internalising white supremacy - as shadism intertwines with class and 
gender distinctions to reproduce historic oppressions on the inside. It is this context of 
ongoing affliction and existential pain that is the backcloth to black creative expression 
and the energetic deployment of African aesthetic forms. It has been the ability of black 
expressive communities to take up these forms and make them relevant to each new 
context, in the midst of addiction, abuse and impoverished spirits. Cultural phenomena 
such as Jamaican danceliall demonstrate such ambiguities in stark detail; in the midst of 
gross materialism and a society sharply at odds with itself in class terms, a form of life 
has emerged that allows women to celebrate their own embodied agency in the midst of 
destructive chaos. 
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Chapter 5: Fanon Can't Dance: Antiphonies of the Gaze 
In this chapter I will challenge the negative discourses of the "gaze"' informing both 
inter-racial encounters and filmic discourse by offering an account based around what I 
am calling the antiphony of the gaze. I will suggest that, as in the example of the 
rhythmic-gestural pattemings of music and dance, black diasporic vision often involves a 
structure of call-and-response which simply does not fit within conventional accounts of 
the relations between vision and power. In her book Double Exposure: The Subject of 
Cultural Analysis, Mieke Bal argues that while it is important to pay attention to vision's 
relation to power, it is vital that we differentiate various modes of vision (1996: 256). 
Writing about black female spectatorship in 'The Oppositional Gaze: Black Female 
Spectators', bell hooks makes a similar point when she writes that, 'Even in the worse 
circumstances of domination, the ability to manipulate one's gaze in the face of structures 
of domination that would contain it, opens up the possibility of agency' (1992: 116). 
Using the film Dancehall Queen (1998) to challenge conventional discourses of the gaze, 
' The negativity accorded to the "gaze" within feminist film theory and artistic practice implies a 
logic of 
(primarily white male) domination and sadism or in terms of a logic of irreversibility between the activity of 
the subject and the passivity of the object. Such a perspective was introduced into contemporary visual 
theory through Laura Mulvey's 1975 seminal article 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'. Mulvey's 
claim that filmic techniques, spectatorial identification and visual pleasure are structured around a 
it masculine" mode of looking greatly influenced a generation of film theorists, in particular 
feminist visual 
theorists. However, this has not been without criticism and refinement. There is an extensive 
literature on 
this: Mulvey (1981), E. Ann Kaplan (1983), Mary A Doane (1982). To move beyond Mulvey's earlý, 
negative account of vision, some (feminist) visual theorists have tried to offer another way of 
conceptualising vision. This has involved making a separation distinction between the 
"gaze" and the 
"Look" or the "gaze" and the "glance". The "gaze" is possessive, subjective and 
is linked to power- 
knowledge and corresponds to Foucault's panopticon. The "look" on the other hand 
implies a structure of 
mutuality, inter- relationship and processuality between subject and object. It is not a negating activity 
but 
one of mutual recognition and affirmation (Kaplan 1997, Bryson 1983). 
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I will argue that the dialectics of looking relations cannot be sustained. This is because 
looking relations have to be understood within a framework of the existence of two 
modes of looking which unfold and slide into each other. The first mode of vision can be 
characterised as the irreversibly possessive or objectifying look (the Sartrean 'gaze'). 
Sartre maintains the view that interpersonal relations are structured by a logic of 
alienation and domination. The gaze can only be resisted by a counter gaze, leading to a 
dialectical struggle. On the other hand, the second mode of looking is less about 
opposition and more about resistance, refusal and play. I will call this form of relational 
resistance the "female rebuff'. 21 will suggest that in Dancehall Queen the gaze is 
subverted, undermined by the female rebuff, a dynamic interplay between looking and 
being looked at. The contention is that when looking and being looked at are no longer 
seen as polar opposites, there is a play or reciprocity that makes the two terms relational 
rather than oppositional. 
On the basis of this relationality, I will challenge the conventions of looking beyond 
Dancehall Queen and propose that all looking relations must be reconstituted In ten-ns of 
what I am calling an antiphonal continuum. That is, my reading of Dancehall Queen will 
lead to a reciprocal model of vision which challenges the paradigms set in place by 
Western philosophers from Descartes through to Sartre 3. I am aware that this is a strong 
2 My characterisation of the female rebuff has similarities with that of the "look" mentioned in the 
first 
footnote of this chapter. The difference between the two accounts resides in how they relate to the "gaze". 
In my theorisation, the female rebuff lies along an antiphonal continuum with the gaze, while in accounts of 
the look, the gaze and the look are clearly separated from each other. 
For an archeology of the role of vision in Western philosophical discourse see Evelyn Fox 
Keller and 
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claim to make, but in response, I would argue that the violence done to our relational 
being-in-the-world by a dialectical optics of domination and submission is even stronger. 
The strength of my claim is merely commensurate with the apparent incontestability of 
that which it is contesting. My purpose here is to uncover the dynamics of a relational 
looking which has been obscured by much of the contemporary film theory's over- 
investment in psychoanalysis. Such a project has already been undertaken by film 
theorists working within the phenomenological tradition (e. g. Sobchack (1992). In his 
book It Looks at You: The Returned Gaze of Cinema, Winston Dixon Wheeler argues that 
the act of viewing a film or video, the film views as much as we view it, 'until the film 
itself becomes a gaze, rather than an object to be gazed upon' (1995: 2). Furthermore, he 
writes, 'cinema audience members may, at times, verbally or gesturally respond to the 
spectacle they bear witness to on the screen, but for the most part, audience reception of 
the cinematic process involves a reciprocity of "looks": the gaze of the spectator and the 
concomitant gaze of the screen looking into darkness' (ibid: 2). 
I suggest that the way one can begin this study is by examining the question of agency in 
relation to vision. Such a consideration permits an account of the looking relation that 
privileges the complexities of the agent's work in relation to external economies of vision 
rather than the passivity of the subject. In this way, one is forced to enquire about the 
relation between the looker and the looked and vice-versa, as well as the material and 
Christine R Grontkowski (1983). They argue that there is a need to make a separation between the 
objectifying" function of vision and its communicative or erotic function. Through such separation, we can 
begin to flesh out more appropriately the ways in which gender bias has infiltrated or corrupted our visual 
relations. 
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historical context in which the looking takes place, and the meaning and nature of looking 
(in their different spatio-temporal contexts). Significantly, the ways in which the above 
pre-supposes the lived-body situation in perception and expression will be explored. In 
order to set the stage for my reading of Dancehall Queen, I will begin by looking at 
Frantz Fanon's implicit response to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of vision in his 
essay 'The Lived Experience of the Black' (1967). 1 will argue that where Merleau-Ponty 
emphasises the reversibilities, of somatic freedom (otherwise known as the 'corporeal 
schema'), Fanon forces us to consider the question of bodily unfreedom and 
irreversibilites. I will argue, however, that Fanon's consideration of bodily unfreedom 
tends to lead him back into a Sartrean cul-de-sac in which there can be no redemptive 
space for the gaze outside of either captivation or combat. Fanon's stance accords with 
Mieke Bal's assertion that the dominant model of vision 'tends to reduce looking to 
power only, to an absolute subject-object relation, wherein the viewer/receiver has total 
power and the object of the look does not even participate in communication' (1996: 262). 
Fanon's metaphysics ultimately acquiesces to this model, where sight is equated with 
insight. 
Since the seventeenth century when natural historians began to classify human 
differences, technologies of vision came to articulate racial, gender and class difference 
and hierarchy (Gilman 1980, Schiebinger 1993). In different ways, Winthrop D. Jordan 
(1977) and David Brion Davis (1966), have argued that the exploitative encounter 
between Africans and Europeans is served by contingent, but shifting perceptible visual 
differences. Africans were marked as corporeally different and Europeans remained 
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corporeally unmarked. In this way, the connection between vision and racial subjectivity 
came to depend on an ocular knowledge that is capable of penetrating and revealing the 
"truth" of the subject. This ocular-logic is central to the reception, treatment and 
representation of Africans in the New World context. In his essay 'Cultural Identity and 
Diaspora' Stuart Hall has written on the relationship between vision, representation and 
domination. Hall writes, 
The ways in which black people, black experience, were positioned and 
subjected in the dominant regimes of representation were the effects of a 
critical exercise of cultural power and normalization. Not only, in Said's 
"orientalist" sense, were we constructed as different and other within the 
categories of knowledge of the West by those regimes. They had the 
power to make us see and experience ourselves as "Other" [ ... ]. It is one 
thing to position a subject or set of peoples as the Other of a dominant 
discourse. It is quite another thing to subject them to that "knowledge", 
not only as a matter of imposed will and dominantion, but by the power 
of inner compulsion and subjective conformation to the norm. (1990: 
225) 
Rather than denying the validity of the above account and Fanon's experience I will seek 
to reposition them in terms of the antiphonal continuum already mentioned: 
Antiphonal 
Continuum 
Playful gaze 
(female rebuff) 
Oppositional 
gaze 
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At the left extreme of the diagram lies the female rebuff. Here, the gaze allows itself 
visual play with the other. The actions of the agent are engendered on the basis of 
spontaneity and non-objectification and an absence of any absolutely determined power 
relations. At the other extreme lies a dialectical model of the gaze. The subject is forced 
to either acquiesce to the domineering insight of the eye of power or to resist through an 
oppositional gaze. Rather than choose between these extremes, I insert a bridge between 
inter-relational play and oppositionality. It is vital that these two extremes are placed on a 
continuum, 4 for neither position is fixed or static, rather they unfold onto each other. 
Such a perspective is offered in Bal's reading of Manet's Olympia. Bal reads against the 
grain of conventional reading of the painting. In general, the black woman in Olympia is 
viewed as a servant bringing flowers left by the white woman's client or lover. Bal posits 
that the black woman 'may not be serving but visiting. The flowers, echoing those on the 
bedspread, may be hers; hers to give' (1996: 284). For Bal, the presence of the black 
woman suggests 'an alternative site from where to look, an alternative agent with whom 
to look. She becomes a focal point, a possible mirror image for an engaging viewing 
(ibid: 284). In effect, in any visual representation there are multiple fields of vision 
through which one can read the image. Such a reading position is however partially 
circumscribed by the embodied situation of the reader and their place in the wider 
field of 
power. 
' The notion of the antiphonal continuum in rethinking the question of the 
look is a response to Stuart Hall's 
call for a reading which attempts to 'reconcile - or at least hold 
in a proper balance -[... ] both Fanon's 
spectacular demonstration of the power of the racial binary to fix, and 
Bhabha's equally important and 
theoretically productive argument that all binary systems of power are nevertheless, at 
the same hme, often 
if not always, troubled and subverted by ambivalence and disavowal' 
(1996: 27). 
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Moreover, there is always a possibility that in any reading of vision or visual 
representation these two modes of vision are present. This reading of the structure of 
visual domination and subjection entails therefore that the power of vision be seen as 
fundamentally ambiguous. Once vision is complicated in this way, the necessity ascribed 
to the gaze as inherently either possessive or dialectical is challenged. 
In sum, the aim of this chapter is to show that: a) the looking relation takes place 
somewhere between play and struggle; b) therefore, a relational resistance (through the 
female rebuff) is possible; and c) this is demonstrated in the film Dancehall. 
Vision, Knowledge and Power 
Here, I shall begin at the right hand side of the diagram above - an oppositional model of 
the gaze. Towards the end of chapter one I raised the question: can you be a diaspOnc 
subject and not know it? From the discussion of Merleau-Ponty and Fanon in the first 
chapter, it is clear that knowledge of and about the body cannot be framed wholly as a 
conscious representation to which one has direct access. This raises the question: how do 
we know about our bodies? 
As I demonstrated in the first chapter, knowledge of the body is acquired through bodily 
conditionings. These conditionings situate the body within a cultural context which 
orchestrates its bodily competence. Knowledge is not first of all a mental event or 
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cognition but the effect of a pre-existing set of cultural parameters into which the body is 
inserted and with which it is in dialogue. Knowledge is first of all of the body, or rather 
of the body in relational context. The body acquires knowledge of itself through mimetic 
engagement with its culture. Such mimetic acts unfold a perpetual reworking and 
renewal of pre-existing pattemings. Out of this perpetual renewal, the body composes its 
own motile narrative which allows it to interact or dialogue with the world as an agent ill 
and of history. In the first instance then, we do not know the body, rather, the body is 
what allows us to know (Burkitt 1999, Stoller 1995). The first form that knowledge takes 
is therefore the corporeal knowledge of motile patterning in communication with its 
society. Given this fact, I suggest that "representational" or "conscious" knowledge is 
grounded within a "body knowledge" that always precedes it. Knowledge is first of all 
tacit, not reflective. In other words, beneath all epistemological claims of the subject, 
there is always a "knowledge" grounded in the body. And because it is always inscribed 
within its terms, representational knowledge is implicitly knowledge of the body. 
Now, how does this review of Merleau-Ponty impact upon the question: can you be a 
diasporic subject and not know it? Given that tacit knowledge is grounded in the body, it 
follows that this knowledge is an effect of the body; of a body coded and grounded within 
a specific cultural, historical and political systems or conditioning. Steeped in the layers 
of freedom of their cultural conditioning, the diasporic subject is not immediately aware 
of her origins. Just as we forget the rules of riding a bike once we have acquired 
competence, so we forget the labour of acquiring identity. Given the fact of 
distance 
alone, diasporicity remains implicit, according to the relation between tacit 
knowledge 
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and bodily competence just spelled out. This latent sense of distance and difference from 
reflective awareness and transparency can be articulated in nomological terms or in terms 
of the looking relation. The diasporic agent has yet to be named as such; her freedom is a 
function of being without a distinguishing name. Moreover, her anonymity is more or 
less secure insofar as she has escaped the externalising gaze of the other. In this 
hypothetical moment prior to the gaze and to naming, the diasporic subject is free and 
unknowable. This freedom is assumed on the basis of anonymity. In its ideal form, 
anonymity allows the agent to take her existence for granted, as an unquestioned and 
unconscious affirmation of the right to exist in her body. As a free and anonymous being, 
the agent exists within the terms of a culture that is not challenged into naming itself. For 
instance, within the economy of race, black people are marked and highly visible, 
whereas white people are generally unmarked and invisible. Precisely because whiteness 
is unmarked, its power is concealed so that it becomes normative, expressing itself in 
unspoken and tacit gestural and perceptual practices (Alcoff 1999: 19). As Charles W. 
Mills writes, in his book Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race, whiteness is 
so normative that many white people are not even aware of its power, the ways in which 
they benefit from it. Mills writes, 
White experience is embedded as normative, and the embedding is so 
deep that its normativity is not even identified as such. For this would 
imply that there was some other way that things could be, whereas it is 
obvious that this is just the way things are. A relationship to the world 
that is founded on racial privilege becomes the relationship to the world. 
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(1998: 10) 
it would appear therefore that there is a relationship between whiteness, normat'vity and 
anonymity. Normativity is the matrix in which anonymity is constituted. Having 
established that reflective awareness of diasporicity is avoided in hypothetical context of 
namelessness which Merleau-Ponty's thought explores, I now want to explore the genesis 
of awareness itself. 
Following Fanon, I contend that awareness of diasporicity comes at the moment of being 
inserted into the white scopic regime, or named as Spillers suggests is the case for black 
women. It is the reflection from outside that challenges the ideal of anonymity just 
referred to. As Fanon suggests, outside of this racialised encounter the 'black man among 
his own [ ... ] is satisfied with an intellectual understanding of these differences' (1967: 
110). Growing up as part of a colonial elite in the French Caribbean island of Martinique, 
Fanon did not face the challenge to his identity, which a bodily encounter with the outside 
will impose. However, through an encounter with the white world, Fanon is named as 
other, as different, and as a site of horror. As such, his anonymity is denied, and with it, 
his freedom is challenged. And thenceforth, forms of bodily unfreedom undercut a 
spontaneous agency. Recognising the essential freedom of anonymity, Fanon 'strives for 
anonymity, for invisibility' to the point that he was willing to 'accept the lot, as long as 
no one notices' him (ibid: 116). Introduced into a white world, Fanon is forced therefore 
into a scopic over-determination where his understanding of the world is mediated 
through the body - his dark skin colour. That is, the imposition of the white visual 
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regime contests the capacity for subjective expression of those who exist at a distance 
from its terms. Agents are over-determined because they can no longer exist as free and 
anonymous beings. Moreover, black people are forced to apprehend themselves through 
the eyes of an external white other. As Hall attests, the 'dominant regimes of 
representation had the power to make us see and experience ourselves as other' (1990: 225 
authors emphasis). For Fanon, a single sentence the seemingly innocuous "Look, a 
Negro! " - eliminates and forecloses the possibility of affirming the body's anonymous 
freedom. Moving within a white culture that conceals its own skin privilege through 
marking the black skin as highly visible, Fanon is forced to experience his world through 
scopic over-determination. Consequently, through a negotiation of this scopic over- 
determination, the diasporic agent is forced into an avowal of diasporicity, an 
acknowledgement, if not an acceptance of difference. Thus, for Fanon, the look of the 
other, epidermal reductionism, marks the beginning of alienation, of being marked as 
different and the loss of anonymity. 
For Fanon, this act of scopic-overdetermination serves to reduce black difference to a 
generality. An anonymity that guarantees a degree of agency is undercut by a generality 
that refuses individuality. An individual black person becomes a representative of an 
anonymous black collective. As Fanon writes: 'It was always the Negro teacher, the 
Negro doctor (1967: 117). In this instance anonymity is sought within an economy of 
Naming, Looking and Stereotyping. 
Put another way, it is the insertion of embodied black subjectivity within white regime of 
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representation that leads to the awareness of diasporicity, of difference. Within the terms 
of Fanon's position, this insertion and encounter with the white world, can only be 
perceived as a negation, a violation of the subject's capacity to be and affirm the freedom 
of anonymity. It is through the violence of the gaze that what was previously an 
hypothetical, or in Fanon's words a merely "intellectual" understanding of one's 
difference, explicitly terrorises the order of knowledge. The black subject is no longer 
embraced by the security of residing safely within norms of vision; an anonymous 
individual expressing a culture which does not yet name itself as 'black'. Instead, in the 
racial encounter, there is a denial and questioning of the body's autonomy and freedom. 
The subject is faced with and forced towards a skewed conception of himself, envisaged 
and named for the first time as "black". He or she can no longer be at home in their body. 
The subject's being is experienced through the eyes of the other, and therefore, forced 
towards a perverse and alienated construction of self. It is important to note here that 
unlike Hegel and Sartre, Fanon's account closes off the possibility of challenging the 
gaze. Therefore, he allows the perspective of the other's gaze to shatter the cultural 
framework in which his corporeal schema previously derives meaning. Consequently, the 
black subject is decentred from its world, dis-located, made alien to herself. What are the 
effects of this dislocational naming, this power of vision to fix and alienate? 
Again, it is within the pages of Fanon's book that the phenomenological effects of this 
dislocational and fixated naming can be seen in all their force and with all their violence. 
The dissonant structure of his essay 'The Lived Experience of the Black' is a testimony to 
the psychic torture Fanon's personal racial encounter unleashed. It should however be 
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noted that Fanon's account is not merely the personal anguish of a schizophrenic and 
individualised experience, but bears testimony of the collective trauma experienced under 
the perverse regime of colonialism and white supremacy. Moreover, the account he 
offers is historically and culturally situated - that of racism as it is experienced under the 
colonial situation. According to Fanon, there is first of all a violation of the subject's 
motile imperatives. The black subject is forced to exist within the normative structure of 
white society. The black subject is a script woven out of the white imagination. Out of 
this scripting and sculpturing the black subject then assumes and forms a relationship 
with herself which erodes the capacity for an autonomous self-construction. In this way 
any claims to bodily freedom are challenged and denied by the "white man's eyes". 
Fanon observes: 
I move slowly in the world, accustomed now to seek no longer for 
upheaval. I progress by crawling. And already I am being dissected 
under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. Having adjusted their 
microtomies, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. (1967: 116) 
The named and fixed subject faces the condition of 'absolute depersonallsation'. Fanon 
writes: 'In the white world the man of color encounters difficulties in the development of 
his bodily schema. Consciousness of the body is solely a negating activity' 
(ibid: 110) 
Against Merleau-Ponty's assumption that the non-pathological body is always 
free, Fanon 
holds that in the case of the black subject, at least, the corporeal schema 
is interrupted by 
being seen: "Look, a Negro! ". According to Lewis Gordon, being seen 
'is an ironic way 
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of not being seen through being seen. It is to be seen with overdetermined anonymity, 
which amounts, in effect, to invisibility' (1995: 58 authors emphasis). In this instance, 
invisibility expresses bodily unfreedom. The body, whose knowledge is first of all an 
adoption of a way of being-in-the-world, is denied this primary form of agency. It is at 
this moment, according to Gordon, that 'the Negro finds himself facing the objective 
alienation of his embodiment out there' (ibid: 59). 
Seen and named as 'black', the subject encounters the difference of her diasporicity as 
absolute alienation. Being diasporic, therefore, entails that one's identity is named from 
the outside as being 'different', 'foreign', 'not from here'; being constantly asked the 
question 'where are you from? '; being looked at and having to attune one's listening to 
every diminutive catchphrase. Fanon puts it thus: 
I slip into comers, and my long antennae pick up the catch-phrases strewn 
over the surface of things - nigger underwear smells of nigger-nigger 
teeth are white - nigger feet are big-the nigger's barrel chest -I slip into 
comers, I remain silent, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. (Fanon 
1962: 116) 
The subject is disempowered precisely because it would appear that there is no way of 
reclaiming these names as possibilities for a transformed agency. 
5 From the position of 
5 Writing about white presence in his essay 'Cultural Identity and Diasporic Representation', 
Stuart Hall 
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being named as 'other', the Fanonian subject loses the capacity to re-name herself as a 
possibility for agency. Her capacity to participate within culture is curtailed. Once looked 
at as other, Fanon finds that there is no way to reclaim his body within the terms of an 
autonomous expression. 6 He is fixed by the other 'in the sense in which a chemical 
solution is fixed by a dye' (1967: 109). The economy of the gaze fixes and objectifies on 
the basis of an absolute non-reciprocity. The potential for inter-communal relations is 
negated. Human communication between black and white people is an impossibility, an 
ideal Fanon yearns for. A gesture towards realising that inter-corporeal relation is met 
with violence: 'I shouted a greeting to the world and the world slashed away my joy. I 
was told to stay within bounds, to go back where I belonged' (Fanon ibid: 115). For 
Fanon, the power of vision fixes his black being as inalienably outside hospitality, beyond 
the walls of the community of recognition. 
Fanon's narrative expresses the absolute negativity of the racial encounter. Beyond Du 
Bois "double consciousness ", the experience of oneself as subject and as other, 
diasporicity, as a form of explicit knowledge, is granted at the cost of the imposition of a 
denial of the expressive body. The subject is aware of herself only in the form of 
contests the absolute power of white representational regime to fix black subjectivity in the terms posited by 
Fanon. Hall writes, 'The error is not to conceptualize this 'presence' in terms of power, but to locate that 
power as wholly external to us - as extrinsic force, whose influence can be thrown off 
like the serpent sheds 
its skins'. 
6 Contrary to Fanon, bell hooks argues that in spite of the punishment meted out to black people under 
slavery, and adults rebuke not to look, she, like those in the enslaved communities was able to look in ways 
which allowed them to re-assert a subjectivity. She writes: I knew as a child that the dominating power 
adults exercised over me and over my gaze was never so absolute that I did not dare to look, to sneak a 
peep, to stare dangerously, I knew that the slaves had looked. That all attempts to repress our/black 
peoples' right to gaze had produced in us an overwhelming longing to look, a rebellious 
desire, an 
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otherness. In Fanon's own case, the normative structure of the white gaze effected almost 
an absolute alienation. In a similar vein to Sartre, Fanon reads the looking relation in 
terms of the loss of human freedom (Jay 1993: 289). The exterior normative structure 
violated his ability to be at home in his fleshy existence: 'I become aware of my uniform. 
I had not seen it. It is indeed ugly' (Fanon 1962: 114). In Merleau-Ponty's terms, the 
fixing of the gaze means that the looked-at subject can no longer take up the terms of 
their world and be the locus of agency. The subject becomes incapable of historical 
action. Instead of historical action, the diasporic subject is ascribed a history which is 
constructed solely in terms of the normative structure of the white world. In other words, 
black historicity unfolds or emerges from the terms constructed by the white normative 
scopic regime. As encountered in the first chapter, black history is reduced to a caricature 
organised around cannibalism. In the process of objectification, the black subject 
intemalises this externally imposed sense of history through what Fanon calls 'the 
epidermalization-of this inferiority' (ibid: 13). 
Within the terms of Fanon's theory, the internalisation of an externally constructed 
history denies and eliminates the possibility of an assertive, self-generated black history. 
As such, the capacity to be an agent of another, more autonomous historical action is 
denied. Within this mis-recognition of black historical agency, black historical narratives 
are marginalised from the capitalised History of the World. Against the possibility of 
historical agency ascribed to all non-pathological bodies in Merleau-Ponty's terms, Fanon 
oppositional gaze'(1992: 116) 
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suggests that the corrosive power of the gaze under the colonial regime impedes black 
historical agency. Therefore, the freedom to transform history, implicit in Merleau- 
Ponty's corpreal schema, is denied to those bodies positioned and composed as different 
and as other. 
in the terms of Fanon's phenomenological and existential analysis, the awareness of 
being diasporic is equivalent to the experience of powerlessness. Diasporicity is 
experienced as a form of absolute passivity. The subject acquiesces to the objectifying 
gaze of the external other without recourse to its own motile capacity. On these terms, 
diasporicity is tantamount to an aphasic social pathology. The diasporic subject cannot 
speak, because of their diasporicity. Knowledge of diasporicity in this light appears to be 
essentially tragic - an awareness of the unchallengeable conditions which ground 
unfreedom. 
But surely this is not and cannot be the only possibility for self-representation and self- 
acknowledgment of diasporicity? Does Fanon mark out the structure of possibility for a 
reflexive and active diasporicity, or is there some factor at work in his text which 
precludes another form of expression? Is diasporicity the outcome of a gaze which is 
absolutely unreciprocable? Moreover, would any challenge to the fixing gaze itself 
involve a power struggle? 
In order to pull back from Fanonian type schizophrenia, it is necessary to challenge the 
absolute power accorded to the fixing normative economy of the white gaze as 
it operates 
in his text. I shall do this by turning to the reversible model of vision 
in the work of 
Merleau-Ponty. I shall show that the birth of Fanon's awareness of 
his diasporicity 
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through the pain of racial fixity marks the extreme point of an antiphonal continuum 
which does not by necessity lead to such absolute powerlessness. 
Fanon's account assumes that the gaze which fixes the diasporic subject as inalienably 
outside the community of the Same is non-reciprocal. For Fanon, there does not seem to 
be any way in which the violence of the look can be returned, refused, played with or 
even destroyed. The absolute non-reciprocity of the look structures the black/white 
encounter. For Fanon 'there are two camps: the white and the black' (Fanon 1962: 10) 
and both forms of conditioning are always contestive, embattled and basically 
oppositionally structured. As such, there can be no moment of reciprocity or redemptive 
account of the look which does not involve a fundamental struggle for power. However, 
Merleau-Ponty's oeuvre not only allows for a look that is reciprocal, he makes it a 
condition of looking that there is reciprocation. He calls this condition of vision 
11 reversibility". 
This alternative model of vision co-ordinates nicely with some of the more recent 
research on Fanon. For instance, utilising the work developed by Maurice Natanson, 
Lewis Gordon suggests that there is an alternative account of historical agency which 
exists at a distance from the binarism of whitelblack history. This alternative 
phenomenological history is rooted in the practice of the everyday and an act of choice. 
Gordon writes: "Every black person faces history - his or her story - every day as a 
situation, as a choice, of how to stand in relation to oppression, of whether to live as a 
being subsumed by oppression or to live as active resistance towards liberation, or to live 
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as mere indifference" (1995: 29). And as I will show later, the black dancing body in the 
flini Dance Queen, suggests that women in the Jamaican ghetto choose to be active 
agents of history rather than be subsumed by the violence and injustice of their everyday 
lives. 
Reversibility and Agency in Looking 
In The Visible and The Invisible (1968), Merleau-Ponty suggests that reversibility is the 
"ultimate truth" because it allows us to think about human subjectivity as fundamentally 
interpersonal. This is because the lived body structuring all human relations is at the core 
of Merleau-Ponty's ontology. Our identity as embodied beings is always grounded in 
reciprocal relations with other embodied beings. In the essay 'The Child's Relation with 
the Other', Merleau-Ponty writes, 'I live in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel 
him living in mine' (1964: 146). In grounding intersubjectivity on an intercorporeal 
relation, Merleau. -Ponty suggests that reversible relations of perception cannot be based 
on the individualistic, autonomous, unitary subject of dualist ontology - rather a 
community of other perceivers is always implicated in our subjective experience. Unlike 
Sartre's account, where the other is defined dialectically, for Merleau-Ponty, the other's 
embodied consciousness is a constitutive component of my capacity to perceive. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, being visible is a condition of visuality. To see is to exist 
within a visual field in which we share visibility with others. As he writes "Through 
other eyes we are for ourselves fully visible'(1968: 143). Given this essential condition 
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of reciprocity, the Sartrean objectifying gaze cannot be received unambiguously when 
inserted into the context of Merleau-Ponty's reversible field of vision. The power of 
looking is met with the vulnerability of being looked at. It is on this basis that Fanon's 
collapse back into the devastation of the gaze can be resisted. Here, I want to do two 
things. First, I will detail exactly how this resistance is embedded in ontology; and 
second, I will go on to show how it can become operative in bodily practice through 
corporeal devices such as the female rebuff. I will therefore provide a way of avoiding 
ascribing a necessity to a Fanonian objectification without at the same time denying it as 
a possibility within the antiphonal continuum. 
As I have shown throughout this thesis, Merleau-Ponty's work consistently affirms the 
centrality of embodied perception as a fundamental aspect of being-in-the-world and 
being-with-others. To be a human being is to exist as a human body occupying a shared 
perceptual field with other embodied beings. It is the embodied nature of perception 
which is the 'ground of a style of interacting with the environment' (Dillion 1988: 122). 
The body in effect stands between the agent and their environment or world. It also acts 
as the guarantor both of their difference and their commonality. Without a body, the 
subject could not be considered as a 'being-in-the-world', and without the world, we 
cannot understand the body as the body of an agent. For Merleau-Ponty, then, subject and 
world are reciprocally determined through the body. Again, this reciprocal determination 
is made possible through reversibility. For Merleau-Ponty: 
[] reversibility, is the idea that every perception is doubled with a 
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counter-perception (Kant's real opposition), is an act with two faces, one 
no longer knows who speaks and who listens. Speaking- Ii stening, 
seeing-being seen, perceiving-being perceived circularity (it is because of 
it that it seems to us that perception forms itself in the things themselves) 
- Activity =passivity. (1968: 264-265) 
In this unfinished work, Merleau-Ponty begins with the example of touch. He contends 
that if one hand is touching the other, the direction of 'touching-touched' can only be one- 
way at any particular moment. Either the left hand is touching or the right hand is 
touching. Whenever one tries to make both hands touch or both hands be touched, one 
discovers that there is always a falling back onto either the left hand or the right hand 
being active (touching), the opposite hand being passive (being touched). In other words, 
there is never a moment of simultaneity or of co-presence at work within the bodily 
experience. 
This philosophical parable has extensive implications in Merleau-Ponty's thought and for 
the argument here. The sensing body, here in terms of a hand, only exists and makes 
sense in terms of existential resistance - in this example the other hand. The body 
therefore becomes a relational entity. As Merleau-Ponty writes, 'because my body 
touched and my touching, there is an overlapping or encroachment, so that we must say 
that the things pass into us as well as we into the things' (1968: 123). Therefore, the 
moment the hand begins to touch, it is always opening itself to the possibility that 
touching may reverse into being touched. This is so because they take place 
in the same 
body. Of course, the example of the two hands can be generalised (most obviously 
in the 
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tactile or haptic register). As soon as I put my bare foot on the lawn, I am exposing 
myself to the possibility of sensing the gentle tuftiness of the grass as it cradles my feet. 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that perception in general can be modelled on the interweaving 
of activity and passivity inalienably in operation in the tactile register. Most significantly, 
he argues that reversibility occurs in vision. 7 In 'Eye and Mind', Merleau-Ponty 
famously declares that the tree watches me as much as I watch the tree: 'In a forest, I have 
felt many times over that it was not I who was looking at the forest. I felt, on certain days, 
that it was rather the trees that were looking at me' (1964: 167). Far from being an 
absurd statement, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that perception does not issue forth most 
fundamentally solely from the subject to the world. Rather, as with Monet's Olympia, a 
community of perceivers is always implicated in our intentional being-in-the-world. At 
the very moment in which I perceive (the tree, an other), I cannot attribute the origin of 
the field of perception to myself in that moment. 8 The other was there before I began 
'As has already been suggested, this reversibility thesis is at least implicit in his early texts, most notably the 
"Phenomenology of Perception". It is clear in that work that the embodied perceiving subject no longer 
merely projects meaning into the world. In that work, the subject is embedded into a world that exists and 
has meaning prior to it as much as the subject projects meaning upon the world. This already suggests that 
the world may have intentions upon the subject as much as the subject has intentions for the world. The 
point is that in this early work, Merleau-Ponty had already marked out conceptually, if not in language, the 
very reversibility that became explicitly stated in the later work. 
8 In Michel Tournier's novel Friday (1967), a re-writing of Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, the structure 
of the narrative is grounded in an exploration of the necessity ascribed to the relationship between self and 
other for meaningful perception. Initially, Robinson imposed the key tenets of Roman Law (of property and 
authority) on the deserted island in order to control his perception (to comic effect). It is only after a series 
of disasters when these mechanisms become impossible that the 'other' island of Speranza presents itself as 
that which englobes his subjectivity and makes it possible. Robinson thereafter becomes the island, which 
perceives itself through him in specific spatio-temporal acts of perception. Without the mirror of the other, 
Robinson loses a sense of himself as a finite and bounded being, and his subjectivity becomes displaced by 
exteriority. 
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looking at her, as was the tree. Therefore, I have the power to either reproduce or 
transform what is socio-culturally given (Burkitt 1999: 72). 'My personal existence must 
be the resumption of a prepersonal. tradition. There is, therefore, another subject beneath 
me, for whom a world exists before I am here, and who marks my place in it' (Merleau- 
Ponty 1962: 254). In other words, when I see the tree, the tree opens up the possibility of 
another visual field which transcends my point of view. Merleau-Ponty is saying that the 
visual field cannot simply be my visual field alone -I do not own it nor can I master its 
origin. The moment I begin to see in a world that involves others, I am already prone to 
being seen - to blindspots and occlusions in my visual field which the other may fill. As 
Sobchack writes, 
Although sight possesses the world in its activity of seeing, it does not 
own or circumscribe the world. The seen comes into the vision as 
potentially seeable by all, as occupying its own worldly space and 
concretely marking a distance between my incarnation and its own space. 
(1992: 85) 
Therefore, perception is not purely an interiority or immanence, it is always already 
involved with exteriority or transcendence - again, not in oppositional or 
dialectical 
tenns as Sartre would have it, but as interpersonal and as a reciprocal co-determination. 
In sum, perception takes place through the body communicating with a sensory 
field that 
transcends it. Merleau-Ponty shows that this must involve an inside/outside relation. 
As 
we shall see, this inside/outside intertwining ontology entails the presence of motiliol as a 
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vital element of perception. Dance will be seen to be a form of perception and involve 
shifts between activity and passivity. 
We can say that the tree is looking at me because it represents the possibility of 
transcendence or otherness at work in the perceptual field. As such, there is an instabilio, 
assigned to how we must think the so-called "gaze". Any act of perception can only be 
given within the context of a field of vision that opens onto alterity. In the weakest sense, 
this alterity can be merely the possibility of another perspective - as in the case of 
Merleau-Ponty's tree. However, in a stronger sense, the alterity of the perceptual field 
could represent another perceiving being, such as another person. In this stronger sense, 
the opposing force of being looked at marks all looking. Because of this reversible 
structure, the other as Dillon notes, 'functions as my mirror: he de-centers me, lets me see 
myself from another vantage' (1988: 166). That is, the other allows me to experience the 
facticity of my own visibility, even though I will never know how the other perceives me. 
Having said this, how I experience or see myself can never be the same as the way in 
which the other perceives me. Dillon writes, 'A literal reversal of roles is impossible. 
Although looking presupposes being visible, seeing and being seen remain divergent, 
non-coincidental. I live my body ecstatically, but it is the only body I will ever live' (ibid: 
174). Reversibility in this sense implies asymmetry not symmetry. 
This corporeal inter-reflexivity can therefore be dissociated from the objectifying gaze of 
Fanon for whom the subject is reduced to a consciousness framed in terms of the other. 
In opposition to Fanon's adoption of Sartre's quasi-Hegelian account of a gaze that 
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implies lordship or bondage through a totalisation of the power of vision, Merleau- 
Ponty's account demonstrates that power is essential ambiguous. Vision becomes an 
active possibility for falling back into passivity. My gaze upon you is resisted or 
contested (most readily, perhaps when the resistance is not just interpersonal) because of 
an inevitable inability to master my own visual field. This account of the ambiguous 
relation between power and the act of looking can therefore provide a general mode of 
power relations between people. As I love or deceive you, there is always the possibility 
of me being loved or deceived in turn. I cannot dominate either the world in front of me 
as it unfolds through each moment of motile perception, nor can I dominate the other 
absolutely. Even when black people could be brutally punished for looking at white 
people, bell hooks writes that, 
Spaces of agency existed for black people, wherein we can both 
interrogate the gaze of the Other but also look back, and at one another, 
naming what we see. The "gaze" has been and is a site of resistance for 
colonized black people globally. Subordinates in relations of power learn 
experientially that there is a critical gaze, one that "looks" to document, 
one that is oppositional. In resistance struggle, the power of the 
dominated to assert agency by claiming and cultivating "awareness" 
politicizes "looking" relations - one learns to look a certain way 
in order 
to resist. (1992: 116) 
Therefore, a Fanonian, optical mastery through objectification proves more 
difficult 
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because I cannot master the other absolutely. Attempt at absolute mastery of the other 
opens me to the possibility of losing my power. Vision's reversibility therefore 
destabilises any account of power over another through the gaze. But how can this 
metaphysical framework configure itself as action? Here, we need to ground reversible 
vision in the nature of embodiment. The undoing of optical mastery becomes possible in 
light of Merleau-Ponty's earlier work Phenomenology of Perception (1962). As we have 
encountered throughout this thesis, in this text, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
perceiving body is always already motile. To perceive in part involves construing 
meaning upon the world through the agency of the body. Motility is an agency of being, 
and as such, perception is endowed with a primordial movement. Beyond the merely 
physical, motility implies the possibility of transformation of self. The motile body is the 
ground of spontaneity, of a creative gesture that may inflect the framework of perception 
itself. As the work of the two previous chapters has shown, through rhythmic -gestural 
patterning, a context of generalised existential pain may be responded to in terms of the 
work of the body in creative practices such as dance. This dance implies that the subject 
cannot be fixed by the gaze. As well as the availability of creative response to the 
existential condition of pain, the potential to reproduce conditions of pain is also always 
at hand. Each motile perception bears the potential to transcend the operations of an 
external fixing force. As long as the subject moves spontaneously in the world, there is 
always already instituted the possibility of an active resistance to the fixing powers of the 
gaze. Merleau-Ponty's account of reversible embodied perception therefore shows that 
resistance to the gaze is always a possibility. Being seen or captured by the other's gaze 
can be responded to in terms of seeing - looking back or playfully returning 
the gaze, and 
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again in terms of movement. We are already on the way to understanding the "female 
rebuff '. 
Modes of Looking in Dancehall Queen 
These themes of the antiphony of the gaze, and the playful ambiguities between the 
activity of the looker and the apparent passivity of the looked-at are explicitly addressed 
in Don Letts and Rick Elgood's film Dancehall Queen (1998). Dancehall Queen graced 
the Jamaican screens for a six months stretch, but did not receive a general release in 
Britain. The film centres on the trials and tribulation of Marcia, a single mother with two 
children and a brother to support. Self-employed as a street vendor opposite a popular 
nightclub, Marcia is determined to make sure that her daughters receive the education she 
was denied as a result of an early teenage pregnancy. Without a partner to ease the 
burden of raising two children, the villainous racketeer Larry, contradictorily referred to 
as Uncle Larry by her daughters financially supports her. In return for his financial 
contribution to Marcia's household, there is an unstated agreement between Larry and 
Marcia that Larry can expect sexual favours from Marcia's teenage daughter. Outraged by 
Uncle Larry's advances, the girl tells her mother who although unhappy tells her that she 
needs 'to get with the programme' and promptly reminds her of Larry's contribution to 
her education and the relative material comfort they both enjoy. The young girl 
grudgingly and painfully conceded to a sexual relation with Larry. From this moment 
Marcia painstakingly envisages an alternative means of supporting her family without 
much success until she sees the reigning dancehall queen at a patrol station. 
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At this chance sighting of the nocturnal performer, Marcia is surprised by the simplicity 
of her look and her possession of a luxury car. She is intrigued by the activities in the 
nightclub and how the dancehall queen was able to acquire her wealth (in the display of 
car), look so plain during the day, and yet be so glamorously minimalist in her style of 
dressing at night. From her pitch outside the club, Marcia watches the scantily clothed 
streams of women as they enter the nightclub and decides that she, too, wants to become 
a dancehall queen. The rest of the film takes us through Marcia's effort to become the 
next Dancehall Queen, her manipulation of Larry to her own advantage, her reconciliation 
with her daughter and her emergence from a street vendor to a Dancehall Queen. 
I now want to explore three interrelated factors, which situates Dancehall Queen outside 
the conventional theoretical framework of the oppositional or combative gaze in order to 
show how the film offers a way of rethinking vision in terms of what I have called the 
4 antiphonal continuum'. At this stage I will state them separately. They are: 
1. The representation of the camera and the cameraman in the film are not posited 
outside the field of representation, rather, they occupy a significant place within the 
field 
of vision itself. Here the camera does not operate as a concealed background structure of 
the filmic work - analogous of the all-seeing, all-powerful eye/I - rather 
it functions as an 
embodied perspective within the film. 
2. The audience in the film at the dancehall are not passive observers of 
the body staged 
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at a distance for their consumption, rather the audience are active agents engaged in an 
antiphonal affirmation of the community through participation with the spectacle of one 
of their own erotically manifesting her body in motion. Many of the women in the 
audience have their eyes closed as though they are working within what I will call the 
4play of inside out, and outside in'. To this extent, the power of vision is undermined and 
undercut by the closing of the eyes, the eyes only open as a show of collective 
communion and recognition. 
3. The female rebuff. As well as a communal dialogue expressed through the 
antiphonies of the dancehall event, there is an individual moment at work in the film, 
whereby the gaze of the other is playfully "rebuffed" by the dancing body of the subject. 
I will now examine each of these aspects of visual play at work in the film in turn. 
The Camera 
I suggest that the role of the camera as represented in Dancehall Queen is central to the 
film's refusal to acquiesce to the white conventions of the powerful gaze. In effect, the 
cameraman9s stance presents a different model of looking which, as I will argue shortly, 
is exemplified more generally in the film in terms of the audience-actor relation. 
So, how does the camera as it is represented in the film lie outside of the conventions of 
the gaze? First of all, the camera is always being carried by the cameraman. This is an 
important point - because, as I am arguing, in the 
film the camera signifies the state of the 
gaze. Merleau-Ponty writes, "Our organs are no longer instruments; on the contrary, our 
instruments are detachable organs" (1964: 178). As the prosthetic of the 
human eye, the 
277 
Chapter 5: Antiphonies of The Gaze 
camera is therefore resolutely embodied (Celia Lury 1998). The camera does not stand 
alone. The camera is moved by a motile body, or indeed, if we take Merleau-Ponty's 
statement seriously, the camera becomes embodied. This cyborgian thesis has two 
implications in terms of the relation between the camera and movement. 
First of all, if the body's intentions are expressed as motility, the camera itself becomes 
motile. We can say that the camera is inscribed within movement, within the dance of the 
motile body. The aperture of the lens is not therefore set within stasis, somehow at a 
remove from the vicissitudes and motions of the perceived world. The lens is, on the 
contrary, caught within the movement of the world, as another form of its unfolding 
materiality. In general, the presence of a camera within the film itself is, therefore, not 
simply an object, but a site of ambiguity between being body-subject and body-object. As 
body-subject, the camera is essentially motivated and motile, connected as it is to the 
embodied intentional matrix of the photographer. Sobchack makes a similar point when 
she writes in another context that the camera is 'primarily absorbed into the human and 
intentional experiencing of the world that is engaged and visible through it' (1992: 177). 
To a large extent, the camera "sees" what the photographer wants the camera to see. Of 
course, accidents can always happen, even within the strictest of framings and the most 
precisely controlled depth-offield settings. As Sobchack writes, 'There is a slight 
pressure existent between the flesh of the body lived introceptively and the exterior and 
opaque material of the camera that slightly resists the filmmaker's introceptive 
appropriation of the instrument' (ibid: 177). 
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Second, as body-object, the camera takes up its own space within the material field of 
vision. The camera is, therefore, subject to movement imposed from outside. The view 
from the lens might be occluded by other bodies, or the photograph might get blurred 
from being knocked at the point of exposure. In the film, the camera is represented from 
the outside, as visible. Instead of opting for the usual cliche of a view from within the 
lens, this representation of the camera as object on a filmic level accords with the 
Merleau-Pontyan maxim 'to see is to be seen. ' This mode of presenting a camera 
filming within the film, has parallels with the tradition of filming known as cinema verite. 
This tradition has developed a repertoire of stylistic devices that draw attention to the film 
as a process; through the camera showing film to be 'an act of seeing that makes itself 
seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an act of physical and reflexive movement 
that makes itself reflexively felt and understood' (Sobchack 1992: 5-6). This reflexivity 
can never be completed however; the film-within-the-film can never merge fully onto the 
film itself. The film becomes divided from itself by a gap which mirrors the way in 
which the body-as-object and the body-as-subject cannot collapse into each other in 
Merleau-Ponty's ontology. Merleau-Ponty writes that "[t]he enigma is that my body 
simultaneously sees and is seen" (1968: 162). The camera occupying the double role of 
both frame and object produces a similar enigma. Represented as subject and as object, 
the representation of the camera suggests that to film is to be filmed. Filming9 does not 
imply a purely active penetration of the visual field, rather it opens up an ambiguity of 
power at the core of vision. In psychoanalytic inspired feminist film theorists, film is 
'Filming' here is taken in a wider than usual sense to imply both the moving image and still photography. 
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seen to have its own inherent meaning and with the capacity to capture the viewer. In 
contrast, Jackie Stacey's (1994) work on white female spectatorship in Hollywood cinema 
argues that the viewer participates in the production. Sobchack posits that film is only 
meaningful through the act of viewing and the viewer's engagement with it. Sobchack 
writes, 
It is only in the act of viewing that the film is given to our experience as 
meaningful, and it is only in the act of viewing that the film possesses 
existence for itself as well as for us. A film can't be seen outside of our 
act of viewing it, a film can be outside of its own act of viewing. We 
must see a film for it be able to see it. Therefore, it is the act of viewing 
that links the spectator of a film and the film as spectator. (1992: 129) 
In Dancehall Queen then, the camera is not a privileged site of scopic mastery, rather it 
becomes one more possible view within and upon the visual field. As such, the question 
of the power of filming cannot be given in advance - outside of the viewer. The camera, 
as the figure symbolising the eye of the gaze, does not assume a position at the top of a 
hierarchy of relations between vision and power. In Dancehall 
Queen, the camera 
occupies a horizontal relation with regard to all the other possibilities of vision at work 
in 
each scene. At times, the camera may therefore "capture" events 
in the filmic field before 
it; at other times however, the camera may itself be captured 
by events in that field itself. 
Therefore, the "exposure" of the open aperture is opened to being read as a 
double 
possibility. Not only is the visual field "exposed", rendered naked 
by the camera, but also 
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the film (and by extension the photographer/cameraman) is "exposed". 10 At this point a 
vulnerability opens up from the point of view of the photographer himself. A classic case 
of this latter event occurs in the film when the cameraman is in the front line of the 
audience at the dancehall. Jostled by the dancing bodies around him, his ability to 
photograph the dancehall women is disturbed by the fact of his embodied being lying in 
competition with other bodily beings. Far from being the site of a scopic mastery, the 
camera at this point embodies an oscillation between the capacity to capture the field of 
vision and expressing the fragility of embodied being in the world. 
In sum, the representation of the camera in Dancehall Queen can be read as offering a 
strong challenge to the gaze's hegemony in film theory. Situating the camera within the 
terms of Merleau-Ponty's thesis about the ambiguity of the relation between vision and 
power, the eye and the prosthetic extension of the camera do not signify scopic mastery. 
By implication, that which is seen and that which is filmed do not signify scopic slavery. 
Filming (again in the wider sense) becomes ambiguous: there is no pre-determined fate to 
the empowerment of vision that results from it. That is, it is not decided in advance 
whether those 'captured' on film will be subjected to the rules and norms of its framing 
(for example, the norm of a white male heterosexual gaze) or whether the subjects filmed 
might in fact empower themselves by subverting or perverting those norms on their own 
terms. 
10 Of course, this double reading of the film's exposure demonstrates that the technical definition of 
exposure, referring to the time the film itself is exposed to the light, is already subject to reversal In tenns of 
the non-technical conventions of the word. 
281 
Chapter 5: Antiphonies of The Gaze 
The Audience 
Dancehall Queen challenges the active/passive polarisation in the theory of the performer 
and the audience in a radical way. The audiences represented in the film are simply not 
passive recipients or consumers of an external and exteriorised spectacle. This 
representation of the black participating audience has been theorised by Annette Powell 
Williams (1972). While I recognise that there is a distinction between audience in the 
film, and the film's audience, in my reading of Dancehall Queen, I want to explore the 
role of the audience in the film. At the beginning of this thesis, I was interested in 
bringing together both this aspect of the audience relation by interviewing women 
involved in dancehall in Jamaica about their reception of the film. However, for several 
reasons I was unable to gain access to my intended participants. 
The audiences in the film are spectactors not spectators (Boal 1992). That is, their role as 
spectators receiving the spectacle of the show does not dominate their role as active 
participants in the performance. Instead of there being the discrete entities of the 
performers, the performed and those witnessing, the event of the competition involves a 
fluid interpenetration of each element within the others. 'Show' is indeed an apt 
nomination, implying as it does a mimetic agency that will involve transfers across and 
disruptions of the constitutive elements of a performance treated as separate from each 
other. Those performing witness and respond to the mood of the crowd, and those in the 
crowd mimic the prowess of the performers. Consequently, that which is being performed 
(female agency and eroticism) is distributed equally by those on stage and those before it 
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in a joyous transfer and cross-transfer of voluptuous capacity. The visual spectacle of a 
performing female body gyrating before the crowd is therefore not merely a spectacle; the 
distance or gap between performer and audience required for a pomotropic objectification 
closes down. The performer ceases to be regarded as a form of distance, an externalised 
object, a fetishised mode of activity that implies and enforces an equal and attendant 
mode of fascinated passivity. There is no 'action at a distance' or alienation between the 
stage activity and the audience. The audience is much more like a 'crowd' -a site for 
potential activity and engagement. The dancehall queen presents the audience as a 
representation of themselves; in other words the performing woman embodies her 
community. 
In this sense, the embodied agency of the dancehall queen involves an 'erotics of 
community'. The community of the crowd is folded within her every movement. Her 
dancing body is the subject of the performance and the means by which the crowd can 
reciprocate by expressing its own identity. As an erotic site, the stage performance 
therefore allows for the jubilant celebration of female camal power as a unique 
opportunity afforded by the culture. This celebration does not slip back into a 
pomotropics because the community itself is presented within the audience: the crowd 
contains celebrating women encouraging the vendor seller turned 
dancehall queen. 
Moreover, an erotics of community replaces pornography because 
both sides of the stage 
are engaged in an active dialogue or communion. This is in marked contrast 
to another 
scene in the film in the Go-Go dancing club. Here, women dance on stage 
for the 
consumption of the predominately white male observers. There 
is a distance between the 
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dancers on stage and the (white) male observers whose gaze is inscribed within the 
conventional eye of power. The women perform for the men as sexual objects and 
fetishised black skin, and the men's participation in this performance is limited to self- 
absorbed visual erotic pleasure. " 
In this sense, the dancehall queen performs the function of a goddess. As Athena housed 
in the temple of the Parthenon presented an ideal for the Athenian people, Marcia and her 
competitors are the motile statues of an idealised eroticism that becomes the locus for an 
expression of community. Although in a sense functioning as an ideal and therefore a 
transcendent being, the dancehall queen is nonetheless not an exteriority or an avatar of 
alienation; rather she exemplifies an ideal grounded in the rhythmic body. As such, she 
represents a corporeal ideal; a transcendence enveloped within an incarnate community. 
This intertwining of the ideal and the somatic is implicated within her very title - the 
'dance-hall-queen' suggesting all at once a movement, a place and a figure of 
transcendence. 
It is particularly the way in which the female members of the crowd perform that disrupts 
the white western conventions of the gaze. As was alluded to above, the women celebrate 
a play of 'inside out and outside in. ' During the performance, the film represents women 
in the audience dancing along to the music and the performance with their eyes closed. 
12 
11 Even within this conventional porngraphic display of black women's 
body for white male consumption, 
given the terms of Merleau-Ponty's embodied agency of vision it is certainly open to challenge whether 
these women are objects of the male gaze. 
12 Although it might appear to be the case that the audience of watching 
Dancehall Queen might on the 
contrary have to keep their eyes open in order to see and understand the meaning of the closed eyes 
of the 
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This denial of an overarching visual logic is the opening towards a corporeal communion 
with the woman on stage, and by implication, with all women of the community. By 
closing their eyes, the women turn inwards to their own bodily possibilities as the site of 
celebration of self. Rather than this inward turn presenting itself as a moment of 
separation or alienation, the invisibility and darkness of dancing with closed eyes 
becomes the expression of a heightened sense of inter-relationality. By not privileging 
only the visual and affirming the movement of dance, the women make a connection 
which is more immediate and primordial than anything vision can afford. This 
connection is made possible by the joint celebration of movement and the voluptuous 
possibilities of black womanhood. The inside-quality of dancing with closed eyes is 
therefore the means by which the outside spectacle of the dancing queen is returned to 
and grounded in the body, against the possibility of an alienating visual logic. And in 
response to the rapturous women in the crowd, the dancer on stage in turn infuses ever 
more joy and passion into her movement. 
In sum, in Dancehall Queen, the audience - performer relation is therefore represented as 
resolutely antiphonal. The play of call and response is the dialogue of a community 
celebrating itself erotically. The possibility of the event being framed within an 
alienating logic of vision is defeated by closed eyes and by movement. Through this 
representation, a different model of vision is offered: instead of an exteriorising power 
filn-& spectator. As we shall see in a moment, this objection operates on the basis of an assumption that 
film is individual and primarily a visual medium. Film does not only engage the visual senses, 
it is also an 
acoustic medium. The meaning and the effect of a film is constituted through the relationship 
between 
sound and vision. It is only within a Western ocular-logic can film be reduced purely to vision; 
it is only on 
this premise that audience vocalisation seen as 'noise' in the cinema can be viewed as a 
distraction to the 
enjoyment of the film. 
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over, vision is inscribed within the antiphonies of communal dialogue. Instead of a 
community being shattered and torn apart by spectacularisation and an alienating 
commodity fetishism (the thesis of a Marxist critique of Western culture), the film 
empowers the possibility of community such that vision as a power is reduced to 
operating within its terms. 
There are two points that I would like to make as extensions of this summary. Firstly, the 
question arises as to whether Dancehall Queen and my reading of it can be accused of 
romanticising or idealising a culture that is tangential to mainstream western culture. My 
response to this accusation is to turn it on its head. It is only on the basis of a blindspot of 
difference that such an attack can be made. That is, only when the conventions of a white 
(middle-class) audience are granted as normal can any other configuration appear as an 
idealisation or romanticisation. And therefore only on such a basis can the power of the 
'gaze' be assumed to hold such power and appear to be such a critical tool in the 
production of film-theory discourse. What Dancehall Queen demonstrates in critical 
terms is that the normativity of a physically passive, homogeneously responsive audience 
that consumes the spectacle of a performance quietly and without gesture is in fact a 
culturally and historically specific phenomenon. A possible response to the argument 
here is that white western audiences are not passive. Rather, they express their active 
engagement with the film differently; not through the body but through reflective critical 
attention. To this I would respond that the difference an embodied responsive audience 
makes is that the response is not individualistic and internally confined. By not 
being 
confined to the head-space of a mentalistic model of reception, the vocal and gestural 
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response is 'out there', as an engagement not only with the film itself but also with the 
community that is in the process of responding critically. There are then at least two 
dialogues at work in black audiences response: (to films, to music or other forms of 
expression) that between the performed and the crowd, and also that of the crowd with 
itself. 
From the above account, it is therefore only on local tenns (local to hegemonic forms in 
the west) that the alienating logic of vision operates. The reference here to hegemony 
indicates that even in the west, other forms of audience and other rhythms of vision are 
available. It is interesting in this regard to look to moments in black literature when this 
point about audience difference is made. For instance, in his autobiography, Malcolm X 
writes, 
I think I could be speaking blindfolded and after five minutes, I could tell 
you if sitting out there before me was an all-black or an all-white 
audience. Black audiences and white audiences feel distinguishably 
different. Black audiences feel warmer, there is almost a musical rhythm, 
for me, even in their silent response. (1965: 390) 
What an interesting passage! Again, it bears witness to the denial of acquiescing to a 
visual logic of domination. It is through closed eyes that Malcolm X could 
best discern 
the character of his audience. And this difference is marked in terms of 
heat and rhythm, 
again paradoxically through silence. His words can be found to echo 
in any of our 
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metropolises today, if one ventures to the cinema and watches a film in the company 
mostly of black people. Black cinema audiences are often quite rowdily responsive where 
a constant dialogue between the audience and the filmic events is expressed verbally and 
often at some volume. From a white perspective, this can seem at first sight as though the 
audience is not watching or listening. Again, it would be the violence of a white 
normativity that imposes the reading of the film not being 'watched properly' on such 
occasions. Such a reading is not receptive to the possibility that a different, more 
antiphonal, structure of reception and perception are at work. 
The model of the black audience, literally in dialogue with the spectacle before it, 
answering in terms of mouth and ear to what is presented in sound and light, is the model 
of an actively participative and embodied audience that responds to what is presented not 
solely as individuals and in terms of cognition, but also in terms of community and 
sociality. As I have pointed out, this second form of response in effect involves the 
community in dialogue with itself. This is the model proposed by Dancehall Queen. 
The Female Rebuff 
Let us return to the dancing bodies of the Go-Go bar scene in the film. Here, the women 
slither and inflect their bodies around poles, displaying their buttocks behind revealing 
underwear, pummeling the floor and gyrating their pelvises in a steamy series of sex-act 
simulations. To all intents and purposes, they are caught within the tenns of the other's 
power: they are dancing solely for the male other, in ways which will feed into the other's 
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fantasies about black female sexuality. The Go-Go girls are then apparently destined to 
be victims of the other's gaze. They can in no way dance for themselves, or within their 
own terms. 
And yet, even in the most extreme instance in the film of the gaze used oppressively, 
there is room for re-description. For example, what if some of the women actively 
involve themselves with the erotics of performance? Would this mean that they are 
merely affirming that which oppresses them and degrades them into being sex objects? 
Or, is it not possible to heed to the possibility of agency at work in a Go-Go dancer who 
dances with enjoyment and carnal pleasure? 
Without doubt, I am not suggesting that we should go so far as to accept without 
challenging the pornotropic practices. However, the issue of the subjecCs affinnation of 
a specific bodily practice does raise the question of whether the context of oppression in 
operation can be regarded as absolute or total. This is because the moment affirmation of 
a bodily performance becomes an issue, the charge of absolute passivity in the face of the 
other's gaze gets eroded. However complicit the Go-Go dancer may be in the 
pomotroping at work in the scene, her involvement and activity as affirming the erotic 
dance entails that a form of agency is at work. 
This relation between the performance of dance and the agency implied when that 
performance is affirmed by the performer is the basis of what I am calling the "female 
rebuff'. It is precisely because dancing involves the possibility of agency that playful 
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resistance to an oppressive gaze is made available. Sartrean oppositional combat is 
undermined by an engaging re-framing of the situation in the direction of playful 
antiphony. Each time a woman dances for a man, the woman can always actively affirm 
the performance, and gain autonomy and a level of agency which may re-contextualise 
the situation. Admittedly, in the Go-Go bar scene, the levels of autonomy and agency 
available can hardly subvert the economic and symbolic frames at work. However, 
outside of this extreme example, the power of agency at work in the display of the female 
body in Dancehall Queen shows again that the power of vision is ambiguous. 
An example of this occurs when the photographer approaches Marcia in the club, 
bewigged and in her dancehall finery, and asks her if he can take some pictures. Marcia 
agrees and then begins to pose and twist her body suggestively to the camera. Here, I 
would argue that Marcia therefore begins to perform for the camera, rather than being 
captured within the terms of the image's potential audience. Marcia controls the display 
of her mature eroticality, and teases the cameraman and audience in the process. Between 
the camera and the displayed motile body, an erotic dialogue takes place, the ground of 
power of which remains ambiguous. Indeed, it is an effect of performance that the 
question of power itself is undermined and recast in terms of erotic play. In the 
Caribbean context, women dancing erotically often remain completely in charge of the 
operations of the male gaze at work in the dance-event. The women can tease with their 
bodies and their eyes, and make sexual suggestions with their hips and with the way in 
which they return the gaze of the other - male and female. In this way, they can 
lead the 
gaze onwards, or they can reject any unwanted advances. Far from being a context of 
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visual oppression, or an oppositional power dynamics as Sartre might suggest, the 
voluptuous motioning body of the woman becomes empowered as an agent with the 
power of choice over who she dances with and who she goes home with. 
As on the collective level of the dancehall event, whereby the performer on the stage 
becomes one node in a reciprocal and fluid affirmation of the erotic power of the 
community (within which the camera is positioned), the female rebuff shows that 
oppressive pornotroping is not the inevitable outcome of erotic display. Moreover, the 
female rebuff begins to demonstrate evidence to the contrary. The more a woman gains 
command of her body and the erotic eye-play between herself and the external other, the 
more autonomy and freedom of choice she will gain in the play that ensures. In other 
words, the more voluptuous and controlled the display, the more she can develop the 
possibilities of free agency. And again, this possibility would itself reveal an erotic power 
at work generally in the community. In the case of the dancehall queen, rebuffing 
moments of the audiences' gaze would be celebrated by all in the audience as another 
level of erotic bodily competence and carnal joy, a competence and joy made available by 
the culture and the community itself, as reflections of the values it places upon the erotic, 
dance and movement, outside of the repressive confines of power-play and capture. 
By exploring Merleau-Ponty's idea that perception always involves reversibility and 
motility, the notion that perception involves an alienating or asymmetric gap 
between the 
perceiver and the perceived is relativised. It is this key phenomenological 
insight that 
undermines the oppositional power ascribed to the gaze both in 
Fanonian and Sartrean 
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ontology and in film theory discourse. Merleau-Ponty's inside-outside view of perception 
entails that there can never be a "pure spectator" or a pure and spectacular object. Visual 
perception in fact must operate somewhere between these extremes, according to an 
antiphonal continuum of sorts. 
By analysing the film Dancehall Queen in terms of the representation of the camera, the 
audience and the performative potentiality of the individual dancing body, the relativity 
and variations between activity and passivity at work between the gaze and performance 
were displayed, again along an antiphonal continuum. At the one extreme, the Go-Go bar 
scene approximates to the classic conventional context of an oppressive male gaze 
consuming the objectified sexual contents on display. As I argued, even in this situation, 
it is arguable whether the oppression is inevitably and necessarily absolute. On the other 
extreme, the euphoric triumph of Marcia's victory over the reigning dancehall Queen 
represents the highest potentiality for a woman's erotic self-display; becoming a 
dancehall queen involves a celebration of self and a celebration of community values 
placed upon the erotic powers of women by both sexes. 
Most importantly for the purposes of the argument of this thesis, in showing that there is 
a continuum between the relatively passive and the relatively active possibilities of the 
motile dancing body, Dancehall Queen challenges the conventions of the power of the 
gaze at work unquestioned in many theoretical texts. Far from being inevitably 
pornotropic, dancing, as an affirmation of the autonomous power of the female body, can 
in fact lead to women being in touch with themselves, and with the time of tradition and 
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the possibility of a more empowered future. 
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Conclusion 
The main concern of my argument in this project has been to re-situate black diasporicity 
as a form of lived experience. Instead of a self-referential theoretical celebration of the 
value of terms such as 'hybridity' and 'interstitiality', I have sought to return diasporicity 
to its ground - in the relations between the body and its places and displacements. In this 
respect, the thesis has relied in a sustained way upon the methodological rigour of 
existential phenomenological analysis - whether of the sea, the ship, the relation between 
pain and agency, looking relations or the space of the Dancehall. In general terms, I have 
argued that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology offers rich resources for rethinking 
questions of black diasporic identity, agency and creative experience. In this respect, a 
key guiding concern has been to show how subjects are always also agents. However, I 
have gone beyond the remit of Merleau-Ponty's work to the extent that my argument is 
resolutely grounded within the concrete situation of black diasporic agents. Using the 
work of Fanon, I have shown the limitations of offering a metaphysical account of 
embodiment that does not pay adequate attention to how embodiment is shaped through 
different social forces - gender, race, class, generation, geography, education, sexuality, 
the forces of physical limitation and so on. Although Merleau-Ponty offers an account of 
consciousness, thought and knowledge that is embodied through the flesh, its deficit lies 
in the fact that he does not return embodiment to the concrete complexity of autonomous 
potentiality in the field of normative and social limitation. 
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Thus, working with, through and beyond Merleau-Ponty, I have argued that there is a 
pattern of existence and a rhythm of being which I termed rhythmic -gestural patterning. 
Rhythmic-gestural patterning is a way of disturbing the notion that identity is a logic', 
showing in its place that identity is more a form of inflection. In this way, I have 
uncovered a sense of primordial movement vibrating through the centre of black 
diasporicity that is nonetheless not essentialist. Rhythmic-gestural patterning reveals 
everyday being-in-the-world for black diasporic agents involves a chorus, a polyvocality, 
and a polyphony. Through the emphasis placed on these antiphonal forms of being, I 
have demonstrated that at the core of black existence there is a plurality similar to and yet 
beyond DuBoisian 'double-consciousness'. Plurality in identity, the 'changing same', is 
ensured as African formal structures of expression (the 'cut', songs of derision, antiphony 
and so on) were transported into the New World and modified through encounters with 
the different found cultures. This approach entails that black diasporic identity and 
cultural expressions cannot be viewed solely in terms of a relation to an anterior African 
culture, nor can they be the product of a unified history of pain and violence wrought by 
the abstract logic of white heteropatriachal capitalism. Instead, black identity is 
presented as a phonic round-dance of continuity and discontinuity, resistance and 
complicity, pain and pleasure, freedom and collective affirmation, in the face of the 
ongoing threat of existential dread and social injustice. 
In other words, I have shown that the dance of existence begins from the centre where 
there is the dance. Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the motile body can be re-interpreted as 
privileging dance as a fundamental mode of being-in-the-world. In the beginning, 
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through each here and now moment of a situation and a mood, dancing agents respond by 
inflecting, reshaping and re-patterning what they see and hear, so that dancing becomes a 
way of returning to a beginning that has already moved on, as the dancers themselves 
have moved on. Theorising black identity in terms of rhythm is a way of saying that 
identity has no centre and no essentialist core; there are just forms and pulses that get 
reinscribed and reworked as they return to themselves. Again, as we have seen, through 
the notion of polymetric rhythm, the relationship between a dancer and a drummer is 
without a centre. The drummer doesn't own the rhythm, neither does the dancer, rather, 
there is forever an absent centre or a kind of movement of rhythms between dancer and 
drummer. This relation between dancer and drummer of an absent rhythmic centre 
reminds us of how alterity is essentially inscribed within the warp and woof of black 
diasporic being. So again ambiguity is inserted into our ways of being and relating with 
others. 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology has been useful for my purpose in this thesis because 
his account of agency is essentially holistic. While all kinds of constraints are imposed 
upon us through social, culturaI7 economic and political factors, and the conditions of our 
birth, we are nonetheless capable of using our powers of self-projection to create, to 
question and to initiate change and disruption in the socio-political realm. As it should be 
clear by now, existential phenomenology does not propose that there is one field of 
action, affecting and imprinting its own will onto others, rather, in its terms, one 
field of 
action relays into another field of action which is responded to and the response will 
be 
felt yet again. This perspective has allowed me to show that within any 
historical period 
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the pattern of cause and effect and agency are much more complex and non-linear. The 
'origin' of a culture is not that point in chronological time when it began; it is rather re- 
born through each of its re- articulations. Expression is the here and now engine of 
cultural originality thought of as differential repetition. 
This analysis connects closely with Elaine Scarry's project of the redemptive power of the 
imagination in the context of extreme pain. As I have argued, it is precisely because the 
subject is aware (in a pre-conscious way) of its own bodily capacity that it actively strives 
to move beyond situations of limitation and violence. Such a theory of pre-conscious 
agency provides a model of autonomy has enabled me to hold in proper balance the 
existential condition of black pain and the capacity for creativity, joy and pleasure. Black 
diasporic experience may have been shaped by an ongoing history of affliction and 
woundedness, however, black people do not necessarily continually refer to the person or 
system that caused the pain. Pain, woundedness and affliction become a resource for 
imaginative re-working, so that the fixity of being the victim of an external situation is 
eschewed. 
In a similar way, we may concur with Dennis Patrick Slattery's work on the relationship 
between naming and woundedness. A wound (whether physical or otherwise) can be 
seen as a form of naming which negates the existence of the person named; on the other 
hand, the wound can be turned into poetry, music. Just as the knives and bullets rife 
within Jamaican ghettos are turned into a pattern of clothing in the form of slash marks or 
bullet track holes in certain Dancehall fashions, or just as limbo dancing palpably 
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demonstrates the spatial dimensions onboard the Middle Passage, so too pain does not 
have to engulf and reduce the subject into a quivering powerless inert being. I have 
shown that through various expressive means, black diasporic agents try incessantly to 
turn around oppression so that they are no longer positioned as powerless victims 
incapable of acting differently to that which is expected of them. For example, in 
Dancehall culture, the experience of social inequalities, patriarchal violence and white 
norms of beauty become a resource for Dancehall women to assert the agency of their 
bodily being. When we look at the celebration of women's erotics in Dancehall, it is 
almost as though existential pain is bracketed out and what remains is the pain itself as a 
form of energy and a dynamic of celebration. Again, when we look at other black 
diasporic expressions such as the blues, we see this bracketing of pain. The blues is 
essentially an expressive form that is about the transmutation of pain into expression. 
The blues comes from the spiritual, from the cotton field, from real physical pain and 
hard labour, and yet it becomes music, a tradition, poetry, an expression that can re- 
energise the collective so that they can reconnect to their own active capacity and agency. 
What is it at work is exactly the forms of externalising imagination and modes of 
autonomy Scarry discusses. It is the imagination that allows agents to bring into being a 
world that is not reducible to just being dominated. The idea of just being dominated is 
something that most human beings cannot easily cope with - therefore they refuse it. In 
this respect, black diasporic agents are no different from anyone else. Instead, the 
difference lies in the history, and the sea of memory that swells up every waking day. 
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At this point, re-thinking the notion of survival becomes significant. I have tried to 
suggest that through the creative work of the imagination, black diasporic agents reject 
domination and power over by yearning to survive in a different form. Using Scarry, I 
argued that survival is more about the imagination (even in extreme instances) - and not 
just about brute physical need. In the same way that the organs of our physical body are 
in fact expressive of a pre-ordained world of habits, diet and general style of being-in- 
the-world, so too our imagination reflects our world-historical situation. When our very 
existence and way of being is threatened, what takes over is not just a physical impulse to 
survive but an imaginative response to survive and adapt. Whether it is the context of 
slavery or from Scarry's tortured victim, from a certain perspective, the subject is totally 
dominated, there is no escape and therefore no way of responding. However, through 
Scarry, we see that the one realm that is left for transcendence from pain is the realm of 
the imagination. In diasporic black cultures, the history of pain has generated several 
responses. One response has been to succumb to domination and fear where its practice 
and logic gets reinscribed in modes of relating. Another has been to allow the pain to 
engulf one's being, to the point where the subject becomes numb by pain and therefore 
incapable of acting and challenging hegemonic practices in a way that calls for 
accountability and re-distribution. Both positions are certainly present in diasporic black 
cultures. However, in this thesis, I have deliberately focused on the use of oppression as 
a resource for creativity, for music and poetry in motion in the context of an ongoing 
dialogue with the host cultures and community (themselves diasporic 
by turns). Again, 
the key issue has been to highlight agency rather than subjectivity - black diasporic agents 
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may have been (and still are) on the receiving end of global white supremacy, however, 
this does not mean that they are continually and totally its victims. 
Finally, the account I have offered here is redemptive in scope. My example of 
Dancehall culture shows that even in situations of oppression, autonomous, liberating 
expression can be at work. Like oppression, redemption is never absolute. Redemption is 
wrought with ambiguity. Redemptive possibilities are always just that; momentary, 
taking place in little glimpses that can easily be missed. I am therefore not romanticising 
dancehall, rather, I am showing that although it can be read as a patriarchal space, the line 
of power is not absolute. There are little victories and moments of agency where the 
agent returns to her own corporeal schemas. The embodied capacity to act, to change the 
world, to refuse to be completely overpowered by the logic of domination means that the 
body-subject can be the beginning of a new kind of politics which demand accountability 
and reconstitution of power relations and normative ideology. In broader tenns, just as 
Richard Sennett noted that those Athenian women, hidden from history, worshipping the 
lover god, were not engaged in an explicitly political project, so too, for women in 
Dancehall culture, the corporeal rhythmic moment of redemption is more like a "cultural 
politics" in bell hooks' sense. Rather than representational politics, the project 
encountered here is more like a politics of autonomy garnered in a context that will never 
allow it to become absolute. And so freedoms are attained and powers increased amidst 
limitation, and joy rises like a dancing cloud above an ocean of pain. 
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